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M at h i j s  P e l k M a n s political, and cultural realities can be disastrous. The promo-
tion of technocratic solutions to inherently political problems 
in a volatile country such as Afghanistan has rendered many 
projects ineffective or counterproductive, as was the case of 
women’s rights initiatives that inadvertently ended up weak-
ening the position of women (Kandiyoti, p. 20). 
The contributions in this issue do not offer definitive pre-
scriptions, but by highlighting the complexities involved in 
“development” they suggest new ways of approaching the 
issue. Moreover, by documenting the work of Islamic charities 
they point out that Western or secular international NGOs are 
not the only, or even necessarily the most important, actors in 
development. Islamic charities are often more visible on the 
ground and better connected to the grassroots. This is not 
to say that they also produce “better” results: several authors 
note tensions between proselytizing and development activi-
ties (Weiss, p. 12; Utvik, p. 16) while others discuss whether Is-
lamic charities empower their recipients or entangle them in 
new forms of patronage (Harmsen, p. 10; Sparre and Petersen, 
p. 14). But the relative success of these programmes challeng-
es Western suspicions of religious development initiatives. 
In fact, in light of the West’s less-than-stellar track record in 
recent development attempts, we may question its right to 
judge the propriety of development at all. 
The front cover shows yet another type of (“post-”conflict) 
development. Rather than showcasing the work of an inter-
national NGO or Islamic charity, we chose to display a more 
mundane (and perhaps more common) form of development. 
The men in the picture have just returned to Afghanistan. 
What they are constructing is not clear yet. Perhaps it will not 
be beautiful, perhaps its shape will not conform to our expec-
tations, but it is being built with the limited means available 
to people in a conflict-ridden society. It is their attempt to cre-
ate a liveable future.
To the outsider, the paintings on the recently constructed 
“Baghdad Wall” (see back cover) may reflect a wry sort of nos-
talgia. The romantic portrayals of pre-war Baghdad offer a vis-
ual escape from the contemporary omnipresence of violence. 
Like all nostalgia it offers only a selective view on the past, 
omitting the oppression experienced during previous dec-
ades. But given the dangers and problems of current times, 
it is quite understandable that Iraqi citizens look back wist-
fully on the lives they had lived during Saddam Hussein’s rule, 
even if those lives were filled with economic difficulties and 
political tyranny (al-Ali, p. 28). One can only hope that such 
romantic visions of the past will facilitate future reconciliation 
and peace. 
However, the need for a wall between Shiites and Sunnis 
also accentuates a darker side of “dreaming.” There is a dan-
ger in allowing wishful thinking and ideological dogmatism 
to steer international politics. On top of the tremendous 
damage inflicted on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, these 
conflicts have produced situations antithetical to the visions 
which prompted foreign interventions. Afghanistan has be-
come the world’s primary producer of opium and the Taliban 
is extending its hold over large territories, while the rhetoric 
of liberation, development, and women’s rights—so busily 
touted six years ago—has shrivelled to a hollow echo. Most 
people now acknowledge that the occupation of Iraq cre-
ated a vast breeding ground for terrorist groups. Moreover, 
the intensifying sectarian violence is sucking U.S. troops into 
a multi-polar civil war that threatens to destabilize the region 
far beyond Iraq’s borders (Hiltermann, p. 26). Finally, last year’s 
July War on Lebanon seems to have produced only one obvi-
ous winner: Hizbullah’s stature was enhanced not only by its 
ability to withstand Israel’s attacks, but also by taking the lead 
in the reconstruction of key areas of Beirut (Fawaz, p. 22). In 
this context one might wonder whether this issue’s title, “Con-
flict & Development,” was inspired by hope or by cynicism. 
In the prelude to war, Western governments spoke of “de-
mocratization,” “women’s rights,” and “economic progress”—
using discourses of development to legitimize violence. It is 
therefore unsurprising that “beneficiaries” are suspicious of 
the agendas behind foreign aid. “Democracy” and “liberation” 
gain new connotations when arriving in the form of oppres-
sion, violence, and insecurity.
The political entanglements of “development” require a 
fine balance be maintained. Ganji (p. 34) criticizes the op-
pression of women by the Iranian regime and reaffirms his 
own commitment to democracy. Interestingly, in his recent 
(18 September) open letter to the UN Secretary General he 
is equally critical of U.S. politics, including its funding of de-
mocracy assistance to Iran. His critique is directed both at 
the political motives behind the financial aid and the way in 
which the assistance allowed the Iranian government to de-
nounce the activists as pawns of the U.S. While commitment 
to the ideals of “development” such as Ganji exhibits is laud-
able, naïve dreams which pay insufficient attention to social, 
The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) 
conducts and promotes interdisciplinary research on social, political, cultural, 
and intellectual trends and movements in contemporary Muslim societies and 
communities. ISIM was established in 1998 by the University of Amsterdam, 
Leiden University, Utrecht University, and Radboud University Nijmegen in 
response to a need for further research on contemporary developments of 
great social, political, and cultural importance in the Muslim world from social 
science and humanities perspectives. ISIM’s research approaches are expressly 
interdisciplinary and comparative, covering a large geographic range which 
includes North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South 
and South East Asia, and Muslim communities in the West. Broad in scope, ISIM 
brings together all areas of disciplinary expertise in anthropology, sociology, 
religious studies, political science, and cultural studies.
I S I M
Editorial
O R G A N I Z A T I O N
I S I M  R E V I E W  2 0  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 7  5
ISIM
M a r t i n  v a n  B r u i n e s s e nAid workers on the ground have be-
come increasingly aware that Islamic 
associations and agencies have often 
much better access to the people in 
need of support than their own secu-
lar counterparts. In the case of civil 
war-torn regions such as Somalia, for 
instance, there is no other way to bring 
relief to the victims then through the 
few transnational Islamic agencies still 
operating there.
The increased distrust between the 
Muslim world and the West since 9/11 
and the “war on terror” have made it in-
creasingly difficult for both Western and 
Islamic donor agencies to operate ef-
fectively in many areas. In many Muslim 
societies, the motives of Western agen-
cies are distrusted, and groups have actively opposed them. Besides the 
old suspicions that aid is a thinly veiled cover for neo-colonial economic 
penetration or for efforts to spread Christianity in Muslim lands, there is 
now also a widespread perception that aid and the “war on terror” are in-
timately connected and that Western development agencies are aiming 
to subvert Islamic movements and replace them with more acceptable 
varieties of the faith. Reports on ambitious American programmes to 
“change the very face of Islam” have strengthened these anxieties about 
Western charitable involvement in the Muslim world.1 Even at times of 
natural disasters, these anxieties have stood in the way of effective help. 
Christian charities sending relief to Aceh in the wake of the December 
2004 tsunami found that the best way to overcome the suspicions and 
have the aid reach the target population was by channelling all funds 
through the large Indonesian Muslim association, Muhammadiyah. 
The problems faced by Muslim charities are of a different nature. Most 
of their activities amount to the channelling of zakat and sadaqa funds 
to needy and deserving recipients. Since a considerable part of jihadist 
and terrorist activity in the world’s trouble spots has been funded from 
the same type of sources (and is considered as a legitimate concern 
by some donors), all international Muslim charities have come under 
scrutiny for possible involvement in terrorism. Bank accounts have been 
frozen and financial transfers blocked, causing much genuine charitable 
work to suffer. It is true that several Islamic charities have in fact chan-
nelled money to groups engaged in armed violence against perceived 
enemies of Islam, and such movements, from Hamas to Al-Qaida, can 
no doubt count on numerous voluntary contributions to its struggle. 
However, many other Islamic charities are only involved in charitable 
work in the strict sense, including relief in disaster-struck regions where 
Western agencies cannot or do not operate. Their work too has been 
seriously impeded by the “war on terror,” depriving numerous poor peo-
ple from aid. 
Prejudices against and suspicions of Islamic charities are deeply en-
trenched, and not only in the West. The uneasiness with which certain 
charities are viewed, is shared by many in the Muslim world—just like 
many Westerners object to the way certain fundamentalist Christian as-
sociations carry out charitable work. Especially those with headquarters 
in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are widely criticized for pushing 
a political agenda that serves the interests of the Saudi regime and 
of being oblivious to the basic economic needs of the poor in Muslim 
societies. Much of the enormous resources of these charities has gone 
to spread the Salafi version of Islam, to combat beliefs and practices 
considered as deviant—whether Sufi-inspired, rationalistic, or accom-
modating local traditions—and to contain the revolutionary influences 
emanating from Iran. These charities would finance mosques but not 
modern schools, provide students with 
grants to study religious subjects but 
not other sciences, and “educate” the 
masses with cheap booklets expound-
ing simple Salafi messages and a con-
spiratorial, dichotomous worldview, in 
which Islam is under attack by a coali-
tion of Crusaders, Zionists, Freemasons, 
Orientalists, and a fifth column of liberal 
Muslims. But this does not sum up their 
activities, and even less that of other Is-
lamic initiatives.
The range of Islamic associations in-
volved in various forms of aid and social 
welfare work is enormous.2 Those in-
spired by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
similar Islamist movements have been 
especially conspicuous, providing food 
and clothing to orphans and the poor, but also cheap medical services 
and education, income-generating projects, and disaster relief. Their 
professional staff and voluntary workers are usually highly educated 
(typically in such disciplines as medicine and engineering, not in reli-
gious studies) and strongly motivated. They often provide better serv-
ices than state agencies, and they are often more trusted by the poorer 
segments of the population than either the state or secular NGOs. They 
differ from the latter in that to them the charitable work is a form of 
da‘wa, missionary effort, and part of a broader struggle to achieve a 
more Islamic (and therefore more just) society. Some of them, moreo-
ver, may represent ideological positions and political strategies—nota-
bly the use of violence—that Western governments find objectionable. 
There have also been doubts about their commitment to democracy 
and human rights, especially where religious minorities are concerned. 
Critics have wondered to what extent their activities empower the re-
cipients or simply make them dependent on patronage. 
These are valid and legitimate concerns, and many in the West would 
reject the possibility of meaningful co-operation with Islamic welfare 
associations out of hand. Yet most of these concerns are not specific 
to Islam and are familiar from the experience with development asso-
ciations of different ideological orientations, e.g. those associated with 
liberation movements, and the dilemma of patronage versus empower-
ment is well-known in the history of Western aid. Workers in the field 
have often tended to take a more pragmatic view and perceive that 
there is an area of shared interest, in which co-ordination and co-op-
eration with Islamic counterparts are quite possible and perhaps even 
desirable—if only because in certain contexts the Islamic associations 
can deliver where others cannot. In the current world environment, 
Islamic charities and welfare associations have 
become major actors that need to be taken seri-
ously. It is important to recognize that they are not 
all the same, nor are they unchanging. There has 
been much reflection on development issues and, 
like in Christian charities, there have been efforts 
to move beyond the distribution of alms to more 
“structural” approaches. A dispassionate look at 
these charities and welfare associations may sug-
gest that, in spite of all reservations, here lies one 
of the most promising prospects of a meaningful 
engagement with the Muslim world.
There was a time when Western relief and 
development agencies working in Muslim-
majority countries would, as a matter of 
course, choose secular or non-Muslim NGOs 
as their local partners (or, not infrequently, 
help in establishing such NGOs to be their 
counterparts). Even where there were Islamic 
organizations, often much better connected 
at the grassroots level than the secular actors, 
these were generally not perceived as proper 
NGOs and distrusted because of their religious 
nature and unfamiliar agendas. During the 
past decades, however, the number and range 
of activities of Islamic associations involved 
in charity, relief, and the empowerment of 
underprivileged groups have dramatically 
increased; they can no longer be ignored.
Martin van Bruinessen holds the ISIM Chair at Utrecht University.
Development & 
islamic Charities 
Notes
1. See David E. Kaplan’s report on the White 
House’s well-funded Muslim World Outreach: 
“Hearts, Minds, and Dollars: In an Unseen 
Front in the War on Terrorism, America is 
Spending Millions ...To Change the Very Face 
of Islam,” US News and World Report, 5 April 
2005, at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
news/articles/050425/25roots.htm.
2. A serious overview is: Jonathan Benthall 
and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable 
Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World 
(London: I.B.Tauris, 2003).
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Islamic charity already has a bad image 
in much of the non-Muslim world, even 
among the generally well informed. 
Certainly during the 1980s Afghan 
conflict and the early 1990s Bosnian 
conflict, a number of Islamic charities, 
especially those founded in the petro-
dollar states, engaged in activities that 
pursued a mixture of humanitarian, 
religious, political, and sometimes mili-
tary aims. It is less often remembered 
that the United States government 
actively supported the mujahidin in 
Afghanistan until 1989, and closed its 
eyes to some arms shipments to their 
successors in Bosnia, until in both cases the honourable “combatant” 
was transformed into the hostile “terrorist.” As regards the years imme-
diately preceding 9/11, evidence of support by some Islamic charity 
managers for the Chechen mujahidin is fairly strong. Direct support for 
Al-Qaida type activities by charities as such has been strongly suspect-
ed by the U.S. authorities, but seldom, if ever, proved to the standard 
required by Western criminal courts. As regards the period since 9/11, 
evidence of the activities of controversial Islamic 
charities is equivocal as to mixed aims, and always 
needs to be treated with caution because of the 
risk of observer bias.
Charities are always vulnerable to abuse be-
cause they rely on trust. Moreover, many Muslims 
involved with charity still subscribe to a “seam-
less” view of jihad, according to which humanitar-
ian, religious, political, and even military aims are 
fused. Their defence—in which there is more than 
a grain of truth—is that the Western devotion to a 
pure domain of charitable altruism is hypocritical. 
For the Western aid system is deeply connected 
to national foreign policies and security concerns: 
humanitarian action often provides a fig-leaf for 
military intervention, Christian missions proselyt-
ize in many parts of the world, some unfortunate 
populations are reduced to “exporting” images 
of their misery through the Western-controlled 
media and thus becoming aid economies—and 
so on. In any case, a strong tradition may also be 
identified within Islam that admires and enjoins 
selfless charitable giving for the benefit of the dis-
advantaged. Moreover, a general trend is observ-
able among Islamic charities towards accepting that the charitable sec-
tor ought to accept strict disciplines in return for the privileges that it 
enjoys, which include tax exemptions and the relatively free mobility of 
both funds and employees. Yet politically sophisticated Muslims won-
der whether the present U.S. and Israel administrations actually want 
to allow a healthy Islamic charitable sector to realize its potential.
The rise of Islamic NGOs is the result of a confluence of two historical 
movements both of which date back to the 1970s. One was the rise 
of NGOs in general. The second was the Islamic resurgence, which we 
may trace back to the time of the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967. Islamic 
charities all have a family resemblance: for instance in their drawing 
on the potent religious idioms of zakat 
(mandatory alms) and waqf (the Is-
lamic charitable foundation), in their 
references to the religious calendar 
and quotations from the Quran and 
Hadith, and in their special concern for 
orphans and refugees.
The association of Islamic charities 
with transnational mujahidin, despite 
its wide geographical spread, will 
probably be looked back on as a short-
lived historical episode. Of course, vio-
lent movements will continue to find 
ways in the future to equip themselves 
with weapons. But the charity sector is 
under increasing scrutiny by watchdog organizations such as the in-
ternational Financial Action Task Force (FATF), by national regulators, 
and by banking compliance officers. Many alternative channels exist 
whereby clandestine funds may be transferred: trade, tourism, labour 
migration, hawala, cash couriers, and bank remittances between indi-
vidual account holders. The attack on Islamic charities since 9/11 has 
had the unintended consequence of driving money underground 
where regulators have no control over it.
Dubious scholarship
One manifestation of this overreaction is the growth of a new disci-
pline, counter-terrorist studies. Anyone who travels by air or train must 
be grateful that police and counter-terrorist professionals are continu-
ously trying to protect us by piecing together networks of suspicious 
activity through analysis of financial transfers, personal meetings, elec-
tronic communications and the like. This is a sad sign of the times. But 
is it necessary to dignify the publication of such analysis, fortified by 
extracts from heavily biased intelligence websites, with the authority 
of major university presses?1 Such books disrespect the normal re-
quirement that serious social researchers should check their informa-
tion from different sources, make allowances for their own prejudices 
and those of informants, and situate their findings in a broad political 
context. Two recently published books of this kind on Islamic charities 
allow no voice whatever to the charity workers themselves or their 
beneficiaries. Smearing of a bona fide charity’s reputation can seriously 
wrong its trustees and staff, and destroy their ability to help the people 
for whom it was set up.
Dubious scholarship of this kind also supplies the expert testimony 
to support the U.S. government’s assault on Islamic charities through 
the law. Whereas in Britain a number of Islamic charities operate suc-
cessfully under the regulation of the Charity Commission, virtually all 
major Islamic charities in the United States have been closed down. 
Some of these cases are the subject of civil and criminal trials still in 
process, and it would be premature to comment here. (Likewise, one 
British Islamic charity set up to bring aid to Palestinians, Interpal, has 
been designated as a terrorist entity by the U.S. government. Though 
highly regarded by most aid professionals in Britain and already twice 
cleared of wrongdoing by the Charity Commission, it is currently being 
reinvestigated by the Commission.) However, it is hard not to see the 
way the U.S. government treats Islamic charities in general as of a piece 
with two other blots on the reputation of the most legalistic country in 
the world: Guantánamo and extraordinary rendition.
The title of this article may be tempting fate. 
The British counter-terrorist services have 
reported that the financial trail leading to the 
7 July 2005 attacks on London included direct 
or indirect links to eight unspecified charities. 
A single major terrorist outrage anywhere in 
the world, clearly funded through abuse of an 
established Muslim charity, would decisively 
blacken the reputation of the whole sector. 
However, from the evidence available at the 
time of writing, one of the repercussions of 
9/11 has been hyper scrutinization of Islamic 
charities by the United States government that 
uncomfortably recalls the McCarthy period.
j o n at h a n  B e n t h a l l
Muslim NGOs
the overreaction 
against islamic 
Charities
The attack on 
Islamic charities 
since 9/11 has had 
the unintended 
consequence of 
driving money 
underground.
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in the world (widely respected even in the USA) is able to channel the 
generosity of Muslim donors into worthwhile aid programmes, and 
also benefits from a certain degree of special access in majority Mus-
lim communities. I have been able to verify this by observing Islamic 
Relief’s development work in a remote district of northern Mali, where 
the Tuareg local coordinator and an all-Malian staff have established 
an impressive rapport in their mission to help the most vulnerable. It is 
well established that international Christian NGOs can work effectively 
in Christian parts of Africa through local church networks, and there is 
surely considerable potential for international Islamic charities to work 
in a similar way among Muslims.
Moreover, back in Britain, Islamic Relief offers an excellent example of 
practical integration with the mainstream non-Muslim aid and develop-
ment agencies. This has been called “dialogue on the ground.” Islamic 
Relief has also launched an ambitious project called the Humanitarian 
Forum, which sets out to build bridges between different humanitarian 
cultures. Obviously there is a considerable difference between a British 
charity—Muslim or other—and, say, a Saudi charity: for instance, on is-
sues relating to gender. However, politicians and diplomats should not 
fall back on the easier option of talking only with people who already 
agree with them. This is the trap into which fall too many well-meaning 
organizers of conferences devoted to dialogue and toleration.
Because of political turbulence, the immediate outlook for projects 
such as the Montreux Initiative and the Humanitarian Forum is not 
unclouded. It is significant that even in Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait, with 
all their wealth derived from oil, private charities are now tightly re-
stricted in sending funds overseas for relief aid—apparently because 
of fear of contravening U.S. foreign policy. All charities have difficulty in 
remitting funds to the Palestinian Territories through the banking sys-
tem. However, if we look further ahead it is clear both that faith-based 
organizations in general are gaining more attention in development 
circles, because of their access to vast civil society networks, and that 
private philanthropy is becoming a recognized adjunct to the interna-
tional aid system. There is no good reason why Islamic charities should 
not play a valuable role, not only at the local and national level, but also 
in due course on a par with the major international NGOs—which are 
likely to be so important to our future as a counterbalance to the power 
of nation-states and multi-national corporations.
Take the case of the refusal of the USA to grant a visa to Tariq 
Ramadan, the well-known Swiss Muslim intellectual. The root 
of the problem may be that he is regarded in some circles as 
a radical. However, he has consistently condemned terror-
ism and is accepted as an interlocutor by many prestigious 
academic institutions, and as an important voice for mod-
eration by some political leaders. The grounds for excluding 
him from the USA seem skimpy. He was refused a non-im-
migrant visa in September 2006 by the American consulate 
in Bern, on the grounds that he had made donations to a 
Swiss charity set up to help Palestinians, the Association de 
Secours Palestinien (ASP). These donations, amounting only 
to some 1,700 Swiss francs in all, were made between 1998 
and 2002, whereas it was not until August 2003 that the 
U.S. Treasury designated ASP as terrorist entity. The govern-
ment’s position is that Ramadan ought to have known that 
it was a terrorist entity.
Strengths of Islamic NGOs
Under Swiss law, ASP was operating, and is still permitted 
to operate today, as a charitable organization, which Ram-
adan says he had no reason to suspect in any way. The U.S. 
government’s assumption in black-listing it, unsupported by 
evidence, seems to have been that ASP was supplying material support 
to Hamas; and this raises a vital legal point. The USA regards Hamas 
as an indivisible entity. It would seem to ignore evidence which sug-
gests that, if ASP was sending funds to zakat committees and similar 
organizations in the Palestinian Territories, these were, in turn, distrib-
uting funds in the normal way of charities: on the basis of need. All 
these charities are regulated by the Palestinian Authority, and the zakat 
committees in particular by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Survey 
evidence suggests that they enjoy a high degree of popular trust and 
approval, being run with minimal administrative costs and having unri-
valled grass-roots knowledge about the needs of the most vulnerable.
But even supplying funds to a zakat committee for life-saving medi-
cal technology, or emergency food aid, is considered equivalent to an 
act of terrorism by the U.S. government, if it is satisfied that there is a 
personal connection of some kind with Hamas. This seems a strange 
position. Many observers infer that, unwilling to appreciate the distinc-
tion between a nationalist movement and internationalist extremism 
of the Al-Qaida type, the U.S. government is determined to impose a 
kind of martial law extending even to efforts to alleviate the miseries 
of Palestinian non-combatants. But America boasts a strong tradition 
of civil rights advocacy, which is providing a legal counterbalance. The 
mainstream American non-Muslim charities initially failed to react to 
the closing down of most of the big American Muslim charities after 
9/11, but are now realizing that the steps taken against the latter have 
implications for the whole charitable sector.
It seems likely that the scapegoating of Islamic charities originates 
from a very high level in the U.S. administration, and will not contin-
ue forever. Islamic charities in many countries, though sceptical as to 
whether any actions they take will change the American political posi-
tion, are coming to accept that they have much to gain from improving 
their standards of professionalism and accountability. The Montreux 
Initiative, a project sponsored by the Swiss government in 2005 but 
carried forward by Muslim as well as non-Muslim experts, is attempting 
to help bona fide Islamic charities dissolve the obstacles facing them. 
The solution proposed is voluntary self-regulation at the technical 
level, overseen by a board of eminent persons acceptable to all par-
ties. Involvement in this process makes it more likely that such chari-
ties will move towards embracing principles such as transparency and 
non-discrimination when they have not done so already. The Montreux 
Initiative does not, however, suggest that those Islamic charities which 
combine religious with humanitarian aims should be disqualified for 
that reason from admission to collegial relations with the international 
aid community, any more than Christian evangelical charities such as 
World Vision or Tearfund should be so excluded. With so much suffer-
ing and distress in Muslim countries it is inevitable that Islamic charities 
should focus on alleviating it. However, widely accepted international 
codes of conduct insist that, within a given community of aid benefici-
aries, there should be no discrimination in favour of co-religionists.
A successful organization such as Islamic Relief Worldwide, founded 
in Birmingham, England, in 1984 and now the largest Islamic charity 
An Islamic 
charity delivers 
relief to 
flood victims 
in Matuail, 
Bangladesh. 
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There has been quite a flow of euros 
and dollars earmarked for non-gov-
ernmental organizations south of the 
Mediterranean over the past decade 
and a half, and many hundreds of coop-
erative ventures between Atlantic and 
Arab NGOs.1 Apart from the eye-catch-
ing example of the shared humanitar-
ian mission of the Red Cross / Red Cres-
cent Societies and the work of some 
ecumenical missions in the Holy Land, 
however, the large number of Islamic 
charities and think-tanks seem conspicuously absent from Western-
funded activities. Even before September 11 very rarely did religiously 
oriented Muslim organizations access international monies available 
for what donors call civil society organizations in the Arab world, al-
though Islamic NGOs provided medical care, education, welfare, emer-
gency relief, intellectual outlets, and other services throughout the 
region. With remarkably few exceptions, the overall pattern persisted 
into the twenty first century: among the many Arab NGOs that rely on 
foreign funding for at least some of their projects, few are grounded in 
Islam; and among the even larger number of Arab associations that are 
Islamic in their orientation, the proportion getting Western assistance 
for any of their programmes seems low.2 Why is this? Are the two kinds 
of humanitarian organizations so much at cross purposes that they can-
not cooperate, or are there institutional and po-
litical barriers as well? Here I speculate on several 
alternative explanations, or hypotheses, suggest-
ing, respectively, that donor prejudices, Arab or 
Islamist biases, hurdles imposed by Arab govern-
ments, institutional incompatibility between in-
ternational agencies and grassroots movements, 
alternative sources of hard currency for Muslim 
organizations, and/or restrictions imposed by the 
“war on terror” may discourage Islamic-Northern 
humanitarian liaisons. 
A clash of ideologies
First, perhaps Orientalist preconceptions and 
essentialist stereotypes are at work. One plausible 
hypothesis is that Western institutions are averse 
to associate with Islamic associations, even in the 
provision of welfare or emergency assistance; and, 
conversely, that donors seek like-minded part-
ners. After all, public opinion in Europe and the 
United States tends to take a dim view of Islam in 
general and (to the extent that the distinction is 
recognized) the Islamist movement in particular. 
Faith-based or values-driven Western NGOs, char-
ities, and development contractors, especially 
institutions with Christian or Christian democrat 
orientations, groups with Jewish constituencies, 
secular humanists, and feminists may refuse to collaborate with part-
ners whose values are or are assumed to be anathema to their own 
moral vocation. Short of pervasive Islamophobia, even a few naysayers 
among the staff, board of directors, or donor base of some agencies 
could be enough to dissuade the group from cooperating with Islam-
ists, or, indeed, any Muslim NGO on ethical grounds. European or North 
American women’s organizations whose undertaking is to fortify femi-
nine participation or rights protection in the public sphere might es-
chew solidarity with interlocutors whose central mission is to promote 
family welfare in the private sphere, even where the two sets of goals 
overlap in mother-child health care. Or Northern NGOs might consider 
embrace of family planning a litmus test for cooperation, or focus on 
campaigns against genital cutting or honour killings that define Islam 
as the culprit. Organizations dedicated specifically to serving Muslims 
may be disqualified by some secular Northern institutions on the nor-
mative grounds that services should be 
nonsectarian, while religiously orient-
ed humanitarian organizations based 
in Europe or North America may have 
traditionally worked in Latin America 
and Africa through churches and Chris-
tian charities. It is not surprising, for 
instance, that among Egypt’s many 
religious charities, the Coptic Evan-
gelical Organization for Social Services 
(CEOSS) and the Upper Egyptian Chris-
tian Association have historically been 
favoured by European and American over their Muslim counterparts. 
Ideological favouritism for “peace camp” Palestinians, capitalist solu-
tions, or buzz-words like civic, women’s, or human rights may further 
narrow eligibility by Islamic and popular organizations.
Self-righteous indignation cuts both ways, of course, along with 
demonization of the binary “other.” The second possibility is that 
Arab Islamist groups (or, for that matter, on the opposite end of the 
spectrum, progressive Arab organizations) might demure from as-
sociation with Western philanthropies and aid brokers on ideologi-
cal grounds of their own. Within the Muslim Middle East, the issue 
of foreign funding is divisive. Controversies rage about the ethics of 
“accepting dollars and euros,” and accusations are sometimes hurled 
at the liberal NGOs most dependent on external financing that they 
are stooges of Euro-American imperialism. Arab Islamist NGOs that 
define themselves in terms of the community of Muslims and indig-
enous cultural authenticity (or any group espousing the rights of the 
Palestinians, opposing the war in Iraq, or objecting to Crusaders and 
colonialists) might well be wary of the strings attached to collabo-
ration. Some activists find the ample quantities of technical advice 
and values training that accompany modest financial subsidies more 
vacuous than repugnant. Although by no means do all Arab NGOs 
decline, or even debate, foreign financing, plenty do, and nativism 
and Occidentalism run deepest among the neo-conservative Islam-
ist movement. Some West-baiting Islamist ideologues may be captive 
of their own xenophobic posturing against governments and organi-
zations that benefit from foreign largess, while others categorically 
reject secular humanism, Christian missionaries, feminist agendas, or 
Western hegemonic discourses. Some simply believe Muslims must 
help themselves, or rely on other Muslims. As among Northern associ-
ations, again even a vocal minority insisting it is simply wrong to part-
ner with the devil can squelch prospects for alliance. On both sides, 
it seems to me, some objections are simply obstreperous, whereas 
others are more substantive. 
Corporatist politics
The barriers to Western organizations’ cooperation with Islamic chari-
table NGOs may not be entirely, or even mainly, about a clash of ideolo-
gies, however. A third hypothesis is that Arab governments stymie such 
partnerships with bureaucratic red tape. The rulers of Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, and the Palestinian Authority all jeal-
ously guard access to the international donor monies that are their life-
blood through Byzantine regulations and a practice known as “corporat-
ism” whereby the state centralizes administration of associational life. 
Charities are required to register, often with a Ministry of Social Affairs, 
and often in a way that limits the range and scope of their programmes 
and fundraising activities. In addition, the Ministry or a National Con-
federation of some sort positions itself as an intermediary between in-
ternational aid agencies and local NGOs and attempts to capture the 
disbursement of foreign donations. Egypt’s corporatist strategies for 
monopolizing access to donor funds and at the same time outlawing 
activities connected to the Muslim Brotherhood are notoriously odi-
ous. Observers in Cairo and throughout the southern Mediterranean 
have described how governments create what are known as “clones” or 
GO-NGOs (government-organized non-governmental organizations, 
or the variant, RO-NGOs for royally-organized NGOs in Jordan and Mo-
This article analyzes the multiple reasons 
that underlie the lack of cooperation between 
Western development organizations and 
Muslim NGOs. The author argues that there 
is no singular cause for this state of affairs. 
Instead she demonstrates how existing 
biases and prejudices, government-imposed 
obstacles, institutional incompatibilities, and 
burgeoning distrust mutually reinforce the 
unlikelihood that Western-Islamic humanitarian 
cooperation will gain ground.
sleeping with the Devil?
s h e i l a  C a r a P i C o
Muslim NGOs
Perhaps explaining 
the null set of 
Western-Islamic 
humanitarian 
cooperation is like 
analyzing why 
strange bedfellows 
do not mate.
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Suspected 
of terrorist 
links, this 
Islamic charity 
in Karachi is 
forced to close. 
Suspicions about elements of this transnational philanthropic network 
form the basis of a sixth hypothesis: that in prosecuting the “war on 
terror” and freezing channels of “terrorist financing” the United States 
and its allies have found ways to block flows of funds to any kind of Is-
lamic charity and warn organizations based in the North Atlantic away 
from even indirect contact with them. Gifts to alleviate Palestinian and 
southern Lebanese Shia refugees’ suffering seem to be mixed up with 
funding for Hamas and Hizbullah, and by the same logic many Islamic 
charities are somehow linked to a transnational Al-Qaida network. 
Osama bin Laden himself was quite the philanthropist in his day, after 
all. Thanks to massive U.S. efforts, the banking transactions or accounts 
of some Islamic charities have been jammed, others are under investi-
gation, and all are tainted by some level of suspicion. This is bound to 
have a chilling effect on international donations to Arab, and especially 
Muslim, charities. Fear of being discovered in any partnership tainted 
by an affiliation deemed to be sympathetic to Islamist militants could 
likewise affect the thinking of European and North American founda-
tions, aid agencies, and development professionals about whether 
and how to liaise with faith-based organizations in the Muslim world. 
Perhaps, even, the many professional development and humanitarian 
organization staff working in Arab countries who had recognized and 
studied steps to alleviating the clearly anti-Islamic bias in their funding 
patterns before the turn of the millennium will have put those plans on 
hold for fear of being caught up in the dragnet. This brings us nearly full 
circle. There’s an element of naked Islam-bashing in the war on terror, 
to be sure, yet by the same token, like all conspiracy theories, including 
Arab perceptions of a Western war on Muslim institutions, it draws on 
at least some empirical evidence. 
The gap between the good scholarship on Islamic associations and 
the equally large body of research on donor financing of NGOs in the 
Arab world is itself evidence of the scarcity of examples of both. Per-
haps explaining the null set of Western-Islamic humanitarian coopera-
tion is like analyzing why strange bedfellows do 
not mate. Most likely, different but mutually rein-
forcing ideological, institutional, and geo-political 
factors operate in various local and national con-
texts, amidst fluctuations and swirls of globally 
travelling anxieties and preoccupations, until the 
very idea of misogynist ventures becomes virtu-
ally unimaginable, or terribly risqué. 
rocco) in order to appropriate donor funds earmarked for 
NGOs and, just as importantly, to represent their countries 
at international NGO conferences. Since the principle rivals 
to ruling establishments across the Arab world come from 
the Islamist current, it is not improbable that governments 
reroute donor funds to their own acolytes. 
Alternately, perhaps transnational organizations’ own bu-
reaucratic procedures favour certain kinds of counterparts. 
Large transnational funding agencies’ intricate guidelines 
for book-keeping, the legal liability of boards of directors, 
the submission of bids or proposals, the credentials of those 
offering the service, and other matters might not pose im-
pediments to the large urban Islamic NGOs of the twenty 
first century but certainly did rule out partnership for many 
loosely-run groups in Yemen, Palestine, and rural villages 
elsewhere as late as the nineteen nineties. For all the osten-
sible effort in assisting the downtrodden, a requirement for 
Excel spreadsheets can put foreign finance out of the reach 
of barefoot or ad-hoc community self-help even today. It is 
not only that international donors’ favourite Egyptian part-
ner, CEOSS, was a Coptic charity, this hypothesis suggests, 
but also that it was a professionally-run organization with a 
full-time accountant, a good filing system, and a staff fluent 
in English and French. Arab NGOs that successfully compete for grants 
and contracts from complex transnational organizations most closely 
approximate the form, substance, institutional culture, and business 
attire of their patrons. Different organizations may not match the defi-
nitions of “NGO” or “women’s group” established by administrators in 
Brussels, Amsterdam, Washington, or New York; registering with the 
United Nations to attend international conferences is no mean feat, 
for instance. Indeed, there are plenty of times when European, North 
American, and UN agencies sponsor new NGOs with complimentary 
organizational structure, accountancy methods, and declarations of 
purpose rather than deal with existing potential partners’ idiosyncra-
sies. In some instances, this counter-corporatist policy is explicitly de-
signed to get around Arab or Israeli government restrictions, whereas 
in others it is an administrative directive. “Donor-organized” NGOs, in-
cluding franchises of Western-based organizations and self-standing 
local enterprises, are dubbed DO-NGOs, and occasionally BYO-NGOs 
for “bring-your-own-NGO.” (The popular press in both Arabic and 
English sometimes calls them “fronts.”) Under this hypothesis it is not 
outside the realm of possibility that international donors and develop-
ment brokers would clone Islamic counterparts to replicate their own 
structures and procedures. 
Transnational financial networks
In addition to ideology and bureaucratic corporatism, there are at 
least two other possible explanations for a disjuncture between West-
ern and Muslim humanitarian and welfare projects. The fifth hypoth-
esis is that Muslim NGOs, whether welfare societies, private charities, 
or think-tanks, do not really need dollars and euros because alterna-
tive sources of philanthropy for Arab and Islamic causes are available 
in riyals. Specifically, both public coffers and private financiers in the 
oil-rich Persian Gulf region have supported Islamic hospitals, schools, 
and charities in the more poverty-stricken and war-ravaged parts of 
the Arab region. The Saudi and sometimes the Iranian government 
bank-rolled mosque construction across the region and the globe, and 
all the Arab kingdoms of the Gulf have generous official aid packages 
with a strong welfare component (and, probably, by the logic of hy-
pothesis 4, above, their own ideological and organizational criteria for 
partnership). Individual millionaires in the Gulf, including Gulf princes, 
princesses, and citizens as well as expatriate Arab migrants, presum-
ably tithe a portion of their fortunes to needy Muslims. Migrants in the 
West also send remittances to mosque-based associations back home. 
Individuals and families have established charitable foundations. Small 
and large personal contributions peak in Ramadan; massive fundrais-
ing drives are held at moments of greatest catastrophe, as when bombs 
are pummelling Lebanese slums or bulldozers demolishing Palestinian 
homes, or during the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is almost con-
descending to add that the Arab Muslim world has a rich tradition of 
philanthropic giving in the form of waqf foundations, zakat tithes, and 
sadaqa donations, and that beneficent impulses are equally common 
among Muslims, Christians, and Jews. 
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The role of Islamic voluntary welfare as-
sociations providing services to subal-
tern groups such as the poor, orphans, 
widows, and disabled is—in academic as 
well as media discourse and debates—
often emphasized in the frame of politi-
cal trends of Islamic revival occurring in 
the Arab world. Political scientist Sami 
Zubaida regards such associations as 
instruments of an effort of religious and 
moral colonization of underprivileged 
segments of Muslim societies employed 
by Islamist movements.1 His colleague Janine Clark, on the other 
hand, attributes much greater significance to the function of these 
associations in fostering cooperative ties among actual as well as 
potential Islamists from the middle classes.2 What Zubaida and Clark 
have in common, however, is an emphasis on the instrumental func-
tion of Islamic associations in the service of Islamist movements. The 
degree to which voluntary associations affiliated to political Islam 
may contribute to the empowerment of subaltern groups is hardly 
mentioned by them. Analyzing the role of Muslim NGOs in terms of 
the empowerment of the underprivileged, this article takes a closer 
look at this matter.
Voluntary welfare activism
The Muslim Brotherhood is by far the most prominent formally or-
ganized Islamist movement in Jordan. Unlike in Egypt or Syria, the Mus-
lim Brothers are officially recognized by the Jordanian state and may, 
to a certain extent, undertake religious, social, and political activities 
openly and legally. Establishing voluntary associations that deal with 
the daily problems of the underprivileged segments of the society is an 
important strategy to spread Islamist ideology and influence in society. 
Jordanian legislation knows, however, many restrictions preventing 
such service-providing NGOs from playing too overt an oppositional 
role in the public sphere. Transgressions of these regulations may result 
in the arrest and imprisonment of NGO members as well as in the disso-
lution of the NGO in question.3 This makes it impossible for these asso-
ciations to mobilize subaltern groups into political struggle in order to 
improve their lot. Below, the example of an Islamist welfare institution 
serving orphans and their families will be given to discuss the question 
whether its activities are still contributing to the empowerment of sub-
altern groups, and if so, how. 
The Islamist welfare institution in ques-
tion is a centre for the poor and or-
phaned in Al-Hussein, the Palestinian 
refugee camp in Amman that I regularly 
visited in 2003. It belongs to the Islamic 
Centre Charity Society, the biggest 
Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated NGO in 
Jordan. This Society runs many such 
centres, in addition to medical centres, 
hospitals, schools, and even some in-
stitutions of higher education, all over 
the country. The centre gives financial 
and in-kind assistance to so-called orphan families, i.e. fatherless and 
mostly single-parent families that lack a regular income-provider. The 
centre offers educational, social, and cultural activities to the same tar-
get groups. 
The dependency relationship between workers of the centre and the 
target group was underlined during my observations of the distribu-
tions of financial and in-kind aid. The mothers of the orphan families 
had to wait patiently and quietly in rows in a hall until they were called 
upon to receive their modest benefits. This was obviously not an ex-
ample of self-organization by the underprivileged fighting for their 
own rights. Rather, this was a welfare initiative established and imple-
mented by Muslims from the middle class delivering services to the 
needy. The centre receives the sources of financial and in-kind assist-
ance mostly from local individual donors and sometimes from donors 
in the Arab Gulf States.
Many of the ethical messages in folders, brochures, and pamphlets 
are addressed to potential donors and supporters. The latter are called 
upon to give selflessly to the poor and orphans fi sabilillah, for the sake 
of God. Fulfilling this duty is supposed to counter one’s greed and ego-
ism, to have a morally purifying effect, and to enhance chances for 
divine reward in the afterlife. The poor recipients, in turn, are told to 
find inner peace in God by being thankful for that which He provides 
them, and by cultivating a patient attitude in life. In specific terms, this 
entails countering their greed and jealousy vis-à-vis the better off. The 
perfectly just Islamic society is supposed to be realized through a pious 
mentality or attitude of all the believers, regardless of rank, status, or 
wealth. Such an attitude has to be translated into honest, selfless, and 
helpful behaviour. 
This orientation on duty is also reflected in the way the centre uses its 
financial and in-kind assistance as a means of pressuring the orphans 
and their mothers to participate in its educative and cultural 
programme. Religious ideology, in my experience, plays a 
central part in these educational efforts. 
During a language class for orphan boys that I attended, for 
instance, only religious material was used. Among this mate-
rial was a poem about the life of the prophet Muhammad. The 
teacher drew a parallel between levels of aggression against 
the Prophet and his first followers in Mecca and the present 
situation, during which Muslims were once again humili-
ated and threatened by others, especially the United States 
and “the Jews.” The message was that Muslims had to regain 
power by restoring their mutual solidarity as a community of 
believers with its common faith in God and in His revelation. 
Similar political messages were expressed in a satirical play 
that the orphan girls at the centre were staging. In this play, 
they mock Arab rulers who betray their own people by col-
laborating with the Americans and the Israelis. At that occa-
sion, the orphan girls and the centre’s women workers also 
sang a song about Eid al-Fitr, the feast which concludes Ram-
adan. A message of social solidarity as well as protest is clearly 
Do Islamic charities empower their 
beneficiaries or rather induce new forms of 
paternalism? The author argues that these 
options are not mutually exclusive. Dissecting 
the ideals and practices of Islamic charities 
in Jordan, he shows that empowerment and 
paternalism should be understood in their 
socially and ideologically informed contexts. 
While blind pursuance of self-interest is 
discouraged, the goals of improving society 
may have empowering implications.
Between empowerment 
& Paternalism
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discernable in the song. It deals with the fate of an orphan family that is 
economically unable to celebrate while wealthier people celebrate the 
feast in luxury. 
Interviews with workers as well as orphans reveal that reading and re-
citing the Quran and the Hadith, and following the behavioural injunc-
tions contained within both sources, play a central role in the activities 
and group discussions at the centre. Duties and responsibilities in the 
field of rituals, civilized and pious eating habits, ways of communication 
and modest dress, especially in the case of women, and the duty of older 
children to take care of smaller ones and of children in general to respect 
and obey the elderly or their older siblings are stressed. 
In the view of the workers of this centre, religious duty is clearly con-
nected to change and empowerment. Conversations with the orphan 
girls reveal that they understood the Islamic injunctions in terms of no-
tions of dignity, taking one’s responsibility, and developing and utilizing 
one’s capabilities for the sake of beneficial purposes. There is a strong 
emphasis, for instance, on the importance of knowledge and education 
and high school achievements. The centre also tries to tutor orphan chil-
dren in their homework for school. It emphasizes the value of work as a 
means of self-sustenance, and tries to obtain jobs for the older orphan 
boys by using its social networks. Furthermore, it offers the older orphan 
girls and their mothers training and some income in a sewing workshop 
and a bakery. 
This example shows a blending of a paternalistic approach toward cli-
ents with certain ideas related to empowerment. Such empowerment, 
however, is here derived from a vision emphasizing duty toward God and 
toward the development of a strong and harmonious Islamic society. 
Islamic piety and development
Other Muslim welfare NGOs that I visited and even some other centres 
of the Islamic Centre Charity Society are more obviously willing or able 
to cooperate with global and Western development actors, including 
non-Muslim ones. Such NGOs usually base their philosophy and practice 
of empowerment on global human, women’s, and children’s rights dis-
courses that are enshrined in international treaties. Such an orientation 
is not necessarily at odds with a devotedly religious attitude, however. 
An Islamic women’s association in a poor suburb in the industrial city of 
Zarqa’, for instance, is working for the empowerment of school-dropout 
girls and their mothers from broken and socially weak families. Meth-
ods used by this association are literacy courses, a creative handicraft 
project, confidential discussions of personal and social affairs, and rec-
reational outings. It is led by a woman who is also working as a religious 
teacher and social worker in a mosque. She wears orthodox Islamic 
dress, including the niqab or full veil. She was, at the same time, trained 
by Questscope, a British development organization supporting projects 
for “children at risk.” In the name of the Islamic concept of karama or dig-
nity, this association endeavours to enhance the self-esteem of the girls 
and their mothers, and to counter traditional habits that discriminate 
against females regarding their social and educational opportunities. 
Here we have a clear example of a process of hybridization between 
the discourse of Islamic piety and a modern and global development 
approach as promoted by Questscope. 
Another example is the Al-Aqsa Association led by Nawal al-Fauri. 
She is an Islamist activist for women’s and children’s rights who left the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s out of frustration with the conserva-
tive and patriarchal attitudes among the organization’s leadership. 
The Islamic message means for her that one should adopt a positive, 
friendly, and constructive attitude toward outsiders, including non-
Muslims, and look for beneficial cooperation with them. With the sup-
port of several Western embassies, her association has implemented 
micro-credit projects enabling needy women to set up agricultural and 
stockbreeding farms. In the name of the Islamic message, the associa-
tion carries out awareness raising activities for underprivileged women 
on social, cultural, and political issues, including gender. Again in the 
name of Islam, Al-Fauri stresses that women have a right to participate 
in economic, social, and economic life that is equal to that of men, 
and that a husband has to assist his wife in household tasks and the 
upbringing of children. Women, she states, should follow the will of 
God as it is revealed in the Islamic sources, and not the arbitrary and 
self-interested traditional habits and beliefs invented by men. In my 
experience, especially females belonging to Muslim, including Islamist, 
voluntary welfare associations are often critical of traditional gender 
habits discriminating against women. 
Al-Faruq Welfare Society for Orphans, that is mainly active in the Pal-
estinian refugee camp of the northern city of Irbid, is not Islamist in 
orientation. It provides nonetheless the same type of services to or-
phan- or fatherless families as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated cen-
tres for the poor and orphans are doing. Its educational and cultural 
programmes, however, are much less one-sidedly based on a religious 
doctrine. They pay as much attention to globally formulated human, 
children’s, and women’s rights. Their methodology toward orphan 
children and their upbringing is to an important extent adopted from 
UNICEF. This approach is focused on letting children discover their own 
individual qualities and taking their individual feelings and thoughts 
seriously, rather than on conformity with strictly conceived religious 
injunctions. However, the Society organizes Quran courses as well, and 
uses Islamic concepts in its discourse. A female social worker of the So-
ciety, for instance, saw in the Quranic principle of himaya, or protection 
of the woman, a basis for the struggle against women’s abuse and do-
mestic violence. The social workers use religious concepts like rahma 
(compassion), tasamuh (forgiveness and tolerance), and sabr (patience) 
to redirect communication within client families in the direction of mu-
tual empathy, understanding, and respect and to counter practices of 
verbal and physical violence. 
Between empowerment and paternalism
In the more conservative Islamist view, rights and empowerment are 
not primarily based on the assertive autonomy of individuals, groups, 
or classes. They can be realized only when Muslim society as a whole 
achieves an environment of social harmony and solidarity, thus imply-
ing that one’s rights are necessarily embedded in social relationships 
of dependency. In this view, a Muslim’s duty necessarily fulfils another 
Muslim’s rights. A truly pious lifestyle, Islamists reason, will lead to true 
social harmony, prosperity, and justice. Concomitantly, they insist that 
blind pursuance of self-interest and “one’s own rights” by any separate 
individual, group, or class will lead to the undermining, disruption, and 
disintegration of Muslim society. Such a worldview implies a confirma-
tion and legitimation of existing social hierarchies and dependency 
relationships along the lines of class, age, and gender, even though 
the “stronger” are called upon to exercise their power with good care 
and consideration for the “weaker.” Such a combination of power and 
care creates a relationship of paternalism and patronage. On the other 
hand, the stress of the Islamist discourse on shaping and improving 
one’s actual behaviour and fully utilizing one’s capabilities in a wide 
range of social fields, including ritual discipline, interpersonal relation-
ships, education, training, and work, may have empowering implica-
tions on an individual level for men and women alike.
The Islamic message may also be used to criticize traditional practices 
often perceived as oppressive, for instance toward women or children, 
and as negative in terms of social cohesion and well-being in modern 
society. Muslim NGOs and Islamist social centres with more liberal ori-
entations focus on the reinterpretation of the Islamic message in line 
with globally formulated rights principles, and on an active cooperation 
with transnational—including Western—development actors. On the 
other hand, fear of losing one’s independence and cultural authenticity 
in the face of western-dominated globalization 
processes is widespread. Islamist ideology is the 
most outspoken and dogmatic expression of this 
fear, but the same sentiment is shared by other 
Muslim associations as well. Generally speaking in 
Jordanian society, Islam stands for what is good—
hence, working for a better social environment 
is often perceived first and foremost in Islamic 
terms. This may have implications for the choices 
international development partners have to make 
in the selection of local development partners. 
Secularist biases in the Western-dominated inter-
national development community may have to 
be critically rethought. 
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In comparison with Western/non-faith 
and Christian NGOs, the engagement 
of Muslim NGOs was for a long time left 
unnoticed by most observers, and if dis-
cussed, their input was generally belit-
tled. However, especially after the trau-
matic experiences in the West of radi-
cal militant Islamic organizations, the 
activities of Muslim NGOs have come 
under close scrutiny, both in the West 
and elsewhere in the world. Some Mus-
lim NGOs were believed to be potential 
supporters of Al-Qaida, others of posing 
a potential challenge, if not threat, to the Western secular state model.
The situation in Ghana as regards to Muslim NGOs and their relation-
ship to the secular state and their participation in civil society provide 
an interesting test-case to examine the claim that the expansion and 
activities of Muslim NGOs pose a potential threat to the stability of Gha-
naian society. As I will argue, this is not necessarily the case. Although 
the Muslim population is a substantial minority—about 18 to 20 per-
cent of the total population of ca. 18 million—it does not consist of 
a monolithic block but comprises many ethnic and doctrinal groups 
that have little in common. Some Muslim NGOs are linked to individ-
ual groups, such as the Tijaniyya, the Ahlu 's-Sunna [Ahl al-Sunna wa 
’l-Jamaa], or the Shia, while many others are not. While there was dur-
ing the 1990s, and before 9/11, a rising fear among some observers in 
Northern Ghana that some local Muslim NGOs were branches of militant 
organizations, these suspicions turned 
out to be invalid. Instead, Muslim NGOs 
have done their utmost to become ac-
cepted partners in both the Ghanaian 
NGO scene and civil society.
Visions and activities
One of the reasons for the upsurge of 
Muslim NGOs in Ghana is the distrust 
on the part of Muslim authorities, both 
among those connected to the Ahlu 
’s-Sunna and those connected to the 
Tijaniyya, of the activities of Western 
international donor agencies and Western NGOs. As an outcome, some 
Muslim leaders have started to emphasize the importance of self-
reliance and the need to create a new discourse on the necessity of 
mobilizing Muslim human resources. However, it is important to em-
phasize the shift in government social welfare policies. Due to the vari-
ous economic recovery and privatization programmes, the role of the 
state as the main provider of basic social welfare has increasingly been 
eroded. Equally important is the active proliferation of international 
Muslim organizations in promoting economic and social development 
in sub-Saharan Africa as part of a counter-reaction against established 
Western and Christian activities in the field. Thus, it could be argued 
that the mushrooming of Muslim NGOs in Ghana is as much a philan-
thropic enterprise as it is also part of a new attempt to “capture souls” 
and present an Islamic alternative.2 
One notable result of the societal crisis in 
sub-Saharan Africa has been the expansion of 
NGOs during the last few decades, including, 
especially since the 1990s, Muslim ones. 
Most regional Muslim NGOs often supported 
by transnational NGOs, and, as one also has 
to stress, by foreign Muslim governments, 
particularly the Gulf States and Libya. Tracing 
such links, the author argues that while these 
connections are essential to their activities, the 
dependency on external actors simultaneously 
limits their effectiveness.1
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tional or social welfare project if it is tied to a mosque complex. Or, as 
one Ghanaian activist explained to me: a project application will se-
cure funding if it is tied to the building of a mosque. Especially foreign 
Muslim donor agencies that channel funds through Ghanaian Muslim 
NGOs are criticized for being inflexible and only allowing the funds to 
be earmarked for stylish or even mere propagandistic projects. In fact, 
in comparison to various social welfare 
projects and programmes, huge sums 
are spent on mosque building projects 
by foreign donors and their Ghanaian 
initiators.
Perhaps the biggest problem con-
nected with the activities and projects 
of Muslim NGOs is their restricted so-
cietal impact—although this certainly 
does not apply to all Muslim NGOs. 
Projects are usually designed to target 
a particular group or to accomplish a 
designed task, say an orphanage or a 
school. Although the particular project 
aims to remedy a certain problem, it is 
usually not linked to or integrated into a 
wider societal context. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, some Ghanaian observers have become rather critical about 
the concepts behind the promotion of development assistance. The 
activities of the NGOs, be they Muslim or other, can do little to address 
structural problems. It could be argued that the very nature of the 
NGOs is part of the problem: although most of the Muslim NGOs are 
run by Ghanaians, few, if any, are capable of financing their activities 
by generating funds from the Ghanaian Muslim community. Instead, 
most of them are financed by or are receiving 
funds from international Muslim NGOs or wealthy 
foreign Muslim states and philanthropists. Thus, 
there exists the danger of becoming dependent 
on outside money—a problem not too unfamiliar 
to many African NGOs. 
The dependence on outside investments puts a 
Ghanaian Muslim NGO in a problematic situation: 
it is always the foreign donor who decides what to 
finance and what not. Thus, for the empowerment 
of the local poor, other approaches have to be 
sought, in particular initiatives that are designed 
by the recipients, targeted towards a structural 
change in the local community, and financed by 
funds which the implementing organization is 
fully capable of controlling. Such an approach will 
need the mobilization of the Ghanaian Muslim 
population to take collective responsibility not 
only for the improvement of their livelihood but 
also to engage in a fruitful debate about “Muslim” 
solutions for poverty alleviation. Interestingly, 
such a debate has already started among Muslim 
intellectuals and leaders in Ghana. This debate is 
itself part of an international debate among Mus-
lim scholars, namely on the ability and possibil-
ity of Muslim societies and communities to make 
use of one of the most central concept of Islam, 
namely that of zakat or obligatory almsgiving.
As elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, some Ghanaian Muslim NGOs are 
either branches of international Muslim NGOs or have close links to 
such organizations.3 Several local Ghanaian Muslim NGOs were estab-
lished by returning Muslims, who had studied in the Middle East and 
had made contacts with and were inspired by local philanthropists. 
Some international Muslim NGOs were invited to start activities in 
Ghana as part of former president Jerry Rawl-
ings' attempts to establish economic coop-
eration with the Gulf and other Arab states, 
as was the case of Libyan and Iranian NGOs.4 
However, many local Muslim NGOs do not 
have links to international Muslim NGOs nor 
do they receive any assistance from Muslim 
countries. As a result, these local NGOs have 
an erratic range of activities and are work-
ing only in a particular locality. The main 
bulk of them are found in the south, in the 
Greater Accra Region as well as in Kumasi; 
a few of them are also active in the north, 
mainly in Tamale and other centres with 
Muslim populations. Although they try their 
best to attract the attention of foreign do-
nors, few of them are in the end successful. 
Consequently, many of these small NGOs exist but on paper.
Since the 1990s, many Muslim NGOs have commissioned projects 
for the improvement of the spiritual and socio-economic conditions of 
Muslims throughout the country. Such projects have first and foremost 
been the construction of mosques and, to a lesser extent, decent and 
modern educational infrastructure, community centres and orphan-
ages as well as basic social amenities such as libraries and hygienic 
sources of potable water, and the sinking of wells in Muslim communi-
ties. Charitable activities of various other local Muslim NGOs have been 
of equal importance, for example, providing gifts to inmates in prisons, 
assistance to hospitals, orphanages, and handicapped institutions or 
the distribution of second-hand clothing to the poor and needy. Some 
Muslim NGOs, such as the Iranian ARD, are engaged in the provision of 
agricultural extension services in the north, including tractor services 
and the distribution of fertilizers, sewing centres for training Muslim 
girls, and financial assistance to women’s cooperatives and groups to 
start small-scale businesses.
There are some highly influential local Muslim NGOs in Ghana, such 
as the Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services 
(ICODEHS, established in 1991), Muslim Family Council Services (MFCS, 
established in 1990), and the Muslim Relief Association of Ghana 
(MURAG, established in 1986). They have gained a good reputation 
both within and outside Ghana and have close links not only to inter-
national Muslim donor organizations but also Western ones. Like the 
MURAG, the MFCS has mainly been cooperating with Western donor 
organizations, such as the UNFPA and the UNICEF, in family planning, 
fertility management, prevention of female genital mutilation, child-
care, and HIV projects. Similar to the MURAG, the strength of the MFCS 
lies in its community-oriented approach. Further, MURAG is included in 
a list on “NGO’s in good standing” on the homepage of the Ministry of 
Manpower, Youth, and Employment.5 The ICODEHS, on the other hand, 
is the only Ghanaian Muslim NGO that is a member of the Civil Society 
Coordinating Council (CivisoC) of SAPRIN-Ghana.6 The ICODEHS is also 
a member of the Coalition of Domestic Observers (CODEO).7
Societal impact
Despite all their efforts, the activities of Muslim NGOs have received a 
mixed response from the local people. Whereas educational, social, and 
infrastructural development projects in general are regarded as having 
a positive impact, other projects, such as the building of mosques, have 
at times been criticized by local Muslim intellectuals for not respond-
ing to the needs of the local population. A common argument by Mus-
lim authorities I spoke with both in Tamale and Accra was that foreign 
Muslim donor agencies are very open-handed in providing resources 
for the building of mosque complexes whereas it is much more diffi-
cult for local Ghanaian Muslim NGOs to get funding from international/
foreign Muslim donor organizations for social welfare or infrastructural 
projects, not to mention the provision of resources for staff salaries. 
It seems as if international Muslim aid is usually received as a kind of 
package: a Ghanaian Muslim NGO is able to get funding for an educa-
[T]he mushrooming of 
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In studies of religious collective ac-
tors, the role of religion as a potential 
agent of social change has often been 
downplayed in favour of an emphasis 
on religion as a reactionary social force. 
Whereas recent studies of Christian or-
ganizations and movements challenge 
this rather one-dimensional under-
standing of religion, it still seems to be 
the dominant approach in studies of 
Muslim collective action. Muslim organ-
izations and movements are frequently 
explained from a socio-psychological 
point of view, seeing collective action 
as a product of structural strains and psychological discomfort. In other 
words, people participate in Muslim collective action because they are 
poor and unemployed, have no possibilities for political participation, 
or are frustrated over being excluded from Western modernity. As such, 
Muslim collective action is seen primarily as a compensatory reaction 
to structural changes rather than a potential force for change in itself.
While structural strains naturally play a role in the actions of most 
people, this perspective runs the risk of overlooking other important 
factors in Muslim collective action. For instance, in their focus on un-
derlying socio-psychological reasons, 
such approaches often tend to down-
play the individual participants’ own 
perceptions of social change, thereby 
reducing their actions to more or less 
automatic responses to structural 
strains, and overlooking the purposive, 
reflective, and organized dimensions 
of collective action. We argue that a 
micro-level focus on concrete Muslim 
collective actors and their perceptions 
of Islam and social change can contrib-
ute to a more complex understanding 
of the relations between Islam, collec-
tive action, and social change. Yes, peo-
ple might participate in Muslim organi-
zations and movements because they 
are frustrated, poor, or unemployed. 
But they also participate because they 
see this particular kind of action as the 
most relevant and powerful tool for 
changing their situation.
Islam and social change
A new movement of Muslim youth 
organizations, emerging from Egypt 
but spreading to other Middle Eastern 
countries, presents particularly interesting insights on the topic. Urban, 
upper middle-class young people constitute the backbone of this new 
movement. The majority is in their 20s, and most have been to univer-
sity. In order to understand these young people’s perceptions of Islam 
and social change, we have to turn towards the Egyptian account-
ant-turned-preacher Amr Khaled. Amr Khaled started preaching in 
mosques and private clubs in the early 1990s, and today, his shows are 
broadcasted on a number of satellite channels, reaching an audience 
of millions of young Muslims all over the world. He speaks an easily 
understandable Colloquial Arabic rather than the Standard Arabic spo-
ken by traditional shaykhs, and his style is soft and compassionate, not 
disciplinary and strict. While others call his version of Islam “Islam light,” 
he says that his main concern is simply 
to make young people love religion in-
stead of fearing it. Amr Khaled’s ideas 
about Islam appear to have become 
firmly rooted among young Muslims. 
He has become the catalyst for a much 
broader trend, facilitated by the Inter-
net and satellite TV, and showing in the 
growing number of preachers with a 
similar style and message, as well as in 
the establishment of several youth or-
ganizations based on his ideas. 
Social change plays an explicit role in 
the discourses of this new movement. 
According to Amr Khaled, Islam is not only about praying five times a 
day and wearing the hijab the correct way, and da‘wa is not just a call to 
live by these rules. Islam is about changing and improving yourself and 
your community, and da‘wa is a call to actively engage in this change. 
The overall goal is not only a stronger Muslim individual, but a stronger 
Muslim society, a renaissance of the Muslim world. As such, two equally 
important strategies of the movement are community engagement and 
individual empowerment, both motivated and shaped by the Muslim 
faith. Each in their own way, the different activities of the organizations 
demonstrate this intimate connection 
between individual empowerment and 
community engagement. 
Let’s do it ourselves!
In his TV programme Sunna‘ al-Haya 
(Life-Makers), Amr Khaled called for 
young people to engage in their com-
munity: “Guys, don’t wait for something 
to happen. Let’s do it ourselves!” One of 
his first projects was the collection and 
distribution of second-hand clothes in 
poor areas. Thousands of young peo-
ple participated, and in the following 
months, volunteer work among young 
people increased. This call for par-
ticipation in society is articulated as a 
moral obligation: A good Muslim is an 
active Muslim.
According to the young, one of the 
main challenges in their society is 
poverty and poverty-related problems 
such as illiteracy, unemployment, and 
illnesses. They see social welfare activi-
ties as logical solutions to these prob-
lems. In a Muslim context, this focus 
on poverty and social welfare is noth-
ing new. The duty to give to the poor, zakat, is one of the five pillars 
in Islam. Likewise, activities such as taking care of orphans and poor 
families range high in the extensive system for rewarding good deeds, 
thawab. However, the duty to help the poor has often manifested itself 
in rather traditional charity activities. Few organizations have engaged 
in more long-term development activities seeking to empower people 
to break out of their poverty. 
The new youth organizations introduce a different approach. This is 
not just about collecting thawab to ensure one’s own place in Para-
dise; it is about developing the Muslim world, creating a renaissance. 
Here, buzz words such as capacity-building and sustainable develop-
ment are often heard; several of the organizations run vocational train-
The Middle East has recently witnessed the 
rise of Muslim youth movements with an 
activist agenda. This article shows that these 
movements prove particularly attractive to 
urban upper middle class youth for whom 
religious engagement is about fostering 
the collective good as well as about self-
empowerment. The authors conclude by 
discussing whether these movements 
are conducive to political action, hinder 
formal political participation, or should 
be viewed as constituting a new form 
of political engagement.
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models for the young people, promoting the ideal of a Muslim profes-
sional. As one lecturer emphasized: “When I say that the lecture starts 
at six, six-o-one you’re late. When I say that you have to attend three 
out of four lectures to pass, if you only attend two, you have failed. 
There are no excuses. This is what it takes to be a 
Muslim professional.” 
Hence, Islam clearly plays a significant role 
when it comes to empowerment of the young en-
gaged in these organizations. The kind of religion 
communicated to the participants is not so much 
about rituals and theological doctrine. Instead, 
Islam is the underlying motivation and what 
provides the general guidelines for the modern 
individual, whether it concerns major choices in 
life or daily interaction with friends, family, and 
colleagues. If understood and practiced the right 
way, Islam will help the individual achieve his or 
her goals and become an active participant in 
society. As a leader in one organization told me: 
“Our purpose is not to spread Islam—it’s already 
there. Our purpose is to help people grow stronger. The Prophet was a 
strong man, useful to his nation. He’s our idol.”
Perspectives
It is obvious that participants in the new Muslim youth organizations 
articulate an intimate relation between Islam and change. Society 
needs change, individuals need change, and Islam is the tool to obtain 
this change. Problems such as poverty, unemployment, and apathy are 
seen as moral and social problems, whose solutions must be sought in 
the individual and in the community. With their faith as motivation and 
guiding light, young people seek to address these problems through 
the interrelated and mutually reinforcing strategies of community en-
gagement and individual empowerment, and with the stated goal of 
contributing to the renaissance of the Muslim nation. 
But one thing is how the young people understand social change 
and what they do to implement this change. Another thing is what 
consequences this will have on a structural level. In other words, and 
paraphrasing Foucault, the young might know what they do, but they 
do not know what “what they do” will do. An interesting question in 
this respect is whether their social engagement will develop into more 
formal political participation, thereby perhaps changing the current 
political structures in the Middle East. Given the novelty of Muslim 
youth organizations, such questions cannot be answered definitively 
at this point, and there is a need for more long-term studies. However, 
based on our own very preliminary observations, we propose three 
possible answers.
First of all, one could argue that these youth organizations might 
become breeding grounds for formal political actors. Obviously these 
organizations strengthen skills that can be characterized as essential to 
political engagement—skills such as argumentation techniques, team-
work, and critical thinking. However, in their current form they are char-
acterised by an explicit lack of formal political engagement. The young 
see their participation as an attempt to address social and moral injus-
tice, not political injustice, and they take no interest in using formal po-
litical channels to gain influence. This could lead one to conclude that 
such organizations can end up hindering formal political participation 
by diverting potential actors from the political scene, luring them into 
harmless social activities. Finally, a third perspective might see these 
social activities neither as harmless activities nor as run-ups to formal 
political participation but rather as expressions of a whole new kind of 
political engagement, challenging the often corrupt and dysfunctional 
political system by insisting on different forms and channels of partici-
pation. But regardless of which—if any—of these answers will turn out 
to be true, the new Muslim youth organizations present some interest-
ing micro-level examples of how human beings understand religion as 
intimately intertwined with social change and how they use their reli-
gion as a relevant and powerful tool to obtain such change.
ing centres and organize awareness campaigns, some receive training 
from secular development NGOs, and many are getting involved in mi-
crofinance activities. In addition to this, the organizations also engage 
in traditional charity activities. They distribute food-bags and blankets, 
and they invite people to celebrate religious holi-
days. But they seem to be very aware of the limi-
tations of such activities. As a young man put it: 
“In the end, poverty will not be solved by giving 
out 3,000 bags. You need to change the minds of 
people.” 
This hints at another important aspect, under-
lying the youth’s approach to social welfare: All 
change must start with the individual. As such, in-
dividual empowerment is a key component in the 
organizations’ social welfare activities. What the 
poor need is not just money and material goods; 
they need a direction in their life, and this direction 
is Islam. Through education, training, and conver-
sations, the young seek to convey their ideas of 
a good Muslim lifestyle to the poor. Combining 
secular development tools with Islamic ideals and guidelines, they em-
phasize the importance of education, hard work, and good morals. 
Through their engagement in social welfare activities, they not only 
try to empower the poor—by default they also empower themselves. 
Almost everybody says that their engagement in this work had strength-
ened their skills in areas such as project planning, management, and 
communication. The young do not just interpret these benefits as com-
mon consequences of involvement in any kind of community work. 
Rather, they see them as the consequences of a specific Muslim ap-
proach to community work, emphasizing efficiency, organization, and 
strategic thinking as important qualities in any good Muslim.
Thus, religion is what initially motivates the young people to engage 
in social welfare activities: To be a good Muslim is to do something 
for others. But, combined with secular development ideas, religion is 
also what provides the guidelines for how to do something for oth-
ers. Poverty is not fought through the random distribution of zakat, 
but through individual empowerment, including education, vocational 
training, and moral strengthening. Finally, by providing concrete ben-
efits in terms of strengthened personal capacities, religion is also what 
makes them keep doing something for others. 
You have to start with yourself 
Social welfare activities are not the only concern of the youth or-
ganizations. Many also engage in so-called human and career develop-
ment courses. Whereas the engagement in social welfare activities is 
motivated by a wish to fight poverty in general, young people engage 
in these courses in an attempt to solve more youth-specific problems 
such as unemployment, apathy, and poor quality of higher education. 
Successful managers in multinational companies and university profes-
sors teach courses in topics such as time management, presentation 
skills, leadership, business and ethics, offered to university students for 
free or at a very low price since both organizers and lecturers work as 
volunteers.
The concrete goal of these organizations is to prepare young people 
for a professional and adult life. On the more general level, the organi-
zations wish to create a more effective and responsible generation of 
youth, able to participate in society, and thereby contributing to the 
renaissance of the Muslim nation. Thus, the courses become yet an-
other concrete manifestation of the relation between social change 
and individual empowerment: If you want to change society, you have 
to start with the individual. And most importantly: You have to start 
with yourself. 
Though most courses offered are based on American management 
theories, Islam plays a significant role in both practices and discourses. 
In fact, Islam and modern management are seen as mutually reinforc-
ing. Through the introduction of the ideal of a so-called “Muslim pro-
fessional,” the effective businessman’s strategies are merged with the 
values and morals of a good Muslim. A Muslim professional is someone 
who dresses properly, works efficiently, and has high moral standards. 
The youth organizations are managed after the model of multinational 
companies, but in the tight schedule, there is time for religious lectures 
and prayers. In fact, religious commitment and practice is expected of 
the organizations’ members. The lecturers and organizers act as role 
“… The Prophet 
was a strong man, 
useful to his nation. 
He’s our idol.”
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The need for technological and eco-
nomic development has remained 
central in the political agenda of the 
mainstream Islamist movements up 
to the present. In Egypt in particular 
groups such as the Muslim Brothers, 
the Labour Party1 (Hizb al-‘Amal), and 
the Centre Party2 (Hizb al-Wasat) have 
devoted a great deal of their political 
energy to criticizing the failure of the 
economic development effort, and em-
phasize the need for building an inde-
pendent technological base in Muslim 
countries, in order to escape the current total dependence on Western 
and East Asian countries for advanced equipment. Through their press 
and as elected representatives, Islamists call for rapid industrializa-
tion, improved communications, upgrading basic infrastructure and 
services in the villages, etc. Not least, beyond the level of immediate 
questions of economic policy, the Islamist interpretation of the social 
message of Islam is much conducive to economic development, and 
reminiscent of the Protestant ethics that Max Weber saw as propitious 
to capitalist development in Europe. This will be confirmed by a glance 
at what Egyptian thinkers linked to the Muslim Brothers and the La-
bour Party have written on economic questions.3
Based on their pronouncements the building of a strong and tech-
nologically advanced economy emerges as a sacred duty. For Adil 
Husayn, the deceased charismatic ideologue 
of the Labour Party’s turn to Islamism, this was 
an integral part of the quest for independence 
which was at the heart of his political and intel-
lectual efforts. Economy professors Yusuf Kamal 
and Husayn Shahhata, central spokesmen for 
the Muslim Brothers on economic issues, for 
their part state that the Islamic Sharia aims at 
comprehensive development in order to achieve 
strength and glory for the Muslim nation. They 
claim that mankind is entrusted with a sacred 
obligation to exploit natural resources to the full 
for the increase of the material wealth of society, 
and that economic development is a fard kifaya, 
a collective duty, to be secured by the state if in-
dividuals fail to promote it with sufficient force. 
The whole development effort is likened to a 
jihad. Both Kamal and Shahhata emphasize the 
centrality of the development effort in an Islamic 
system through stating that zakat revenue can 
be used by the state for productive investment 
in order to further development. Shahhata states 
that work is to be considered a form of ‘ibada, part of the worship 
of God. This implies that the perfection of one’s work is a religious 
obligation equal in importance to the fulfilment of ritual duties like 
prayer and fasting, and is reminiscent of the Protestant idea of work 
as a calling. Shahhata holds up the furtherance of public interest, 
maslaha, as equal to fulfilling God’s will, and in line with this he ac-
cords the call for modernizing the economy priority over the formal 
fulfilment of tenets of fiqh, as in Islamist critique of “Islamic” invest-
ment companies and banks for not investing in projects which would 
contribute to the development of production. 
There is an old fiqh principle stating that in considering maslaha in 
the choice between possible interpretations of the Quran or Sunna 
on a specific point of jurisprudence, one should proceed accord-
ing to a descending ladder of priorities: first necessities, daruriyyat, 
then needs, hajat, then improvements, 
tahsinat. The Muslim Brothers take up 
this list of priorities and adopt it as 
“Islamic priorities for production and 
investment,”4 so that Muslim society, 
and the Islamic state as its representa-
tive, must before anything else secure 
the sufficient allocation of resources 
for the procurement of basic necessi-
ties for the population. Even if self-pro-
claimed Islamic financial institutions 
can be said to be operating without 
interest it does not make them Islamic 
in the eyes of the Muslim Brothers and the Labour Party if they do not 
support this effort, but concentrate on financing trade and currency 
speculation.
God’s stewards on earth
There is common agreement among Islamist writers that private 
property is the basic principle in Islam and that this is necessary for 
stimulating men to exert their best efforts at developing and preserv-
ing wealth.5 Still they all stress that public interest takes priority over 
private interests. A central idea is that of man as “God’s steward (kha-
lifa) on earth.”6 Everyone has the right to private property, but this right 
is limited by the fact that all wealth ultimately belongs to God. The in-
dividual is seen as holding property in trust from God and from soci-
ety as God’s deputy, as it were. Therefore private 
property involves a social responsibility. It should 
be made to bear fruit in the service of society, and 
it should be preserved and developed for future 
generations. And others have claims on the prop-
erty; that is, the return it brings or even parts of 
the property itself may be needed to satisfy ur-
gent needs of the wider community. 
The Egyptian Islamists consider it a task for an 
Islamic state to secure a minimum of welfare to all 
members of society. This is to be realized through 
concentrating investment and production on 
the provision of basic necessities, and, centrally 
for Kamal and Shahhata, through the zakat. The 
Muslim Brother writers emphasize that the zakat 
should provide more than what is necessary for 
mere survival; every member of society should 
have the right to a certain degree of enjoyment 
of life.7 The ideal of the just Islamic society is not 
one of radical egalitarianism, but rather of bal-
ance, of Islam as a moderate third way avoiding 
the excesses of capitalism and communism. This 
implies that the ideal is to seek a harmonious balance between differ-
ent social groups and between generations. Class conflict is seen as an 
evil which it is an imperative to avoid lest its divisive cancer split society 
into warring factions.
The liberating force of faith 
Over and above the general principles enunciated as guiding an Is-
lamic economy, the Islamist writers emphasize the liberating force of 
faith in itself. Faith induces good behaviour towards others and there-
by creates a solid framework for social solidarity, says Kamal. Husayn 
stresses belief in a sacred doctrine as an indispensable prerequisite for 
the will to sacrifice without which any serious development effort is 
doomed to failure. More generally this is linked to the idea that a true 
Muslim is involved in an unceasing battle for good against evil, and 
Middle Eastern Islamists have been unequivocal 
advocates of bringing their societies up to 
the technological level of modern industrial 
society. In fact, the most fertile recruiting 
ground for Islamist organizations has been 
students in technological and natural science 
subjects. As Islamist movements gather 
strength year by year, and are poised to be 
the main beneficiaries of any turn towards 
democratic government in the region, it seems 
imperative to gain an insight into their ideas on 
economic issues.
Development as 
Divinely imposed Duty
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potential for 
economic 
mobilization.
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but also in view of the individualizing aspects of Islamist interpreta-
tion of the Islamic message. There is a strong focus on the individual as 
responsible not only for his own proper conduct but for all the affairs 
of society and state that contrasts with more traditional communalist 
attitudes and a traditional division of roles where politics would be the 
domain of notables and religion that of the clerical leaders. Especially 
with the Muslim Brothers the focus on individual duties is coupled with 
a strong defence of individual rights against the encroachment of the 
state. Common to all Islamists is a strong emphasis on merit, which is 
the idea that there should be full access to social 
mobility for every individual regardless of fam-
ily background, and that all promotions should 
take place based on consideration of individual 
merit in piety and in efficient and good work. This 
would require equal access to education and em-
ployment and an end to age-old practices of nep-
otism and favouritism in public and business life.
The stress on merit is therefore closely linked to 
the Islamists’ frenetic campaigning against cor-
ruption. The main target is the misuse of public 
office to further personal interests or those of 
individual or groups close to the office holder. 
The Islamists criticize officials taking bribes and 
illegitimate charges for exercising their duties, 
and denounce the misappropriation of funds 
for buying votes and for paying commissions to 
cronies of people in office, or by awarding public 
contracts to other than the one presenting the 
best tender. In this can also be seen a moderniz-
ing aspect, in that the borderline is very thin and 
vague between corruption and traditional pa-
tron-client relations. One might perhaps say that 
corruption thrives in the confrontation between 
inherited social structures based on the recipro-
cal solidaric obligations of kinship and client net-
works, and the institutions of a modern market 
and a modern state. The Islamists seem not only 
in their campaigning against corruption, but also 
to the extent that they are involved in business, 
to favour a detached impersonal style focused on 
economic efficiency.
should use her or his measured time in this 
world in a disciplined and purposeful way. 
When the energy of the believer through 
the values listed above is directed towards 
the increase of material production, Islamist 
doctrine would seem to possess a substan-
tial potential for economic mobilization. 
This is true not least since there is an em-
phasis not only on an Islamic state enforc-
ing these values, but ultimately on them 
being internalized as natural instincts by 
believers.
Misguided belief in miracles?
In his influential works on Islamic eco-
nomics, notably Islam and Mammon: The 
Economic Predicaments of Islamism,8 Timur 
Kuran presents a rather more gloomy pic-
ture. To Kuran the core of the recently 
emerged idea of an Islamic economy stems 
from a notion of justice based on the two 
principles of equality in distribution and 
fairness in productive, commercial, and fi-
nancial interaction. The realization of these 
principles is presented as flowing naturally 
from the implementation of the Islamic pro-
cedures of zakat (which secures equality), 
and the prohibition of riba (which secures fairness). Kuran argues that 
this is an illusion based on unrealistic presumptions about the work-
ings of a modern market economy. The literature analyzed by Kuran 
stems mainly from the South Asian Islamic region, and is mostly not 
produced by political Islamists. It is probably correct to say that the 
writings in question tend to be of a more technical and scripturalist 
nature than that of the Arab Islamist discourse. Yet this can at best 
partially account for Kuran’s inclination to reduce Islamic economic 
thought to a misguided belief in the miraculous effect of reintroducing 
medieval economic principles. 
It would seem that in his effort to disprove the “workability” of Islam-
ist economic prescriptions Kuran becomes insensitive to the dynamic 
aspect of Islamist reformulations of Islam. He does acknowledge that 
equality and justice are part of wider set of moral injunctions. But to 
Kuran these injunctions can be summed up as a general call for altru-
istic behaviour, and this he summarily dismisses as unworkable, since 
altruism can only work within small social units, such as the family, 
and not on the scale of a nationwide market. This statement in itself 
is certainly debatable. But more importantly Kuran fails to notice that 
Islamist advocacy of hard and conscientious work, the establishment 
of merit as the sole criterion for economic decisions, and the urgency 
of economic development as central Islamic values, gives a thorough-
ly modernizing flavour to the “package” of values presented as those 
guiding an Islamic economy. Furthermore, and precisely for this reason 
the fact that efficiency, growth, employment, and industrialization are 
held forth as important goals, stands for Kuran as somehow isolated 
from, and partly in contradiction to, the “moral economy” otherwise 
propagated. A careful reading of this same moral economy would rath-
er show consistency between the moral principles advocated and what 
is set up as practical economic goals. Kuran instead ends up suggesting 
that the only link between Islamism and modernization would spring 
from social reaction against “fundamentalist” Islamic regimes. 
Kuran concentrates on discussing the feasibility of the solutions 
proposed by the “Islamic economic” literature. This leads him to dis-
regard the possibility that the inconsistencies he points to might be 
understood as expressing a tension between the resolve to promote 
a reading of the Islamic message relevant to the problems of modern-
izing society, and the equally strongly felt need to guard the sanctity of 
the scriptures. The tension in question reflects precisely the innovative 
character of the discourse.
A pro-modern ideology
On the whole, then, I would argue that mainstream Islamism in the 
Middle East as exemplified by the Egyptian movements discussed here 
should be considered as a pro-modern ideology not only in the sense 
of its stressing the need for economic and technological development, 
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Dimensions of development 
ethics
Development ethics explores the ethi-
cal basis of development by bringing out 
what is often implicit in development 
discourse.1 Here, I explore briefly three 
dimensions to development ethics. First, 
what are the goals of development? Sec-
ond, what kind of social/political order 
should we try to establish? Third, in what 
ways should we pursue our conception 
of development? 
First, what kind of a society at all are 
we trying to promote in development? If, as is commonly assumed, devel-
opment involves economic growth, what does that growth enable people 
to do or be? At one level, it is about enabling very poor people to escape 
from their poverty—to empower the disempowered—though, as I indi-
cate later, exactly what empowerment is is a matter of dispute. At another 
level it is about enabling people generally to achieve (better) quality of 
life—which may be defined in religious terms or secular/liberal terms. 
The basic concept of development is capable of many conceptions—and 
the latter could be informed by religious values, even fundamentalist reli-
gious values. This issue is explored more fully below.
Second, there is the question of how the goods of development are to 
be achieved. This is the distributive question, often linked with ideas of 
equity and social justice. What is a fair distribution of the bases of well-be-
ing and how can it be achieved? Is the primary vehicle individuals acting 
charitably e.g. giving zakat as a religious duty, or is it various charitable 
NGOs enabling the poor through aid and training, as Harmsen’s article in 
this issue well illustrates? What is the role of the state in this? Do we need 
a conception of social justice such as that provided by John Rawls2 that 
requires redistributive measures like progressive taxation?
Third, there is the fundamental issue of how people are to pursue their 
own goals and also to pursue the goal of development itself. A general 
commitment to non-violence and dialogue is commonly assumed—
and usually also the specific commitment to democratic values as well 
as strong legal protection of rights and liberties including political and 
religious liberty. These are both procedural values 
to do with how we promote social change, but they 
also constitute elements of human well-being itself, 
as it is commonly conceived. But then of course 
there is always a dilemma when a society falls radi-
cally short of our conception of development as it 
should be. Is one then entitled to use violent means 
to achieve change? Here the current process of de-
velopment may, on this view, require violent inter-
ventions and pressures, but its goal is a later stage 
of development in which there will no longer be 
a need for violence. This was the line taken by the 
ANC in pre-1994 South Africa and which is taken by 
Hamas in Palestine. I now explore some of the is-
sues I have raised in more detail.
Nature of development
If development is defined minimally as econom-
ic growth or economic growth with equity, then 
this is consistent with many conceptions of what 
a full human life consists in, whether 
religious or secular. It is usually com-
bined with weak pluralist (liberal) and 
civil society assumptions. (a) Pluralist 
assumption: many different kinds of 
goals and life-styles are consistent with 
this account of development. That is, 
within the general framework of de-
velopment, some people pursue non-
religious goals, some various different 
religious goals, of which some could 
be fundamentalist. (b) Civil society as-
sumption: what is done is pursued in 
ways consistent with law, that is, non-violently, non-coercively, non-
deceptively, and where public decisions have to be made, goals are 
pursued by dialogue and democratic decision/negotiation. 
Within this framework NGOs can pursue a wide range of goals as part 
of civil society, where civil society is defined as commitment to particu-
lar procedural values of certain kinds (but not to the same substantive 
values). For example, a pro-life organization and a family planning or-
ganization may pursue different mutually excluding agendas, but if they 
do so non-violently and seek to get their views accepted democratically, 
then they are part of civil society. (We need to contrast this sense of civil 
society with a wider descriptive sense of civil society which applies to 
any non-state/non-business organization and could include the Mafia 
and the IRA.)
But the pluralist element can be reduced, either somewhat or greatly. 
A society could accept, even encourage, a wide range of life-styles but 
still reject certain ways of life, for instance those of homosexuals or of 
travelling people. A radically secular society might ban all or some reli-
gious ways of life, as we saw at least in public life in USSR’s communism. 
A radically religious society may ban or discourage non-religious ways 
of life; Locke’s famous toleration did not extend to atheists (or indeed 
Catholics). At the extreme it might ban or discourage both secular views 
and indeed any religious ways of life not in accordance with the domi-
nant conception implemented by a government with the backing of 
(sufficient of ) its citizens.
Development then is normatively based. Usually economic growth or 
economic growth with equity is seen as good as a means towards the 
achievement of human flourishing in whatever ways it is conceived, con-
sistent with (a) a system of liberty in which the liberties of some are not 
unreasonably limited by the exercise of liberty by others, and (b) pub-
lic decisions are made in an orderly and non-violent (non-coercive, etc.) 
way. In Western liberal democracies (and other societies like them) the 
framework of liberties and democratic procedures is part of the values 
assumed. In other societies not modelled on Western liberal democra-
cies, there may also be liberties but less of them, and there may either be 
democracy (maybe in different forms), or benign autocracy. (There might 
of course be non-benign autocracies or tyrannies, but these would be 
seen as impediments to, rather than models of, development.)
An example of a Western approach which acknowledges this norma-
tive basis is Sen’s well-known capability approach.3 The expansion of ca-
pabilities to be or do what we have reason to do or be of course includes 
the option of developing a religious conception of a good life. This is not 
of course value-neutral, but it is intended to allow for a wide range of 
conceptions of the good to be enabled by development. But develop-
ment could alternatively be defined in an even less value-neutral way: 
In this article, philosopher Nigel Dower outlines 
the logical implications of the relations 
between religion, ethics, and development. 
In doing so, he shows the importance of 
making explicit the values, assumptions, 
and conceptions that inform discussions of 
development. Only by acknowledging that 
all development agendas are value-driven, 
is a fruitful dialogue between religious 
and secular approaches to development 
possible, even if they will continue to disagree 
about desirable outcomes.
religion, ethics, 
and Development
Some Comments
n i g e l  D o W e r
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Is a liberal 
education that does 
not include kinds 
of fundamentalism 
a form of 
indoctrination?
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Suppose that empowerment is more 
about enabling people, not to do what 
they want, but to do what they have rea-
son to want (though they may not know 
it). This is more typically what we have 
in mind with children and young peo-
ple. Here education is about expanding 
our capability not merely to take effec-
tive means, but also in our goals and as-
pirations. But even here the non-liberal 
and liberal may both see their inputs 
as creating a richer range of values—in 
the one case by a fuller understanding 
of what one’s religion calls one to do, 
in the other by an understanding of 
the range possibilities which one may 
choose—requiring a society in which 
that range of possibilities is protected 
by law.
An example from my society can be 
given which is in many respects similar 
to what can happen in Muslim societies 
including what voluntary organizations 
are about. A Catholic child, let us sup-
pose, is “indoctrinated” into the Catho-
lic faith and thereafter takes on a life of 
Catholic faith, never seriously question-
ing it. A fellow Catholic may judge that 
that person has been empowered to 
live a fully Catholic life. Even a liberal or a person of another religious 
persuasion could judge that for that person that upbringing has em-
powered him to live a full life. However the liberal (including of course 
liberally minded Catholics) would probably take the view that, had the 
upbringing been less strict and other options made plausible, the per-
son might well have chosen otherwise, and that, whether or not he 
remained a Catholic, it would have been better if a wider range of op-
tions had been built into his education. A person of another religious 
persuasion would either agree with the liberal or, if his own beliefs are 
also held in a certain exclusivist form, have wished for another religious 
education. My point is that empowerment and indoctrination do not 
mutually exclude each other.
(c) The issue of universalism and NGOs
Finally, we need to comment briefly on the issue of universalism 
implicit in NGO work. Any organization within development will, with 
regard to what it does, such as aid for the very poor or empowering 
through training, (a) be precisely committed to empowering people so 
as to make their own choices as to how to live (within the law/ground-
rules of an organized community), or (b) do so with a view to encourag-
ing people to adopt certain specific values and beliefs. But we need to 
see that, as between (a) and (b), they are both working with universal-
istic agendas. There is no problem with an organi-
zation having a universalistic agenda. This is in my 
opinion built into the very logic of ethics and cer-
tainly any ethical basis for an organization pursu-
ing public policies. The real question is what uni-
versal values are being pursued—e.g. the expan-
sion of choice and capacities or the promoting of 
more specific ways of life and belief (or positions 
in between with both elements, like those com-
mitted to development but with strong commit-
ment to environmental consciousness). There are 
also background universalistic commitments, at 
least for those associations which see themselves 
as part of a civil society. These are commitments 
to the procedural values of proceeding in an or-
derly, non-violent non-coercive way, and often 
additionally to democratic procedures as well. 
These are universalistic as well, as is made explicit 
when we accept the idea of global civil society.
development is the expansion of the material basis (wealth) so that peo-
ple can achieve more specific goals such as a particular form of religious 
faith. It is still development, but development defined in more precise 
normative terms than usually in liberal societies. Sustainable develop-
ment and ecological conceptions of development also have built into 
them further substantive values to be achieved, so that insofar as these 
are adopted in Western countries, development is less simply linked to 
the expansion of freedoms.
Within the religious framework, an NGO is more or less free to pursue 
a range of goals: e.g. poverty relief as such, empowerment by provid-
ing training; and doing these things but with a view to encouraging a 
certain set of ethical or religious values, as Harmsen’s thesis shows many 
NGOs in Jordan clearly to be doing. Some it may be said are engaging 
in indoctrination. But this does not make it inconsistent with develop-
ment, though it may be something which others may prefer not to hap-
pen, either because they would prefer something else to indoctrinate or 
because they reject indoctrination as such. They may have rival concep-
tions of development, though the basic concept of development ap-
plies.
Several points about indoctrination
(a) Different views of indoctrination
We may recall here the old proverb: “one man’s meat is another man’s 
poison.” What counts as indoctrination for some may be the imparting 
of reasonable knowledge for another. Is a liberal education that does 
not include kinds of fundamentalism a form of indoctrination? What 
counts as indoctrination depends upon whether one thinks about the 
range of values and beliefs imparted as being either too narrow or sim-
ply wrong, compared with what one thinks is the right set of values and 
beliefs to impart.
(b) Is in any case indoctrination necessarily not empowering?
There are two ways of thinking about empowerment. First, empower-
ment may be enabling people to do what they want but do not have 
the material or motivational resources to do. This could be (weakly) giv-
ing people greater power over their lives so that they can choose to do 
what they want—e.g. greater access to resources. Second, it could be 
(more strongly) giving people the motivational resources to be able 
to make genuine choices of different ends, including what they had 
wanted but also new things they might now want. 
Now indoctrination is consistent with the first level of enabling, but 
not with the second. But the first form of enabling may be all that is 
seen as desirable. This is precisely a key difference between non-liberal 
and liberal views of education. But they are both about empowering 
people to lead fulfilled lives.
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Afghan girls 
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carpet loom in 
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Attempts to accommodate a women’s 
rights agenda in conflict and post-
conflict contexts presents us with 
unprecedented challenges. Gender 
advocates often bemoan the fact that 
scant attention is paid and insufficient 
resources are allocated to the gender 
dimension of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, arguing that women’s involve-
ment is essential to achieving sustain-
able peace. However, the prospects 
for a rights-based agenda are, as I shall 
attempt to demonstrate throughout 
this text, compromised by the nature 
of the interventions that purport to 
uphold them and by the corrosive, 
long-term effects of prolonged conflict and endemic insecurity.
In contemporary post-conflict situations we encounter the “interna-
tionalization” of state-building under new forms of tutelage. This con-
juncture presents its own specific set of challenges. Foremost among 
these is the fact that donor-led institution-building may create enti-
ties with juridical sovereignty (and international recognition) but with 
little de facto power to effectively administer national territories and 
provide law and order.2 This poses serious dilemmas of legitimacy and 
calls for the management of multiple tensions between global and 
local players and political factions with different degrees of commit-
ment to state-building. 
The first part of this paper examines the nature of the claims made 
for women’s inclusion in post-Taliban Afghanistan by analyzing the 
outcomes of constitutional and electoral processes. The second part 
explores whether such claims have any purchase in contexts where the 
rule of law is severely compromised and where the social dislocations 
resulting from conflict expose women and girls to new and unprec-
edented forms of violence and insecurity. 
Promise of inclusion: “Democratization” and women’s 
rights
The constitutional process in Afghanistan offers important insights 
into the contradictions resulting from donor-instigated attempts to se-
cure women’s rights in the absence of a stable political settlement be-
tween an aid-dependent government and a variety of opposition groups. 
These include jihadi factions committed to a conservative interpretation 
of the Sharia and who have, so far, shown little inclination to compro-
mise on matters pertaining to the status of women. These contradictions 
were reflected both in the process and the letter of the Constitution.
After the fall of the Taliban, the international community and the Unit-
ed Nations acted rapidly to bring mujahidin factions and the political 
leadership in the Afghan diaspora together to agree to an interim power-
sharing arrangement. The resulting Bonn Agreement of December 2001 
was not a conventional peace agreement, however, since not all the war-
ring parties were represented and it lacked specific and actionable claus-
es on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Instead, it 
was an externally mediated power sharing arrangement between the 
Northern Alliance and the international community. The Agreement 
endorsed the establishment of “a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-
ethnic and fully representative government.”3
In the period of consolidation that followed, a process hailed as a rela-
tive success, synergies were noted between efforts of the international 
community, government bodies, and women’s civil society organiza-
tions. On 4 January 2004, a 502-member Loya Jirga approved the new 
constitution. Afghanistan emerged from this process with a new state 
structure based on a presidential democracy and supported by a bicam-
eral national assembly (comprising a 
lower house-Wolesi Jirga and an upper 
house-Meshrano Jirga) where the po-
litical representation of women became 
enshrined in law.
Some amendments to the draft con-
stitution were successfully pushed 
through in the period leading up to the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga. These amend-
ments included an explicit reference to 
the equality of men and women before 
the law (Article 22) and an increase 
in the participation of women in the 
Wolesi Jirga from one to two female 
delegates from each province (Article 
83). In addition, Article 7 of the Consti-
tution requires that the state of Afghanistan “abide by the UN Charter, 
international treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has 
signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” These conven-
tions include the Convention for all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women that was ratified without reservations in March 2003. 
On the other hand, Article 3 on “Islam and Constitutionality” states 
that, “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and the provisions of the sa-
cred religion of Islam.” This article, along with its affiliate which declares 
Afghanistan an Islamic state, is not subject to amendment. The Constitu-
tion gives the Supreme Court the authority to determine whether laws 
and treaties made by the government are in accordance with the Consti-
tution, giving it the power to reject any law or treaty deemed un-Islamic. 
Thus, a Supreme Court dominated by religious hard-liners could poten-
tially become an unaccountable body controlling the legislature, execu-
tive branch, and electoral system on the pretext of protecting Islam. 
Contests over the “Islamic” nature of the state were overshadowed by 
a central dilemma that threatened to stalemate the proceedings of the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga; the choice between a strong presidential sys-
tem versus a parliamentary system. The draft presented by the govern-
ment proposed a pure presidential system, while the opposition, from 
jihadi groups and non-Pashtun areas of the country, favoured a parlia-
mentary system. 
Both the political stakes around Islam and the fact that different ethnic 
and political constituencies are locked in struggles of representation in 
defence of their collective rights substantially erodes the political spaces 
available to women, except as spokespersons of their communal inter-
ests. In fact there is little a priori ground for making simplistic assump-
tions about women’s primary commitment to subscribing to a common 
platform. Indeed, a report by Rights and Democracy claimed that “a ma-
jority of the female delegates at the CLJ were affiliated with violent, con-
servative factions and voted in line with their demands, dividing women 
in accordance with ethnic, religious, and factional identities.”4 A sizable 
proportion of the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) belonging to parties that 
could be classified as Islamist and jihadis are expected to be the best 
organized legislative force in parliament. Female members who hold 
27% of the seats are not necessarily expected to function as a coherent 
political group since they are affiliated with parties across the political 
spectrum.5 
Lest we imagine that this state of affairs is straightforwardly attrib-
utable to the “Islamic” nature of society, let us remind ourselves of the 
historical trajectory that led to Afghanistan’s current predicament. The 
various parties locked in struggle were consolidated in the process of 
the Cold War by proxy fought on Afghan soil. Different political factions 
were financed and armed by various countries with their own political 
agenda. The mujahidin supported by the United States to rise up against 
the Soviets also included the Salafist groups promoted by Saudi Arabia 
Gender issues are becoming politicized to 
the detriment of women in contexts where 
armed interventions usher in new blueprints 
for governance and “democratization.” 
Using illustrations from Afghanistan, 
this article shows that the nature of emerging 
political settlements may jeopardize stated 
international commitments to a women’s 
rights agenda, especially in contexts where 
security and the rule of law are severely 
compromised, where Islam becomes a 
stake in power struggles, and where ethnic/ 
sectarian constituencies are locked in power 
struggles for representation in defence of their 
collective rights.1
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plementation of Islamic law, but “were engaged in “staged publicity” 
that ritually affirmed their power and legitimacy.”7 
We must also re-examine any preconceived notions about the nature 
of normative frameworks informing gender relations in Afghanistan. A 
common assumption is that despite years of conflict support networks 
based on family and kinship have remained robust and that the exist-
ence of this social capital has avoided even higher levels of poverty. 
However, a crucial consideration in war-torn societies are the growing 
discrepancies between normative expectations and material realities. 
When men are no longer able or willing to honour their obligations yet 
continue to use male privilege to convert the vulnerability of their de-
pendents into material assets, we may witness novel forms of abuse. 
There is mounting evidence that new patterns of “commodification” of 
women arise in contexts where indebtedness and dependence on local 
strongmen and drug traffickers lead to loss of community autonomy 
and enmesh clients in dependency relationships.8 A study of indebted 
drug traffickers in Badakhshan province shows that women rank next to 
land in the choice of disposable assets used to settle debts. 32% of the 
traffickers interviewed reported selling a female relative.9 And a study 
by the IOM shows that young rural women (and children) are subjected 
to forced prostitution, forced labour, and practices akin to slavery.10 
Interpreting these trends as an expression of “natural” tendencies of 
the societies in question has the undoubted advantage of disclaiming 
any responsibility for escalating abuses of human rights by blaming 
them on “local culture.” A similar logic may authorize a form of double-
speak that upholds the principle of gender equality and social inclu-
siveness in official pronouncements, whilst marginalizing women in 
the allocation of development aid. 
Between the hammer and the anvil
State-building and democracy are the product of long and histori-
cally specific processes of political struggle for participation and voice. 
Civic rights—including the rights of women to participate as equal 
citizens—are also the product of these histories. The women’s rights 
and gender “mainstreaming” agenda that informs donor-assisted post-
conflict reconstruction packages adopts a technocratic approach to 
address what are fundamentally political prob-
lems. The legal and technical solutions offered by 
gender mainstreaming may be at odds with the 
“real politics” of highly volatile and insecure en-
vironments where women’s rights and the role 
of Islam become political stakes in the struggles 
between contending factions. 
The evidence from post-Taliban Afghanistan 
shows how democracy “by design” can legitimize 
social forces that are likely to resist the equal 
participation of women in civic, political, and 
economic life. This is hardly surprising since state-
building does not take place ex nihilo but draws 
upon social forces thrown up by the legacies of 
conflict which are themselves shaped by complex 
geopolitical influences. 
Above and beyond the political platforms of 
emerging power holders, however, I have argued 
that the social changes brought about by pro-
longed conflict have produced their own trans-
formative dynamic—a dynamic that can neither 
be fully addressed nor remedied by institutional 
and legal reforms. In that sense women are caught 
between the hammer and the anvil; they have to 
fight both for their formal de jure rights that are 
under constant threat from conservative social 
forces and for their substantive rights to security 
and human dignity that have become the casual-
ties of endemic lawlessness and impunity in their 
societies.
and Pakistan. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union the country was 
left to its own devices until the Coalition-led invasion in 2001. In the im-
mediate aftermath of the Bonn summit in 2001, the Coalition continued 
to distribute arms and money to militia armies to assist them in the on-
going battle against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, while the international 
community stressed the importance of state-building and of a strong 
political “centre.” 
In summary, the notion that democratization by design may herald an 
automatic expansion of women’s rights does not stand up to scrutiny. 
It may be argued, with justification, that any reversal of the policies im-
plemented by the Taliban represented an unambiguous gain. However, 
reading off substantive rights from state policies and legal frameworks 
remains a misleadingly limited exercise in contexts such as Afghanistan 
where the vast majority of women have little or no contact with state, 
market, or civil society institutions. Furthermore, in contexts where secu-
rity and the rule of law are totally compromised and impunity on the part 
of multiple perpetrators of violence holds sway, the notion of rights—for 
men or women—rings hollow. Before turning to explanations that privi-
lege the role of Islam or local culture to understand the nature of abuses 
against women in Afghanistan, we would do well to train our analytic 
lenses on the ways in which the war economy has affected patterns of 
gender inequality and aggravated gender-based violence. 
Gendered legacies of conflict
In contrast to sophisticated analyses of political economies of con-
flict, in discussions of gender relations and women’s rights we often 
revert to a world of unchanging tradition and cultural stasis. One of 
the clear dangers of such an approach is to misrecognize or misinter-
pret what are, in effect, reactive behaviours of ordinary people as they 
try to grapple with the uncertainties of everyday life by treating them 
as mere extensions of local custom. The dynamics of gendered dis-
advantage, the erosion of local livelihoods, the criminalization of the 
economy, and insecurity at the hands of armed groups and factions 
are analytically distinct phenomena. However, their effects combine 
seamlessly to produce extreme forms of female vulnerability. Attempts 
at addressing issues of gender justice through institutional and legal 
reforms fall short of acknowledging these interactions or their long-
term effects on deepening the disadvantages of women and girls.
The Soviet invasion in 1979 and the resulting collapse of the state 
eroded whatever little institutional support existed for women’s pub-
lic roles and legal rights and the period of insecurity and upheaval that 
followed acted to annul any formal gains. Between 1979 and 1992 an 
estimated six million people fled their places of origin, rural infrastruc-
ture was decimated, and the Afghan resistance set the scene for the 
growing influence of Islamist parties and local commanders. By the 
time the Taliban emerged in 1994, at the height of civil war, Afghani-
stan was in the grip of endemic lawlessness and human rights abuses 
of all kinds, including crimes against women. The Taliban came to 
power with the promise to restore law and order, albeit through a par-
ticularly harsh application of Sharia. Taliban policies towards women 
imposed a virtual state of curfew on women and enforced mandatory 
covering under the burqah, subject to severe punishments for infrac-
tions. 
The gender regime imposed by the Taliban represented a major 
break with “traditional” forms of social control in various ethnic com-
munities across Afghanistan.6 Decisions relating to the dress and mo-
bility of women and to relations between the sexes that were previ-
ously monitored by households, kinship groups, and community 
elders could now be mandated by decree and enforced by groups of 
armed young men, sometimes with little regard for local hierarchies. 
This did not only oppress women but potentially disempowered non-
Taliban men by robbing them of their prerogatives. It would, therefore, 
be quite unhelpful to present their depredations as either reflections 
of local culture or routine manifestations of Islamic government.
We should concentrate, instead, on problematizing the different 
uses of gender-based violence deployed by diverse social actors in 
Afghanistan. The “privatized” violence exercised by kin groups and 
families in the service of honour and reputation must be distinguished 
from sexual violence used as a systematic tool of war to intimidate, 
despoil, and establish positional superiority, and from the public per-
formances of Islamic retribution (featuring spectacular events such as 
lashings and executions) deployed by the Taliban as a means of social 
control. The Taliban were not merely affirming their piety or their im-
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During its blitz of Lebanon in the sum-
mer of 2006, the Israeli military ravaged 
the neighbourhood of Haret Hreik in 
the southern suburbs of Beirut, razing 
to the ground or severely damaging 
265 residential, commercial, and office 
buildings, and displacing thousands 
of households in what Human Rights 
Watch described as Israeli “war crimes.”1 
But beyond the sheer tonnage of ordi-
nance targeting Haret Hreik was the 
symbolic violence attempting to erase 
the body politic which had produced 
this space. Paralleling the September 
11 attack on New York’s World Trade Center, the city was invoked by 
Israeli war planners as a party to the conflict; erasing a neighbourhood 
or a number of buildings amounted to undermining the life-support 
of an enemy, in this case Hizbullah, which had established its national 
headquarters in the neighbourhood. 
Reflecting on the September 11 attacks and the events that ensued, 
David Harvey proposed to conceptualize the city as a body politic 
which can be attacked, wounded, remoulded, or rebuilt.2 This meta-
phor, Harvey argued, provides an interesting entry point to examine 
the relation between processes of urban production and the (neces-
sarily contested) governance of the city. It directs analysis towards the 
political choices taken as this body politic was historically created and 
how, once formed, such a body politic confronts various challenges. A 
year after the “July War,” as it is commonly called in Lebanon, this essay 
offers reflections on the current post-war reconstruction, builds on the 
metaphor of the city as a body politic, and places the events of the 
summer 2006 in a historical context which traces some of the processes 
in which Haret Hreik3 came to boast a powerful body politic and how 
this body politic responded to the Israeli assaults. 
Formation of a spatial body politic
As a neighbourhood, Haret Hreik witnessed a major transformation 
during the first years of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1983), when Bei-
rut’s division in two antagonistic and religiously homogenous units 
resulted in ousting the majority of its primarily Christian dwellers. 
Haret Hreik and surrounding areas be-
came the refuge of thousands of Shiite 
families displaced from other quarters 
of the city or from the country’s south 
that had fallen under Israeli occupation 
in 1978.4 During this decade, it rapidly 
transformed from a green, low density 
suburban neighbourhood into a con-
gested area where most construction 
violated urban regulations that dictat-
ed moderate land exploitation ratios. 
This urbanization was controlled by a 
handful of developers and was fuelled 
by the desire to accumulate capital and 
by dire housing needs in a war-torn and unaffordable city.
The formation of a popular social and cultural foundation that could 
sustain an Islamic political movement capable of military resistance to 
Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon probably began with the estab-
lishment of the Hawzas (or religious study groups) around 19845 and 
continued soon after, and in the face of neglect by the state authorities, 
with the organization of service provision in the southern suburbs of 
Beirut (e.g. garbage collection, drinking water provision, maintenance 
of sewer systems). During the late 1980s–early 1990s, Hizbullah’s po-
litical headquarters and the main offices of an array of social organiza-
tions affiliated to it were established in Haret Hreik. Over time, many 
linkages were created between this social and political organization 
and the neighbourhood, generating an “economy of Islamic resistance” 
there.
These developments modified the character of the neighbourhood. 
For one, Hizbullah’s security apparatus gradually imposed itself: streets 
surrounding the main political headquarters (Majlis al-Shura) were 
gated to form its “security quarters” (murabba‘ al-amni); armed security 
staff began patrolling in front of the houses and offices of its leaders; 
researchers and journalists visiting the neighbourhood were required 
to obtain special permits from the Party; and visitors were frequent-
ly questioned about their business there. Culturally and socially, the 
neighbourhood began to display the political and religious orienta-
tion of the community supporting Hizbullah, with the closure of liquor 
stores, night restaurants, bars, movie houses, and other entertainment 
considered immoral. Furthermore, neighbourhood streets were plas-
tered with signs and posters celebrating the presence of the Islamic 
Resistance and its martyred heroes while advertisement billboards 
conformed to religious guidelines. Many streets were renamed after 
heroes and martyrs of the Islamic Resistance. Similarly, people increas-
ingly adopted a religious dress code, and apartment buildings began 
to be fitted with curtains to shield household interiors from eyes in 
neighbouring buildings. I do not mean to suggest, as it is sometimes 
claimed, that Haret Hreik was hence “Hizbullah territory.” Like every-
where else, space is the subject of contention and resistance to this 
appropriation was visible everywhere. Yet, the Islamic resistance had 
clearly taken root, deeply altering the character of the neighbourhood 
and delineating it as a space in the city with a clear identity.
Reconstruction of Haret Hreik
In this context, authority over reconstruction of Haret Hreik this past 
year carried more symbolism than anywhere else in Lebanon and was 
hotly contested. The central government immediately announced its 
intention to take charge, as declarations abounded about ending “years 
of a state within a state” in reference to Hizbullah’s control over par-
ticular areas in Lebanon. On the other hand, Hizbullah’s leader, Sayyed 
Hasan Nasrallah also made a public “solemn” promise that Haret Hreik 
will be rebuilt “more beautiful than it was” and Hizbullah’s members 
Israeli bombs completely destroyed Beirut’s 
neighbourhood Haret Hreik in the summer 
of 2006. Because Hizbullah’s headquarters 
is located in the neighbourhood, Israeli 
war planners considered its destruction of 
particular symbolic and strategic relevance. For 
the same reasons, authority of reconstruction 
carried heightened symbolism and led to 
contestation between the central government 
and Hizbullah. In the intersection of these 
two powerful actors there remains little 
room for local residents to have a voice in the 
re-organization of their living spaces. 
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involving architects of several confessions in re-drawing the buildings, 
the actual decision about the modalities of reconstruction were taken 
early on by the political party who determined that there will be no de-
densification of the area and that the overall reconstruction will gener-
ally reproduce the pre-war fabric and its concomitant problems of poor 
ventilation, little natural lighting, and absence of public space. 
Moreover, local actors have been excluded from this reconstruction 
planning. This includes the Haret Hreik Municipality which, though 
closely allied to Hizbullah, has been sidelined from the project’s mak-
ing; none of its members were included in the plan formulation and 
it has no representative in Waad. Furthermore, the Municipality’s ef-
forts to improve the urban fabric of the neighbourhood by introducing 
more changes than was dictated by Hizbullah’s central political author-
ity were dismissed and have hence been abandoned. The same can be 
said about neighbourhood dwellers, 85% of whom have already signed 
documents conferring legal authority over collecting their compen-
sation and constructing their new apartments to Hizbullah.7 Among 
these dwellers are some of the developers who were historically cred-
ited for building the neighbourhood but have now lost authority over 
its making. Asked about why they have opted to sign away their legal 
rights, those interviewed argued that they had no choice in the current 
political context. 
A legal proposition
Despite their differences, Hizbullah and the central government 
agree on the legal framework in which reconstruction will occur. The 
cabinet has already approved a legal proposal in principle which pro-
vides a temporary and exceptional permit for the dwellers to rebuild 
their houses “as they were,” even if in violation of current public urban 
and building regulations. If this arrangement is approved by the leg-
islative body, dwellers will obtain a short-term entitlement to build 
“illegal” houses, while the exclusive urban planning framework that 
generated this illegality in the first place will not be revised. These 
citizens are hence tolerated rather than accepted and granted a lower-
than-normal entitlement to participate in the production of the city.8 
In the context of the southern suburbs of Beirut, 
an area that has been historically stigmatized as 
“illegal” and largely condemned in popular press 
and public discourse as such,9 a truncated entitle-
ment strengthens the community’s perception 
that it is unwanted in the city and that it needs 
solid political backing in order to retain the pre-
carious entitlement it has obtained. As a result, 
the community’s dependence on Shiite political 
parties who are able to provide this backing is 
strengthened further while its relation with the 
state continues to be mediated through these po-
litical parties. Conversely, public agents are able 
to, whenever they see fit, recite the refrain of “il-
legality”… every time they opt to attack political 
opposition through the window of the “illegal” 
communities they protect.10 
A new body politic?
So what do the events of the past year tell us 
about how the body politic responded to the 
Israeli attack? It is certainly premature to draw 
conclusions but, one year later, it seems that the 
threatened body politic has responded by further 
reducing the spaces of contestation. In attempt-
ing to re-secure a home in the city, dwellers have 
to manoeuvre in the intersection of two power-
ful actors whose respective approaches to urban 
governance have concurred to foreclose their 
possibilities for taking charge of the making and 
organization of their living spaces. 
recurrently described a prompt reconstruction of the neighbourhood 
as another “victory” for the Party. Many wondered in the months that 
followed the war how this reconstruction would play itself out, espe-
cially in the context of an ongoing political standoff between the gov-
ernment and a Hizbullah-led opposition which has suspended central 
government agencies and the Parliament since November 2006. 
As a planner, urban researcher, and citizen of this city I became inter-
ested in how this conflict influenced the ability of residents to take part 
in the reconstruction of their neighbourhood. The issues presented 
here emerged from my ongoing interaction with the neighbourhood 
and my frustration vis-à-vis the governance of a post-war reconstruc-
tion which I have come to believe forecloses the opportunities for pub-
lic debate and for dwellers to intervene as partners in their making of 
their living environment. 
The position of the state
A public commission was established in the days following the war 
and included representatives from public planning agencies and local 
political parties (including Hizbullah). This commission was however 
rapidly caught in the wider political standoff: it only met a few times 
and its final recommendations were never adopted. Faithful to a neo-
liberal tradition in public governance that conceptualizes the role of 
the public actor as an entrepreneur whose task is to attract foreign in-
vestment rather than as a manager of space or a service provider, the 
central government retracted developing reconstruction plans for the 
area when it became clear that Hizbullah would stand in the way of 
any redevelopment plan that could displace dwellers. The Council for 
Development and Reconstruction, the central planning agency in the 
country that had orchestrated much of the post-civil war reconstruc-
tion, was sidelined directly by the Prime Minister’s office in favour of 
the Higher Relief Commission. Thus, the state conceptualized its role in 
reconstruction as “relief”; its involvement would be limited to paying 
(rather generous) financial compensation to those who had lost their 
homes, while the management of reconstruction would be left to indi-
vidual homeowners and contractors. Hence, there will be no strategy 
to conceptualize or compensate for damage to the public domain or 
to introduce direly needed open and communal spaces that form the 
heart of any community.6 This was well in line with the post-civil war 
reconstruction of the country where public efforts were concentrated 
in large-scale developmental projects (e.g. redevelopment of Beirut 
downtown, the construction of an international airport) while social 
policy was essentially reduced to paying indemnities to households 
displaced during the war. 
In the months that followed, even relief proved to be more chal-
lenging than expected. Compensation was delayed as the legal re-
quirements for establishing clear ownership titles clashed with the 
grey zones of real life where multiple inheritances in large families 
and unprofessional market developments produced discrepancies in 
national property records. Furthermore, the reconstruction still lacks 
a legal framework: while most dwellers had adjusted their buildings’ 
legal status in 1994 by virtue of a regularization law and in exchange of 
penalties, they are not entitled to rebuild outside building regulations 
if these buildings are demolished. New planning regulations have to 
be issued if reconstruction is to proceed without dramatically de-pop-
ulating the area. These however require approvals from the Parliament 
which has been suspended by the political standoff. 
The Hizbullah project
Meanwhile, history continues to repeat itself in Beirut’s suburbs as 
Hizbullah emerges as the planning body developing the neighbour-
hood’s reconstruction plan. The party has established a private devel-
opment company named Waad (or Promise) in reference to the com-
mitment made by Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah to rebuild Haret Hreik for 
its community. Six architects, all of them university professors with 
no necessary affiliation to the party, were asked to develop a recon-
struction plan with firm instructions not to change the fabric, density, 
and general organization of the neighbourhood. It is on the basis of 
this plan that Waad has now commissioned a number of architectural 
offices to redesign buildings, with strict criteria to observe the same 
footprints, building heights, and lot boundaries for every building, thus 
replicating the environment that was generated by profit-driven proc-
esses during the years of civil war. While Waad goes the extra-mile to 
present an image of religious inclusiveness and open-mindedness by 
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Northwestern Somalia, although it is 
part and parcel of the larger context 
of the Somali civil war which affects 
all Somali populations in the Horn, 
stands out as a particular political con-
text. The region declared secession as 
an independent state as early as 1991 
under the name of “Somaliland.” It is 
generally peaceful and has known a 
reasonably stable measure of govern-
ment since 1997. Democratic (exter-
nally monitored) elections were held 
in 2002, 2003, and 2005. The fledgling 
state-apparatus however, is tiny and 
severely under-funded. Political stabil-
ity has been maintained via a peculiar 
mix of institutions and actors, state as well as non-state ones, with a 
pivotal role for the elders and the political strongholders of the vari-
ous Somaliland clans and subclans. Clan politics is a real and important 
factor in Somaliland’s making and functioning today. In the absence of 
a protecting and providing state, clan allegiance is a determining fac-
tor as far as individual physical and economic security are concerned. 
Apart from clan, Islam is felt very strongly about. The persistent situa-
tion of insecurity and uncertainty over the past fifteen years seems to 
have only exacerbated this.
Islam in a stateless society
The clan-system and Islam have co-existed for centuries as institu-
tions suited to the needs of an egalitarian Somali pastoralist society. 
In Somali mythical history, the clan system is as old as Islam itself. It is 
traced back to the advent of Muslim traders on the Somali coast. Arab 
traders, who were to various degrees related to the Prophet himself, 
married Somali women, thus starting the lineages which make up 
the clan-system today. Somali clans take pride in 
never having known “paganism.” The Somali pol-
ity was a so-called “stateless society.” In a context 
without formal political hierarchy social order and 
peace were guaranteed via customary law2 (heer), 
a system of contracts between roaming pastoral-
ist (patrilinear) descent groups belonging to the 
larger groups called “clans” and “clan families.” 
Heer varies from place to place, depending on 
situations, circumstances, and groups involved. In 
matters concerning family-related issues such as 
marriage, divorce, or inheritance, heer is consid-
ered heavily influenced by the Sharia. Yet, rather 
than being based on individual responsibility, 
heer is characterized by collective responsibility, 
which is in fact at variance with Islamic ortho-
doxy. When blood compensation (diya) is paid in 
case of death or injury, it is paid collectively by 
the descent group of the perpetrator to the de-
scent group of the victim. In decisions concerning 
a particular descent group or in case of conflict 
between two descent groups, the group’s elders 
are collectively in charge. The elders see to it that 
the interests of the group are protected either by 
negotiation or by having the able men of the group take up arms. In 
the daily dealings of the descent group, the role of these elders, the 
so-called “spear bearers” (waranleh) is complemented with the role 
of another type of elders: the “men of religion” (wadaad). In principle, 
these men are excluded from full participation in secular politics: they 
are by definition non-combatants in 
conflicts between descent groups and 
they do not participate in political de-
liberations pertaining to their group’s 
interest. They are supposed to play a 
mediating role in case of conflict. Ex-
cept, that is, when the war is a jihad. 
One famous “wadaad” of the Darood 
clan however, Sayyid Mohamed Ab-
dule Hassan, nicknamed by the British 
protectorate forces “the Mad Mullah” 
became a political leader. He waged a 
long and bloody jihad against Christian 
occupation (British as well as Ethiopian) 
of Somali lands from 1901 to 1920. He 
thereby predominantly attacked fight-
ing forces of other Somali clans he considered as traitors because they 
had aligned themselves with the British “infidels.” 
A wadaad can be anything from a member of a nomadic group who 
knows some Arabic and has more than average devotion and knowl-
edge of religion to a truly learned man, a shaykh with intimate knowl-
edge of Quran and Islamic jurisprudence. The religious men attend to 
the religious affairs of their lineage: they solemnize marriages, give 
their blessings, settle divorce and inheritance matters, direct Friday 
prayers, and so on. Their services are rewarded with gifts—some of 
the wadaads rely entirely on charity for their livelihood, as any gift to 
a wadaad brings a reward from God. In the fifteenth century, the in-
troduction of the Qadiriyya brotherhood in Somalia gave rise to the 
foundation of brotherhood “settlements.” In these religious communi-
ties, pious Somali from different clan backgrounds lived together as 
brothers, devoting themselves to cultivation, animal husbandry, reli-
gious study, and worship. In addition, they protected the sick, the old, 
and the disabled and provided religious education to future wadaado. 
Independent Somalia
The 1960 independence signalled the advent of modern state struc-
tures to Somalia. In 1969, the civil regime was overthrown by a military 
coup. The coup leader, General Siyyad Barre, immediately outlawed the 
Somali clan system. Sharia remained formally part of the legal system, 
but in practice it played a marginal role. The regime displaced any po-
tentially competing structure—aiming for total legal and political con-
trol. Protests against the promulgation of the new family law of 1975, 
which in accordance with the proclaimed socialist ideals of Barre (but 
in contravention of the Sharia) granted equal inheritance rights to men 
and women, were immediately crushed by executing ten religious men 
who had stood up against the law. Barre added the extra-legal National 
Security Courts to the judiciary system, bringing arbitrariness and ter-
ror to the Somali. Traditional clan elders were made into state agents as 
so-called peacekeepers between the “ex-clans.” At the same time, clan 
was instrumentalized politically. In the government’s discourse, Islam, 
as well, was “Siyyadized” to serve the ideological purposes of the mili-
tary regime.
The regime’s “socialist” ideology with its secular, materialist outlook 
and its dictatorial style of government was a thorn in the side of an 
increasing number of Somali political and social actors, including a 
(relatively small and very loosely connected) group of Islamist activists. 
These Islamists stated that they wanted to establish an Islamic public 
order—eventually culminating in the establishment of an Islamic state 
based on the Sharia. One aspect of their ideology stood out as similar 
to Barre’s proclaimed ideals for the Somali state: the Islamists wanted 
to do away with the clan system. They resented clanism as a political in-
strument that served Barre to keep Somali Muslims divided and under 
A reformist brand of Islam emerged and 
consolidated during the decades of the 
Somali civil war, which began in the early 
1980s—leading up to outright state collapse 
in 1991. Initially, its socio-political position 
was rather marginal. Proponents of the new 
brand denounced the dominant local Sufi 
Islam as well as the Somali clan system, to 
which it was traditionally closely associated. 
Soon however, lack of political and military 
success seems to have forced the Islamists 
back into the organically grown interaction 
between Somali Islam and the ubiquitous 
clan system, its politics, and institutions. 
At least for the time being.1
new “religious Men” 
in somaliland
M a r l e e n  r e n D e r s
(Post-)Conflict
Explicit Islamist 
political activism 
was virtually 
impossible in 
Somaliland’s clan-
based polity of the 
late 1990s.
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are much preferred beneficiaries of zakat: the Prophet himself was an 
orphan. As for the educational activities organized by the “new” reli-
gious men, these were a far cry from the traditional religious educa-
tion provided by the wadaad in roaming Quranic schools (known as 
dugsi in Somali). The educational institutions they set up were similar 
to the so-called écoles franco-arabes in Western Africa (Senegal, Mali, 
etc.) with a broad curriculum but with a strong religious orientation. As 
such, these private Islamic schools have (together with other private 
initiatives) filled part of the gap left by the defunct Somali state educa-
tional system. They teach Arabic (which is the language of instruction 
at these schools) and Islamic sciences, but also marketable skills such 
as math, English, or computer sciences. The schools sometimes even 
belong to a formalized international network which gives the school’s 
graduates direct access to further education at Arab or Islamic universi-
ties worldwide. 
Skills such as math, Arabic, and English are highly practical tools 
when doing business. Indeed, business seems to be the preferred oc-
cupation of the “new” religious men. Many of them became well-to-do 
businessmen, involved in contracting or trade. They are valued busi-
ness counterparts (sometimes operating as subcontractors for interna-
tional agencies) as they have a reputation as honest, diligent, and effi-
cient workers who finish their work within the agreed deadlines. Some 
sources claim that the better part of businesses in Somaliland is in fact 
controlled by these Muslim-believer type entrepreneurs. As such, once 
more, they are respected members of their communities, generating 
welfare as well as actual wealth.
The economic activities of the “new” religious men, however, high-
light the most crucial difference with the traditional wadaad. Whereas 
the old wadaad was for his survival dependent on 
handouts from his clansmen—in cash or kind—
the “new” religious man is economically independ-
ent, cultivating all kinds of business connections, 
independently from his lineage. Despite their ap-
parent re-integration as a new kind of “wadaad” 
in the age-old interaction between Somali Islam 
and the clan system, their economic independ-
ence and power constitute a crucial change and 
may make for a fundamentally altered political 
dynamic in the future.
control. Yet, while Islamist armed 
militancy slowly started to develop, 
it was overtaken in speed by clan 
based military movements. In Janu-
ary 1991 Hawiye clan militia (Gen-
eral Aideed’s “United Somali Con-
gress”) overran Mogadishu, ousted 
Barre and ended the twenty-one 
years of military dictatorship. Soma-
lia fell apart, dismembered in ever 
more disintegrating clan-fiefdoms.
Upon the disintegration of the 
regime and the country a new dy-
namic ensued in the Islamist sphere. 
Part of the Islamist militants and 
sympathizers decided to stay out 
of the war between the clan-based 
militia and went back to their own 
clan areas where they promoted 
an Islamic public order from below, 
getting involved in various social ac-
tivities, particularly education and 
health/sanitation related ones. An-
other part of the Islamist militants 
resorted to violent means, forming 
the then only trans-clan militia of 
the war, referred to as Al Itihaad (“Islamic Union”). The Islamist Al Iti-
haad behaved and operated like any other militia, trying to secure ter-
ritory and strategic assets to make money out of them. Without long-
term success, however. The Islamist militia was beaten by clan militia 
wherever they tried to set up shop in Somalia, be it Kismayo, Bossaaso, 
Las Qoray (Somaliland), or elsewhere. Unless they teamed up with one 
of the clan factions, they remained politically and militarily unable to 
establish themselves as a sustainable administration. Towards the mid-
1990s, the Somali Al Itihaad militia disbanded: the rank and file just 
went home to their clan areas (including the new Somaliland state) 
while the leadership went on to pursue other avenues to further the 
Islamist project—within, rather than against the clan system.3
Islamists in peace-time Somaliland: the “wadaad” 
revisited?
Despite their ideological disapproval of the Somali clan system, Is-
lamists had to re-insert themselves into that system in order to safe-
guard their physical safety (and ultimately their political project). Ex-
plicit Islamist political activism was virtually impossible in Somaliland’s 
clan-based polity of the late 1990s. Proponents of an Islamic public 
order became very prominent in business and charity: living, working, 
and preaching among their clansmen.
Their teachings still propagated a “new” Islam, stressing values such 
as a strict moral code, modesty in dress, and hard work as well as de-
nouncing typical Sufi practices such as dikhr or religious chanting. They 
also strongly disapproved of the chewing of qaat, a herbal stimulant 
and favourite past-time of the overwhelming majority of the male pop-
ulation. From a religious attribute for Sufi shaykhs who used it for medi-
tation, qaat had developed into a social vice, taking up huge parts of 
household budgets, workers’ time, and causing health problems such 
as mental disorders. Although their religious teachings (especially con-
cerning qaat) by no means went uncontested, the “new” religious men 
were respected in their communities for their virtuous behaviour and 
their religious knowledge.
Like the “old” wadaad, these “new” religious men were part and parcel 
of their clans, yet, without a central role to play in actual clan politics. 
A few of them appear to have been involved in talks following political 
conflicts between clans or between the Somaliland government and 
self-appointed representatives communicating “clan grievances,” thus 
allegedly fulfilling the traditional tasks of religious wise men trying to 
temper conflict. More importantly however, they have been devoting 
considerable energy—as did the “old” wadaad —to charity and educa-
tion.
A pet project for Islamic charity is, for example, the construction and 
maintenance of orphanages. Quite a few were set up in Somaliland, ei-
ther with the help of locally generated funds or with proceedings from 
zakat collected and sent over by Muslims abroad. To be sure, orphans 
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Having failed in its declared objec-
tive to turn Iraq into a stable, thriving 
and democratic country in the Middle 
East, a model unto the autocratic re-
gimes that are the region’s unfortunate 
hallmark, the United States has had 
to scale back its ambitions. Facing a 
growing sectarian conflict and fearing 
the situation would spin out of control 
it announced a security plan for Bagh-
dad and surrounding towns, as well as 
Anbar province, in January 2007. The 
plan consisted of a military initiative 
involving an extra injection of some 
30,000 troops (a “Surge”) that was de-
signed to create space and time for the 
Iraqi government to reach a political 
deal with its opponents.
In September, the Surge’s architect and implementer, Gen. David 
Petraeus, was able to claim he had made serious headway on the mili-
tary front: a number of violent actors, such as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and 
the Sadrist movement’s Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi, JAM), had been 
put on the defensive, and Sunni tribes had launched a revolt against 
AQI (the “awakening”). But on the political front, he was unable to show 
even the least bit of progress: the only thing the Maliki government 
had exhibited since January was its inability, or reluctance, to reach 
out effectively to Sunni Arab leaders with a view toward bringing them 
back into the new Iraqi order.
Military presence and political strife
The fatal flaw in the security plan was the decision to rely on the Ma-
liki government to bring peace to Iraq. This government is dysfunction-
al and weak. In name it is a government of national unity, but in reality 
it deserves not a single part of its name: it is not unified, it does not 
represent the nation, and it has failed to govern. 
While popularly elected (in December 2005), it 
lacks popular legitimacy. This paradox is resolved 
when we understand the nature of Iraqi politics: if 
a majority of Iraqis voted in 2005, they did so by 
religious edict and simply because they could. By 
default (in the absence of any alternatives), they 
voted for the coalition that had received the Shi-
ite religious leadership’s endorsement. Yet this co-
alition’s components were, with the exception of 
the Sadrist movement, parties that returned from 
exile in 2003 and that by and large have failed to 
connect with the Iraqi street since then. The Kurd-
ish parties do enjoy a measure of popular sup-
port, but only in Kurdistan, and their participation 
in the Iraqi government enjoys very little support 
among Kurds, as the Kurds’ overriding goal is to 
secede from Iraq, if not in this generation, then 
the next.
Not only is the government weak, it is consti-
tuted on the basis of an ethno-sectarian logic that 
favours two communities (Shiites and Kurds) at 
the expense of the third (Sunni Arabs). As such, it 
is unwilling to compromise with the Sunni Arabs, 
whom it considers unchanged regime loyalists, 
Baathists, and terrorists. To bring Sunni Arabs 
back into the state’s security structures would, in 
their view, fatally undermine the new order and 
augur the return of the former regime 
in a new guise. Rather than reconciling 
with its adversaries, the government 
thinks it will be able to crush them 
once the Americans have completed 
their job of building up, training, and 
equipping the Iraqi security forces. 
This is why it does not want the Ameri-
cans to leave just yet, however much it 
decries the occupation and calls for a 
timetable for U.S. withdrawal.
This position has a mirror image. 
Sunni Arab leaders also have come to 
the conclusion, contrary to their earlier 
insistence that U.S. forces should with-
draw at once, that these forces should 
stay, because the “Surge” has shown 
that only the Americans are able to protect them from a Shiite militia 
onslaught in Baghdad, which threatens to turn this mosaic of a capital 
into a Sunni-free city. They hope they can convince the Americans that 
the Maliki government is a proxy for Iran, and that the Sunnis and the 
Americans have a common interest in countering Iran’s spreading influ-
ence in Iraq and the wider Gulf region. They even hope that in this way 
they can get rid of the Shiite militias and regain power.
All sides, except AQI, are tugging at the Americans to stay and do 
their bidding—to choose their camp in this civil war, which continues, 
even if temporarily subdued by the additional U.S. military presence. 
The Bush administration and the U.S. Congress have made very clear 
they do not want their forces to play this role, but what options do 
they have? In the absence of a political strategy that gets around the 
Maliki government’s weaknesses and obstinacy, the Americans could 
either leave or stay. An early departure, however, is not a viable op-
tion. Such a move would leave behind a vacuum that could only be 
filled by non-state actors that are ready to go at each other’s throats 
with heavier weapons, thus increasing the possi-
bility of an escalation that could engulf the entire 
region. In turn, this would require a massive U.S. 
military intervention aimed at protecting its stra-
tegic interests in the Gulf.
Prospects
In reality, U.S. forces will not be able to stay out 
of an Iraqi civil war. This is because there will not 
be a single, neatly defined civil war, for example, 
one between Sunnis and Shiites. The more likely 
prognosis is one of a failed state in which a great 
variety of groups, enjoying at most local support, 
will battle for turf: rival militias, insurgent groups, 
warlords, and crime gangs. A sectarian conflict will 
coexist with, and intersect, an intra-Sunni conflict 
(for example, between tribal elements and AQI), 
an intra-Shiite conflict (between the Supreme 
Council’s Badr militia and JAM), and possibly an 
Arab-Kurdish conflict (over the Kurdish region’s 
boundaries, especially in Kirkuk).
In this confusing mix, the Americans will find 
groups that may be its friends one day and its 
enemies the next, the principal criterion being 
whether they serve U.S. interests: to protect a 
semblance of government and keep its adver-
saries divided and off-balance. The U.S., in other 
words, will seek to “manage” the Iraqi civil war(s) 
Whither the surge 
in iraq?
j o o s t  r .  h i lt e r M a n n
(Post-)Conflict
It should be 
beginning to dawn 
on all the principal 
actors ... that the 
failure to contain 
the Iraqi crisis may 
spell a cataclysm of 
global proportions.
The security plan for Iraq has failed, not 
least because of its reliance on the Maliki 
government. This government is dysfunctional, 
lacks popular legitimacy, and has failed to 
govern. Prospects for the near future are 
bleak. The looming civil war will involve strife 
between a great variety of groups; U.S. forces 
will be drawn into these conflicts; and there is 
a serious threat that neighbouring countries 
also may be sucked into this vortex. The 
challenge to counter this trend is enormous. 
As the unilateralist approach to managing 
world affairs has shown its bankruptcy, 
there is now an urgent need to return to 
multilateral diplomacy, even if there are 
no guarantees of success.
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autocratic regimes and to spread their activities well beyond the region 
into Europe. And it will wreak havoc with the global economy, driving 
up oil prices to unprecedented heights and thereby suppressing eco-
nomic growth in the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Iraq’s fate, and that of the region, now lies in U.S. hands. It is unclear 
whether the Bush administration has a fall-back approach, a Plan B if 
and when it comes to the conclusion that Plan A has failed. But for now, 
it cannot afford to unveil a Plan B, or even to discuss the possibility of 
the need for such a plan, as doing so would be tantamount to admit-
ting that Plan A is not working—that not only the Surge but the entire 
arrangement created since April 2003 has descended into unmanagea-
ble chaos, the new order as disorder. This, the administration is not pre-
pared to do, at least not yet. But it also does not seem to have a political 
strategy to get around the Surge’s failure to bring about a new national 
compact. Washington appears adrift, with Democrats and some mod-
erate Republicans (such as Senators Lugar and Hagel) opposing the ad-
ministration’s approach but incapable of mobilizing sufficient support 
to force a significant troop withdrawal before sometime in 2008.
This leaves us in a dangerous situation. Whatever our position was 
concerning the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and remove its tyrannical 
regime, the challenge in front of us is one that all must share. This can-
not be done as long as the U.S. keeps the reins tightly in its hands. It 
will require a joint international effort (such as we have seen, if so far 
unsuccessfully, on the Iranian nuclear issue), with shared control and 
responsibility. It should be placed under the aegis of the only agency 
that has the credibility, expertise, and resources to lead it, the United 
Nations. The unilateral approach to managing world affairs has shown 
its bankruptcy. We must now return to the painstaking and protracted 
approach of multilateral diplomacy, with no guarantee of success, but 
with the knowledge that the path chosen since 2003 can only lead to 
disaster.
with a view to containing the conflict within the country’s borders. Such 
brinkmanship, however, entails enormous risks of spillover. Neighbour-
ing states may be sucked into this vortex, against their will and strate-
gic interest, as they watch their own proxies being hammered by their 
enemies’ proxies. A regional conflagration would then enter the realm 
of possibilities.
There is a growing awareness in the region of the dangerous situation 
that has developed. If there is hope of stabilizing Iraq and its borders, it 
lies in the fact that all of Iraq’s neighbours have one thing in common: 
none of them wants Iraq to fall apart. To turn this premise into a work-
able relationship is one of the difficult challenges ahead. 
Despite President Bush’s early, adamant rejection of engagement 
with Iran in his response to the recommendations of the Baker-Ham-
ilton Study Group in December 2006, the Americans have started talk-
ing to the Iranians—for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
and the embassy takeover that followed. On at least three occasions, 
representatives of the two countries have met to discuss the situation 
in Iraq (only), but so far progress has been minimal, barely rising above 
mutual recriminations of the “You’re totally wrong” and “You’re at fault” 
type. Almost certainly, to be successful on Iraq, the two sides will have 
to expand their discussion to include the nuclear question. It is the con-
tinuing U.S. threat against Iran over its suspected offensive nuclear pro-
gramme that has induced the Iranians to act as spoilers in Iraq rather 
than play the role of regional peacemaker that its own interests in Iraqi 
stability suggest would be more constructive. (Iran is best served by 
an Iraq that is weak but friendly and united; continued chaos in Iraq 
entails serious risks for internal peace in Iran.) 
Finding a way to diplomatically manage the nuclear question, let 
alone find a durable solution for it, is a hugely difficult task that both 
governments, in Washington and Tehran, seem incapable of. The start 
of a dialogue should therefore be applauded and encouraged, even if 
real progress may not occur until after the U.S. presidential elections—
if then. It should be beginning to dawn on all the principal actors, in 
the region and outside it, that the failure to contain the Iraqi crisis may 
spell a cataclysm of global proportions. It will precipitate a humanitari-
an crisis in Iraq and neighbouring countries that will dwarf anything we 
have seen so far in the region. It will also empower a new generation of 
jihadis, who will seek to destabilize the Middle East by challenging its 
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A woman sits 
in her kitchen 
as an Iraqi 
soldier watches 
the street.
Over the past decade, I have worked 
both as an academic and as an activist 
to document the various ways in which 
Iraqi women and gender relations have 
been changing in the context of po-
litical repression under the Baath re-
gime, changing state policies towards 
women, a series of wars, as well as eco-
nomic sanctions. In the aftermath of 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, I decided 
to build on this earlier work, extend the 
historical frame to include the period 
before the 35 years of the Baath regime (1968–2003), looking back to 
the transition from monarchy to republic (late 1940s through the revo-
lution of 1958 to the early 1960s), and to deepen my understanding by 
interviewing almost 200 Iraqi women in London, Amman, Detroit, and 
San Diego. 
The women I talked to were of different generations, varying ethnic 
and religious backgrounds: some were more secular, others more re-
ligious. I talked to those who have been politically active and those 
not, women associated with different political orientations and parties, 
professional women, housewives, mothers, etc. Yet, the majority of the 
women I talked to were educated middle class women of urban back-
grounds. In terms of places of origin, most women I interviewed were 
from the capital, Baghdad, but I also spoke to women from other major 
cities and towns such as Basra, Najaf, Karbala, Mosul, Babylon, Kirkuk, 
Irbil, and Dohuk. 
Plurality and difference
One of the many problems in the post-invasion era is the failure by 
many sections of society to acknowledge different experiences of the 
past, therefore alienating parts of the population who do not see them-
selves represented in a particular narrative. In reference to the present 
situation, I always feel uneasy when I hear people say: “Iraqi women 
think …” or “Iraqi women want …” generalizing from what is inevitably 
a wide variety of opinions, views, and 
visions. What arguably has emerged 
from my research, however, is that dif-
ference is historically based on a com-
plex set of variables and can not simply 
be reduced to ethnicity and religion as 
is often construed nowadays.
The period after the first Baath coup 
(1963) is generally associated with in-
creased political violence, greater sec-
tarianism, and a reversal of progressive 
laws and reforms. Yet, many women I 
interviewed spoke about the relative social freedom and cultural vi-
brancy during the rule of the Arif brothers (1963–68) and the early 
Baath period (1968–78). The experiences of these periods differ most 
significantly in terms of class and political orientation. Many secular 
and apolitical middle-class Shia, Sunni, Kurdish, and Christian women 
concurred in their appreciation of the achievements of the early Baath 
in education, modernization of infrastructures, and welfare provisions. 
However, the memories of those who were politically active in opposi-
tion to the regime are filled with accounts of political repression, mass 
arrests, torture, and executions. Yet, even some of those women who 
had first hand experiences of the regime’s repressive practices retro-
spectively appreciate its developmental policies.
At the same time, accounts of Iraqi women reveal that an urban 
middle-class identity, especially the more cosmopolitan Baghdadi 
identity, continued to subsume ethnic and religious differences even 
throughout the period of the sanctions. In other words, a middle-class 
Shia family in Baghdad had more in common with its Sunni Arab and 
Kurdish middle-class neighbours in mixed neighbourhoods than the 
impoverished Shia living in Madina al-Thawra (renamed Saddam city 
and now called Sadr city), or the majority of Shia in the south. Indeed, 
Baghdadi families have frequently been multi-religious and multi-eth-
nic and mixed marriages amongst urban Baghdadi middle classes were 
quite common. 
Since the late 1970s, differences on 
the lines of secular and Islamist politi-
cal positions started to assume greater 
significance and influence women’s ex-
periences of the regime. Members or 
sympathizers of the Islamist Shia Da‘wa 
party, for example, were targeted not 
so much because of their religious af-
filiation but because of their opposition 
to the regime and their aim to estab-
lish an Islamic state. Without wanting 
to diminish the suffering and hardship 
that members of the Shia Islamist op-
position parties endured, the narrative 
about being the main recipients of state 
repression not only belittles the suffer-
ing of Kurds, but also other segments of 
the population, including those Sunni 
Arabs who actively resisted the regime. 
Iraqi women and gender 
relations under the Baath 
regime
Based on a more in-depth reading 
of the previous regime’s gender poli-
cies and its attitudes to the position of 
women in society, many Iraqi women 
The fact that Iraqi women are living under 
abhorrent conditions often leads to generalized 
depictions of these women as faceless victims. 
The author draws attention to the stories and 
life-courses of individual Iraqi women, as these 
do not only give a human face to their plight, 
but also reveal how women have been further 
marginalized during the U.S. occupation. 
Set against this background it becomes 
understandable why so many Iraqi women are 
nostalgic for a past that was far from peaceful.
Contextualizing the 
Plight of iraqi Women
n a D j e  a l - a l i
(Post-)Conflict
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hostage by U.S. forces and used as bargaining chips. Aside from the 
violence related to the arrests itself, those women who were detained 
by the troops might suffer as well from the sense of shame associated 
with such a detention. As there has been mounting evidence not just of 
physical assaults and torture but also of rape; women who have been 
detailed might even become victims of so-called honour crimes. 
Islamist militants and terrorist groups also pose a particular danger 
to Iraqi women. Many women’s organizations and activists inside Iraq 
have documented the increasing Islamist threats to women, the pres-
sure to conform to certain dress codes, the restrictions in movement 
and behaviour, incidents of acid thrown into women’s faces, and even 
targeted killings. Early on in 2003, many women in Basra, for example, 
reported that they were forced to wear a headscarf or restrict their 
movements in fear of harassment from men. Female students at the 
University of Basra reported that since the war ended groups of men 
began stopping them at the university gates, shouting at them if their 
heads were not covered.3 
Not only students, but also women of all ages and walks of life are 
nowadays forced to comply to certain dress codes as well as restrict 
their movement. Suad F., a former accountant and mother of four chil-
dren who lives in a neighbourhood in Baghdad that used to be rela-
tively mixed before the sectarian killings in 2005 and 2006 was telling 
me during a visit to Amman in 2006: “I resisted for a long time, but last 
year also started wearing hijab, after I was threatened by several Islam-
ist militants in front of my house. They are terrorizing the whole neigh-
bourhood, behaving as if they were in charge. And they are actually 
controlling the area. No one dares to challenge them. A few months 
ago they distributed leaflets around the area warning people to obey 
them and demanding that women should stay at home.” 
By 2007, the threat posed by Islamist militias as well as the mush-
rooming Islamist extremist groups goes far beyond imposed dress 
codes and calls for gender segregation at university. Despite—or 
even partly because of the U.S. and UK rhetoric about liberation and 
women’s rights—women have been pushed back even more into the 
background and into their homes. Women, who have a public profile 
either as doctors, academics, lawyers, NGO activists, or politicians, are 
systematically threatened and have become targets for assassinations. 
Criminal gangs increase the general “climate of fear” by kidnapping 
women for ransom as well as to sexually abuse them and to traffic 
young women outside of Iraq to sell them into prostitution.
Conclusion
If views of history are by definition directed towards the past, ana-
lyzing how history is constructed and used reveals as much about the 
present, as I show in my book, Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to 
the Present. In the context of the aftermath of the invasion in 2003, the 
escalating violence and sectarian tensions, contestations about power 
and national identity, history becomes a very important and power-
ful tool. Contesting narratives about what happened in the past relate 
directly to different attitudes towards the present and visions about 
the future of the new Iraq. They relate to claims about rights, about 
resources, and about power. More crucially, the 
different accounts of the past lay down the pa-
rameters of what it means to be Iraqi, who is to 
be included, and who is to be excluded. History 
justifies and contains both narratives of unity and 
narratives of divisions and sectarianism. Given 
the current devastation and continuous deterio-
ration of living conditions inside Iraq, it might not 
be so surprising that many women look at their 
past with great nostalgia even if their memories 
are filled with political repression, wars, and eco-
nomic hardship. 
gained in terms of socio-economic rights during the 1970s and 1980s 
within the general context of political repression. Living conditions im-
proved for the majority of the population as the state relied not only on 
force and its power to control and co-opt, but also devised generous 
welfare programmes and opened up opportunities for investment and 
capital accumulation which were of great benefit to a large number of 
people within the expanding middle classes. 
Yet, political repression, a series of wars, and the militarization of 
society seriously affected women, families, and gender relations, not 
only in terms of the loss of loved ones, but also in terms of a dete-
riorating economy, changing government policies, and shifting norms 
and increasingly conservative values surrounding women and gender. 
After the end of the war, and under the sanctions in the 1990s and early 
2000s, a radical shift took place in terms of women’s diminishing partic-
ipation in the labour force, restricted access to education, inadequate 
healthcare, and other social services. Women were increasingly pushed 
back into their homes as unemployment rates sky-rocketed, the econ-
omy faltered, and the infrastructure collapsed.
Developments since 2003
Every-day survival is a priority in a context where lack of security 
goes side by side with incredibly difficult living conditions. The Iraqi 
infrastructure, which was already severely debilitated as a result of 
economic sanctions and a series of wars, has deteriorated even further 
since 2003. Electricity shortages, lack of access to potable water, mal-
functioning sanitation systems, and a deteriorating health system are 
part of every-day lives in post-2003 Iraq. Intisar K., who works as a doc-
tor in a teaching hospital in Baghdad, summed up what has also been 
documented in several UN-related documents: “We only have electrici-
ty for three to a maximum of five hours a day. There is not enough clean 
drinking water. Lack of sanitation is a big problem and continues to be 
one of the main causes of malnutrition, dysentery, and death amongst 
young children.” 
It is not only lack of electricity, clean water, and petrol that affects the 
every-day lives of Iraqi civilians. According to recent reports published 
by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the British-based 
charity organization Medact, the 2003 invasion and ongoing occupa-
tion has led to the deterioration of health conditions, including malnu-
trition, rise in vaccine-preventable diseases, and mortality rates for chil-
dren under five. Iraq’s mortality rate for children under five rose from 
5 percent in 1990 to 12.5 percent in 2004.1 Similar to the humanitarian 
crisis during the sanctions period, women suffer particularly as they are 
often the last ones to eat after feeding their children and husbands. But 
they are also having to stand by as their often sick and malnourished 
children do not obtain adequate health care. 
Despite incredibly difficult circumstances, Iraqi women have been at 
the forefront of trying to cope with and improve the exceedingly dif-
ficult living conditions and humanitarian crisis since 2003. There has 
been a flourishing of locally based women’s initiatives and groups, 
mainly revolving around practical needs related to widespread pov-
erty, lack of adequate health care, lack of housing, and lack of proper 
social services provided by the state. Women have also pooled their 
resources to help address the need for education and training, such as 
computer classes, as well as income generating projects. Many of the 
initiatives filling the gap in terms of state provisions where welfare and 
health are concerned are related to political parties and religiously mo-
tivated organizations and groups. However, independent non-partisan 
professional women have also been mobilizing to help. 
Violence against women
While aerial bombings of residential areas are responsible for a large 
number of civilian deaths, many Iraqis have lost their lives while being 
shot at by American or British troops. Whole families have been wiped 
out as they were approaching a checkpoint or did not recognize areas 
marked as prohibited. In addition to the killing of innocent women, 
men, and children, the occupation forces have also been engaged in 
other forms of violence against women. There have been numerous 
documented accounts about physical assaults at checkpoints, and 
during house searches. Several women I talked to reported that they 
had been verbally or physically threatened and assaulted by soldiers 
as they were searched at checkpoints. American forces have also ar-
rested wives, sisters, and daughters of suspected insurgents in order to 
pressure them to surrender.2 Female relatives have been literally taken 
Notes
1. See http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/
iraq_statistics.html and http://www.medact.
org/content/wmd_and_conflict/Medact%20
Iraq%202004.pdf.
2. Those suspected of being involved in both 
the resistance as well as in terrorist activities 
are regularly detained without informing 
their families about their whereabouts 
and their wellbeing. People disappearing, 
random arrests, as well as torture and 
abuse in prisons are ironically common 
phenomena in post-Saddam Iraq.
3. “Iraq: Female Harassment from Religious 
Conservatives,”IRINNews.org, 14 April 2004.
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When I went home again for the first 
time, I thought, this is the soil I was 
born in. This is the smell of my land, 
the red fields, the earth as red as blood. 
This is what my own land looks like … 
I wept. I screamed. All the memories I 
had as a child of every place. When we 
came home from school we would find 
the bodies of the slain. Once the heli-
copter came, the army, and bombed 
us. I remember all of this … Now we are 
like tourists. If we go there, when we think of our homes we cry with 
our memories, we left this and came. We left our brick house and came 
to live in cadjan (thatch) huts with the rain and snakes. How we used to 
live there! Our house is bombed, the walls are not even there. The LTTE 
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) had taken everything there was. 
Mumida 
Mumida is a young Northern Muslim woman, from the Mannar 
district in the north, now living as an internally displaced per-
son (IDP) in the Puttalam district in northwestern Sri Lanka. The 
home she refers to is her former natal village, shared between 
Tamils and Muslims. She is telling me about her first visit to her 
former village, 12 years after leaving it, in the brief period of grace 
opened up by a 2002 ceasefire between the warring Sri Lankan 
Government and the Tamil insurrectionary group the LTTE. That 
ceasefire along with the visits of Muslims to 
their former homes has now collapsed. The 
memories she has of that home are of com-
plex and multiple cycles of violence. She re-
calls the deaths and destruction caused by 
the military campaigns of the Sri Lankan Army 
against the Tamil-speaking populations of the 
north. However, the central event that frames 
her memories is the ethnic cleansing of Mus-
lims from the north and the continuing vio-
lence of displacement.
In October 1990, the LTTE expelled all the 
75,000–80,000 Muslims from the five districts 
in the north under its control, Vavuniya, Man-
nar, Mullaithivu, Jaffna, and Kilinochchi. They 
were given 24–48 hours to leave. In Jaffna, 
Muslims were given only two hours to leave. 
The order came from the highest ranks of the 
LTTE and no clear explanation was offered. It 
was a purely military operation and the reac-
tion from the local Tamil community was of shock and surprise—
though Tamils have accommodated it since. By November, there 
were no more Muslims in the north. The LTTE had made the north 
the Tamil-only territory that they were fighting for. This ethnic 
cleansing is known as “the Eviction” and the community of Mus-
lims created by this act are formally “IDPs” and refer to themselves 
as “Northern Muslims” and “ahathi” (refugees). Puttalam district 
houses over 65,000 Northern Muslim refugees. Through two peace 
processes and ceasefires, their collective right to return and an 
LTTE guarantee that they will not be evicted again has never been 
brokered. A few individual families have returned to the north but 
have faced harassment from the LTTE. The majority has not yet 
returned. 
Sri Lanka’s conflict has centred on the Sinhalese majority and 
Sri Lankan Tamils, Sri Lanka’s largest Tamil-speaking minority. Sri 
Lankan Muslims have barely featured in accounts of the ethnic 
conflict, but their lives too have been inextricably linked to the 
civil war. Muslims, though Tamil-speaking, are classified as an eth-
no-religious minority around the categories of religion and eth-
nicity, while Sri Lankan Tamils, Christian and Hindu, are classed as 
an ethnic minority around language and ethnicity. Only the recent 
clashes between the LTTE and East-
ern Muslims, and the Northern Mus-
lim Eviction, have suddenly alerted 
attention to the precarious position of 
an ethnic minority that is a minority for 
both Sinhalese and Tamils. The implica-
tions of this positioning continues to 
leave Sri Lankan Muslims negotiating a 
war that is not being fought for them 
but is, nonetheless, consequential for 
their every day lives. Here I discuss 
Northern Muslims' dreams of “return” and their fragile hopes of a 
Tamil and Muslim north.
The historicity of loss
They were going from house to house … I asked them [LTTE cadres], 
“is this the house that your father’s mother built?” You have to ask! I am 
asking them straight “is this the house your father’s mother built? Is this 
the house the leader of the Tigers built? Have you come all this way to 
take from us, us who built this house, this threshold, who brought these 
things? Now if you want to go and catch a country, you do that. Take 
the country. Who would come and ask from people these things?” 
Nachiya’s story of the Eviction in Jaffna
Muslims from the north, in contrast to the politically and numeri-
cally strong East Coast Muslims and the historically dominant South-
ern Muslims, were a politically and numerically vulnerable commu-
nity. In 1990, Muslims from the north of Sri Lanka became “Northern 
Muslims”—a community created around (1) common origins in the 
northern districts of Sri Lanka; (2) a shared collective experience of 
“the Eviction”; and (3) collective internal displacement. Before the 
Eviction Muslims identified themselves through districts e.g. Jaffna 
Muslims, Mannar Muslims. The term “Northern Muslim” came into cur-
rency only after the Eviction and it denoted a community traumati-
cally born through eviction, it gave them an origin in a place, a region, 
after they had lost it. The strength of this collective identification and 
the density of stories of the Eviction in Puttalam cannot be under-
estimated. Refugees were living, as Nazleen put it to me once, “side 
by side with their sorrows.” Diverse families, individuals, and villages 
found that even though their pasts were dissimilar and multiple, in 
1990 the LTTE ensured that their futures would be intertwined. This 
loss continues to structure Northern Muslim identity, through its con-
cretisation in the everyday residential spaces that Northern Muslims 
inhabit and recreate. 
In 2003, I first went to Puttalam. Thirteen years after the Eviction, 
Northern Muslims continued to construct their identities around their 
former homes; new settlements and residence in camps were struc-
tured around former natal villages from the north. Children were still 
growing up in Jaffna or Erukalampiddy (Mannar) though actually in 
Puttalam. Refugees continued to make social and moral distinctions 
between “local” and ahathi (refugee) Muslims. While Puttalam has 
historically a strong and influential Muslim minority, they were also 
seen as different from refugees—despite their shared ethnicity and 
language—on the basis of villages of regional origin. Differentiation 
between local and refugee on basis of regional origin, also worked 
to allow internal differentiation between Northern Muslims from dif-
ferent districts and villages. Refugees argued that different “homes” 
made different kinds of persons, drawing on former villages from the 
north—physically absent but still culturally nourishing. Houses in 
Puttalam clustered around the social relations of their absent former 
homes enfolding these as productive absences. Moreover, the idiom 
of home and natal villages which Northern Muslims still draw upon 
was consciously multi-ethnic; homes were shared between Tamils 
and Muslims and the idiom of shared homes and neighbourliness 
was frequently stressed as a counterpoint to the dominant narrative 
of a Tamil only north. Common loss was creating a shared everyday 
future.
The promise of return which has been 
embraced by Muslim refugees from Northern 
Sri Lanka may be ephemeral. Nonetheless, 
dreams of returning are vital in attempts to 
repair the past and the wounds of the Eviction. 
The author shows that through dreaming the 
prospect of a peaceful multi-ethnic northern Sri 
Lanka remains imaginable, thus allowing for at 
least one ray of optimism concerning the future 
of a deeply troubled society.
a Dream of return
s h a r i k a  t h i r a n a g a M a 
(Post-)Conflict
“Now we are like 
tourists … we left 
our brick house and 
came to live … 
with the rain and 
snakes.”
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to repair the past and the wounds of the Eviction and Tamil/Muslim 
relations. I heard the interplay of these conversations in many houses 
and stories, in relation to children, land, Tamil neighbours, and to me. I 
make this distinction between the return as promise and the return as 
practical possibility because the symbolism of return is a story about 
belonging that is written into the making of Northern Muslim com-
munities. Whether Muslims can physically return or not, which is be-
coming less likely as time passes, the emotional landscape of possible 
“return” remains central. Even the young, who do not intend to return, 
are rooted in the experience of displacement and the story of a ter-
rible injustice. Retelling Eviction stories beckoned to the necessity of 
insisting on the political legitimacy of return. For Northern Muslims a 
guarantee of return would be the acknowledgement of injustice and 
the repair of Tamil and Muslim relations. “Return” as such is a horizon of 
expectations, dreams, and fantasies; conversations about it speak to “a 
time before” Eviction and “a time after.”
Tamils and Muslim futures?
One of the themes common to all Eviction stories was Northern Mus-
lim insistence that it had been the LTTE rather than Tamils who had 
evicted them, and the description of their Tamil neighbours as passive 
weeping observers. This insistence located ethnic cleansing as coming 
from the outside, refusing to poison intimate village relations which 
continued thus to be infused with love and longing. This is also not un-
true, Muslim eviction was unpopular among northern Tamils and there 
is no evidence of civilian collusion. However, this insistence is as much 
ideological as factual, and it relates to Northern Muslim attempts to 
imagine a multi-ethnic north. 
Muslim conversations about former homes drew on the people that 
these places were shared with. Shafiqa’s memories of Jaffna were all 
about her childhood relationship with a Hindu Tamil man from whom 
she and her brother were inseparable. In 2002 after the ceasefire a let-
ter came carried by many hands to Shafiqa’s family from the old Tamil 
man. The letter told of his own displacement and his return to Jaffna. 
He too was now an IDP living in a cadjan hut, the Muslim family should, 
he wrote, come home to where they belonged so they could be neigh-
bours again. Shafiqa, married with a child in Puttalam, cannot return 
and her despair as she told me about this letter testifies to how “return” 
also promises the repair of social relations between Tamils and Mus-
lims someday in the future. Despite the tightlipped silence of Tamils 
on Muslim eviction, some Northern Tamils did visit their former neigh-
bours in camps, continuing intimacies that both sides treasured. How-
ever, largely, Tamils remain silent. Many Tamils I interviewed refused to 
approve but also condemn the eviction of Northern Muslims. 
Presently, despite the much more violent and interpersonal break-
down of communal relations between eastern Tamils and Muslims, 
the Kattankudy Muslim associations have undertaken to raise money 
and feed thousands of Tamil refugees displaced by recent fighting.1 
They have persisted despite the opposition of the two factions of the 
LTTE (now fighting against each other). D.B.S. Jeyaraj, a Tamil journal-
ist muses in his writing whether such actions indicate possibilities of a 
peaceful Sri Lanka.2 He points out that in the Tsunami, briefly Tamils, 
Muslims, and Sinhalese helped each other. Such narratives, in which 
the continuing intimacy of Tamils and Muslims is highlighted despite 
the war time atrocities, indicate a local need to cling onto an utopian 
story of peace in Sri Lanka, one that attempts to make Tamil and Mus-
lim relations the fragile loom upon which a new future can be woven.
Will this weaving of the past with the present prove to be too frag-
ile? Is it fair that it is Northern Muslims, rather than Northern Tamils, 
who are being forced to demonstrate Tamil and Muslim kinship? At the 
moment there are no answers. As the war continues to unfold in Sri 
Lanka, I am grateful that one community at least 
has maintained a multi-ethnic imagination of Sri 
Lanka, thereby stressing the necessity of continu-
ing communication and intimacy. 
Dreaming of return
Here I return to Mumida, who, like many of the younger generation of 
refugees does not imagine actual return to the north, still a war-zone. 
The key debate that drew together multiple stories, opinions, dreams, 
and divisions was the question of “return.” “Return” in Puttalam, as it is 
indeed for many populations (e.g. Palestinians) displaced by political 
violence, is more than compensation or even physical relocation. It is a 
profound social and emotional question about one’s place in the world, 
about recognition of injustice; it opens a horizon of expectations and 
dreams whose longings can never be fully satisfied. In Puttalam, return 
plaited together two different kinds of conversations, one about the 
actual possibility of relocation and the renewal of actual neighbour-
hoods, and the second, about the acknowledgement of the legitimacy 
of return.
However, this profoundly divided generations of Northern Muslims 
as refugees settled down and children married in Puttalam. Relation-
ships to former homes were formed directly for the older generation 
but, people asked, what of their children? Were these children, children 
actually of this home, Puttalam? And if so, did that make them differ-
ent persons from their parents even though they were kin? Sometimes 
people even wondered if their children had a home. Conversations 
about “return” opened up the impossibility of a future in which the con-
sequences of the Eviction could be erased, and one in which different 
generations occupied different emotional landscapes. The older gener-
ation strongly desired return to the north, even as they acknowledged 
its impossibility. An intermediate generation, who came, struggled and 
raised children in the camps, spoke of their memories of their former 
villages and their longings for that life. However, they saw themselves 
tied to their children who had settled in Puttalam; not least many were 
frightened of undergoing another eviction again. The younger genera-
tion, like Mumida, saw themselves very clearly as Northern Muslim but 
as Razika told me in 2007, “who wants to go back and die?” They were 
in fact Northern Muslims proper, their identities firmly rooted, not in 
their former homes as with their parents, but in a common history of 
displacement and eviction. 
While the impossibility of return constantly reminded people of 
their inability to return to a time before the Eviction, the impossibil-
ity of actual return could not exhaust the promise of return. It seemed 
sometimes that only the promise of return could bring back the ability 
Sri Lankan 
Muslim 
refugees 
returning 
home
Notes
1. Communal relations in the east are more 
tense than in the north.
2. D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Kattankudi Muslims help 
Tamil IDPs in Araiyampathy,” Transcurrents.
com, 20 March 2007 at, http://transcurrents.
com/tamiliana/archives/302. 
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On subjectivity
Some scholars argue that in order to 
interpret the Quran, one must avoid 
all subjectivity. I do not agree with this 
proposition since, to be human, is to 
live a life that is politically, economically, 
sexually, culturally, and historically situ-
ated and subjectivity is merely the effect 
of encountering and comprehending 
the world through this situatedness. It is, 
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, instead 
of pretending that we encounter texts 
from some pure or abstract location outside the confines of time and 
space, we need to be open, honest, and self-conscious about the material 
and ideological sites from which we read them. In fact, that is one of the 
pre-requisites for entering into the hermeneutic circle. 
My first thesis, then, is that no Quran interpreter can avoid subjec-
tivity because it is an inescapable human condition. At best, we can 
be more or less cognizant about how our subject positions shape our 
readings of a text.
On language and interpretation
Another common idea is that only those people who have mastered 
Quranic Arabic should be allowed to interpret the Quran. I also disagree 
with this idea since it suggests that there is only one type of scriptural 
interpretation and seems to confuse translation with interpretation.
In its most basic sense, interpretation is simply the act of giving mean-
ing to what we read, so one does not need to be a language expert or a 
philologist to read a text interpretively since one 
does that anyway merely by virtue of reading it. 
Moreover, mastering a language does not ensure 
that we will arrive at the best or only valid reading 
of a text. If it did, the Quran would not have distin-
guished between better and worse readings of it2; 
the Prophet’s companions would not have differed 
in their understanding of some ayat3; Muslims 
would have had a universally agreed upon inter-
pretation of the Quran; and scholars like al-Ghazali 
would not have held that each ayah has possibly 
60,000 meanings.
The point that I am making is that interpretive 
differences are not reducible to language alone 
but also have to do with an interpreter’s method-
ology, epistemology, theology, and sexual politics. 
I will give two examples from Quranic exegesis to 
support my claim.
The first applies to those cases where, no matter how well scholars 
know Arabic, they cannot agree on the meaning of a word. A good ex-
ample is idribuhunna in verse 4:34 that most scholars read as “to beat” 
thereby interpreting the verse as giving a husband the right to beat 
his wife. However, the root of this word, daraba, has several different 
meanings—including “to go away”—and the Quran itself uses this 
word in seventeen different senses. So, the fact most interpreters have 
chosen one meaning, and the worst, and that most Muslims refuse to 
accept alternative interpretations as legitimate has less to do with lan-
guage than with the sexual politics of patriarchies that want to main-
tain male power over women.
Second, we may agree that a word can 
be interpreted in different ways, but 
that still does not mean that we will 
even get to the heart of the Quran’s 
teachings. For instance, the Quran asks 
us to read it for its best meanings. We 
may be open to accepting alternative 
meanings of best—like finest or most 
excellent—but that does not necessar-
ily mean that we will be able to get to 
the moral, social, or historical content 
of the word. That is because what we 
understand by “best” or “finest” will depend on our morals, our theol-
ogy, the type of society in which we live, the time period in which we 
live, and so on. Thus, knowing Arabic cannot help us to categorically 
define the best meanings of the Quran.
The discipline of Quranic exegesis itself attests to the limitations of 
language in yielding a complete understanding of the Quran. Thus, 
from the earliest times, scholars have known that the Quran has at 
least two levels of meaning. Tafsir, as we know, focuses on the exterior 
or apparent meanings, while ta'wil concerns itself with their interior 
or esoteric meanings. Indeed, an entire tradition in Islam—the Sufi—is 
based on trying to recover the interior meanings of the Quran through 
an array of spiritual practices including gnosis. 
Hence, my second thesis is that while the Quran lends itself to lan-
guage analysis, interpreting it does not necessarily require a mastery of 
Arabic since interpretation is not an exercise in philology.
On translation
In light of this, I understand the insistence on mastering Arabic as 
an argument about the need to read the Quran only in Arabic; i.e., as 
an argument against translating it. I agree that translating the Quran 
requires one to have mastered Arabic and several scholars (all men 
until now) have given us translations that most Muslims accept as 
reliable. It thus seems reasonable to argue that if we can read the 
Quran in translation, we can also interpret it in translation. But, while 
Muslims may accept translations of the Quran, they discourage their 
use for interpreting it on the grounds that the translated Quran is not 
the real Quran.
Clearly, since the Quran was revealed in Arabic, a special symbolism 
attaches to being able to read it in Arabic. However, to claim that the 
Quran in translation is not real implies that its ontological status—its 
“reality,” so to speak—derives from its being in Arabic rather than from 
its being God’s speech. This is a theologically unsound notion since the 
Quran’s ontological status has to do with its relationship to God, not to 
human language. Thus, divine speech is real in all languages because 
its reality stems from its being God’s word, not from being in a given 
language.
If the Quran is a universal text, as Muslims believe, then its universal-
ity lies in its being equally real in all languages, and not just in one. In 
what way can the Quran be universal when non-Arabs, non-literates, 
non-males, are excluded from understanding or interpreting it in light 
of the faculties and grace given them by God?
My third thesis, then, is that the Quran is real in all languages and is 
as open to being interpreted or misinterpreted in these languages as 
it is in Arabic.
In this article, Barlas joins the debates on 
the right and authority of Muslim women to 
interpret the Quran.1 As a way to move the 
conversation beyond simply asserting or 
refuting the right of this or that person to 
read the Quran on this or that condition, she 
distinguishes between different types of 
interpretations and authority. Simultaneously, 
she attempts to come to grips with the tensions 
between an individual believer’s reading of the 
Quran and that of the community. 
still Quarrelling 
over the Quran 
Five Interventions
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The Quran itself 
… does not tie 
interpretive rights 
to race, sex, class, or 
even literacy.
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Beirut, 2006.
My fourth thesis then is that we should not privatize the Quran by mak-
ing a group or individual the sole arbiters of its meanings; indeed, it is 
the ummah’s obligation to ensure that all Muslims have free access to 
the Quran.
On (and in) practice
In principle, Quranic ideas of faith open up “an infinite space for the 
promotion of the individual beyond the constraints of fathers and 
brothers, clans and tribes, riches and tributes.”9 In practice, of course, 
Muslims have not actualized the promise of such views. Most women, 
in particular, have never had lives beyond the “constraints of fathers 
and brothers” for various reasons, including how Muslims have chosen 
to interpret the Quran.
While I do not blame the Quran for its anti-women readings—the 
burden lies squarely on its interpreters—I understand the bitterness of 
those who do. But, then, smearing Islam has become a vocation in the 
West these days, as has its opposite: recovering 
the “true” Islam in line with Anglo-European sen-
sibilities. As Disraeli once said of the East, Islam 
is now a career. Even so, I draw comfort from the 
fact that for most Muslims, the venture of Islam 
can never be a policy issue tied to the political 
ambitions and financial apron strings of a su-
perpower run amok who is chastising us for not 
being moderate enough.
I do not disregard the urgency of reform in Mus-
lim societies, but I believe that it can only come 
from those who consider Islam to be their moral 
compass in this world. Meanwhile, I suspect that 
Muslim interpretations of the Quran are likely to 
remain unworthy of it. But, we do not have to set-
tle for the worst, as we have done by embracing 
anti-women interpretations for so long. To strive 
for ever-better understandings of our scripture is 
a calling for all those who are moved by it. The 
test of a moral community and of moral individu-
ality both is how far we can fulfil that calling by 
relying on what God has chosen to give us. That is 
my fifth thesis and also my conclusion.
On authority
If I am right that the Quran is a universal text, that know-
ing Arabic cannot ensure interpretive unanimity or accuracy, 
that the only way to decipher it is not just through language 
analysis and that no reading of it can be objective, then it 
seems necessary to rethink our view of who has the right to 
interpret it. The Quran itself has made it obligatory for each 
one of us to use our own intellect and reasoning to interpret 
it; it does not say that only males, or Arabs, or scholars can, 
or should, interpret it. In other words, it does not tie inter-
pretive rights to race, sex, class, or even literacy. Literacy and 
scholarship have never been the hallmark of prophets or 
sages, or, for that matter, of most believers who have usually 
been unlettered. To assume that these people cannot under-
stand the Quran because they lack scholarly knowledge is to 
disregard aspects of the Quran’s religiosity and universality 
and to confuse knowledge of God’s words with their “inner 
meanings,”4 a distinction the Quran itself makes. Potentially, 
anyone can arrive at these inner meanings through reflec-
tion.
The Quran does, of course, ask us to learn from and teach 
one another and a certain pedagogical role is part of the 
moral praxis of both women and men whom the Quran urges to en-
join the just and forbid the wrong.5 This type of moral pedagogy does 
not, however, allow us to claim a monopoly on religious knowledge or 
inerrancy in our understanding of it and nor is it based in the sort of 
institutionalized authority that Muslim interpretive communities have 
come to claim over the centuries.
Most significantly for our purposes, the Quran does not bind us to 
the moral authority of earlier generations without thinking through 
things for ourselves. It censures those who insist on following “the ways 
of their fathers,” a phrase that we can read literally as referring to rule 
by the father/husband (patriarchy),6 or, more generally, to traditions 
passed down over time. The Quran also warns us that if our parents try 
to make us “join in worship [with God] things of which thou hast no knowl-
edge, then obey them not.”7 These verses appear in particular contexts of 
course, but their message is clearly universal: we can only grasp divine truth 
by and for ourselves without any compulsions or constraints. Is this not why 
the Quran forbids coercion in matters of faith and religion?
On individuals and the community
Naturally, when we read a scripture within a community, our under-
standing of it can never be wholly free of the community’s understand-
ing of it. Indeed, if there is a conflict between them, we are pressed to 
subordinate the personal to the communal in the name of tradition, 
or rather, the dominant view of tradition. How, then, can we take indi-
vidual responsibility for interpreting the Quran?
This is a complex issue because, for Muslims, community and faith, or 
“ummah and din are mutually defining and they give distinctive character-
istics to the Islamic view of communal existence.”8 But, if this means that we 
can only practice our din to its full potential within a moral community, it 
does not mean that a community is, by definition, moral. Nor does it mean 
that living in a community frees us from the necessity of making interpre-
tive choices for ourselves. After all, if communal readings of the Quran 
were inerrant and we could rely blindly on them, why would the Quran 
protect our individual right and freedom to read it in light of our own 
knowledge and reason? Is it not because no one is infallible and no one 
can decide for another how to approach God? Is it not because God 
wants to give each of us the opportunity to respond to God’s call as 
best we can? If so, is it not reckless disregard and self-defeating for us 
to refuse this charge?
Regrettably, Muslims have not thought about the implications of 
such questions for the relationship between individual and communal 
readings of the Quran. Instead, we expect individuals to subordinate 
their interpretation of it to that of the ummah’s because we confuse 
communal norms with Quranic norms. However, communal and Qu-
ranic norms are not always the same. For instance, the communal norm 
is to treat the Quran as the preserve of a small group of males, typically 
Arabs and often scholars. To me, however, this “norm” is a heresy mas-
querading as orthodoxy because it subordinates the Quran (the univer-
sal) to males, Arabs, and scholars (the particular). The Quran, however, 
belongs to all Muslims and it gives each one of us the right to struggle 
to arrive at an understanding of it as a test of our morality.
Notes
1. This is an edited version of a talk I gave 
in Amsterdam at the ISIM Conference 
“Redefining Boundaries: Muslim Women and 
Religious Authority in Practice,” on 24 June 
2007. For a fuller discussion of my position, 
see Asma Barlas, “Believing Women,” in 
Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations 
of the Qur’an (Texas: University of Texas 
Press, 2002); and “‘Holding Fast by the Best 
in the Precepts’: the Qur’an and method,” 
in Changeable and Unchangeable: New 
Directions in Islamic Thought and Practice, ed. 
Kari Vogt et al. (I.B. Tauris, forthcoming).
2. The Quran does this by asking us to read it 
for its “best” meanings, see 39:18.
3. See Mahmoud Ayoub, The Quran and its 
Interpreters, vol. 1 (Albany: SUNY, 1984).
4. See 10:39 in Muhammad Asad, The Message 
of the Qur’an (Gibraltar, 1980), 297.
5. See 9:122; in Asad, 285.
6. For my definition of patriarchy, see Barlas, 
“Believing Women,” 11–13.
7. See 31:14–15 in Ali, 1083.
8. Merryl Wyn Davies, Knowing One Another 
(London: Mansell Publishing Ltd, 1988), 
129–130.
9. M. Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, trans. Robert 
Lee (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 57.
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We know that the velayat-e 
faqih lacks a rational justifica-
tion. The justifications based 
on narrated accounts of the 
sayings of the Shii Imams are 
also dubious, which is why 
historically most fuqaha have 
not subscribed to the theory. 
So why is political control 
over Iran in the hands of the 
fuqaha? What justifies their 
rule? According to those sub-
scribing to the theory of the 
velayat-e faqih, a faqih has 
authority because he is well-versed in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Fiqh 
has to be implemented so that human beings can achieve felicity in this 
world and the next. The implementation of fiqh requires two things: first, 
someone who is well-versed in fiqh (a faqih) and, two, the establishment 
of a state and the handing over of supreme control to a faqih so that he 
can implement the Sharia.
For a velayat-e faqih-based system, the fact that the system is based 
on fiqh and implements the Sharia is the only criterion and measure 
for the Islamic-ness of the government. It goes without saying that the 
implementation of fiqh does not make the government and society reli-
gious; if a government would implement the precepts of fiqh in an athe-
istic or non-religious society, this would not automatically make such a 
society religious. We will overlook this problem for now and accept the 
claim made by the fuqaha: that a society in which the precepts of the 
Sharia are implemented is an Islamic society. 
Incomplete implementation of Sharia
However, looking at the record of the fuqaha of the Islamic regime 
shows that the implementation of precepts is far from complete. The 
precepts on cutting off a thief’s hand, on stoning, on apostasy, and those 
on jihad are not being implemented. Neither is the precept on interest 
being implemented. The Quran has spoken in the harshest terms about 
charging interest on loans and described it as waging war on God. But 
the Islamic Republic’s banking system is based on interest and applies 
even higher interest rates than many banking systems in the capitalist 
world. Why are the lower profit rates in capitalist banking systems seen 
as interest rates that are prohibited by Islam, whereas the high profit 
rates in the Islamic Republic’s banking system seen as acceptable? Is this 
not the application of trickery in interpreting the precepts of God? The 
list of unimplemented precepts is much longer. Twenty-eight years after 
the Islamic Revolution, the observance of ritual prayers is weak, tithes 
are a dead letter, and the Quran is neglected.1 
When the precepts of the Sharia are not acted upon and the state is 
not based on fiqh, then what makes the Iranian government religious 
and what leads to the perpetuation of rule by the fuqaha? Only one re-
maining feature suggests that the system is Islamic: women’s hijab. The 
Islamic Republic’s regime makes women wear the hijab by force so that, 
one, the country is considered Islamic and, two, there can be a justifica-
tion for continued rule by the vali-ye faqih [supreme Islamic jurist/cleric]. 
In short, women are used to put Islamism on display.
Women should be free to wear or not to wear the hijab. The govern-
ment has no right to impose a particular form of covering on women 
in the name of religion. Let us assume that the Iranian government is 
a religious government and that the implementation of the Sharia is 
the government’s duty. What is the position of the hijab in the Quran’s 
moral-legal-penal system? Is the hijab more important than not charg-
ing interest on loans? Why is Iran’s banking system allowed to charge 
interest, while women are not allowed to deviate from the precept on 
the hijab? Is the hijab or prayer more important? Prayer is a wholly spir-
itual and worship-related affair. It is the link between the needy and the 
needed, the worshipper and the worshipped. It also serves a very im-
portant social function as far as the Quran is concerned. Prayer destroys 
immorality and vice. If the government claims to be implementing the 
Sharia and combating immorality and vice, why does it not make prayer 
obligatory? Even if it were possible, it would defeat its purpose. Forced 
prayer is not a prayer. But the hijab is not important as an act of worship 
or, even if it were, it is not at all comparable in this sense to prayer and 
fasting. And the Quran has not assigned any social benefits to it either. 
Failure to observe many precepts leads to punishment in the afterlife, 
but the Quran has not assigned any punishment in the afterlife for fail-
ure to observe the hijab. 
Lack of security
Why is it that, when people were free in their choice of clothes under 
the Shah’s regime, women and girls used to favour wearing the hijab, 
while the regime in the Islamic Republic has totally failed to impose 
its choice of covering on women even by brute force? Why is it that, 
under the Shah’s regime, girls used to go to state schools and emerge as 
Muslims, whereas today not even the Islamic Republic’s officials wish to 
send their children to state schools? Why is it that before the revolution, 
girls and women used to use public transport without any problem, but, 
since the revolution, the problems cannot even be solved by gender-
segregation on public transport? 
Women need security in society, but they do not have it. They do not 
want to be viewed as sex objects, but the Islamic Republic has reduced 
them to sex objects. Women are the targets of devouring eyes. The prob-
lem of women is a question of freedom and equality. They do not want 
to be discriminated against because of their gender. Why is this demand 
resisted? Is it because of a commitment to Islamic law? No, even Mr. Kho-
meini held that belief in God and the Prophet was sufficient to qualify 
a person as a Muslim. As he wrote: “What, in truth, constitutes Islam … 
is the principle of the existence of God and God’s oneness, the Prophet-
hood and, possibly, belief in the afterlife. The rest of the rules consist of 
the precepts of Islam which have no bearing on the essential belief in 
Islam. Even if someone believes in the above-mentioned principles but, 
because of some doubts, does not believe in Islamic precepts, this per-
son is a Muslim, on condition that the lack of belief in the precepts does 
not lead to a denial of the Prophethood …”2
Most of the Iranian women who want equal rights are Muslims. They 
accept that the precepts of fiqh used to be implemented in the early 
days of Islam and that they were obligatory then. But, contrary to the fu-
qaha, they doubt that these precepts hold for all time and everywhere. 
The unreasoned assumption of the fuqaha is that the precepts of fiqh 
hold for all time and everywhere unless proven otherwise. The assump-
tion of religious modernists is that these precepts were temporary and 
belonged to the society of the early days of Islam unless proven other-
wise. These precepts solved some problems in the simple society of the 
past, but, today, they do not solve any problems; instead they produce 
a negative perception of Islam. 
Crisis of legitimacy
When “the destruction” of so many precepts of fiqh is unproblematic, 
why are the hijab and precepts relating to women so important? Be-
cause the political system is naked and exposed, it needs a cover to 
lend legitimacy to the rule of the fuqaha. But there is no such cover. 
Oppression, violence, and intimidation cannot be rendered legitimate 
by forcing women to cover. The regime in Iran has tried these methods 
for twenty-eight years, but the project for making a fiqh-based society 
has completely failed. Women are not like a few intellectuals who can 
be brought into line through assassination and imprisonment. Their life-
style cannot be imposed on them.
Any regime has an ideology to lend it legitimacy. The ideology justi-
fies rule by the state (the authorities) and makes it appear rightful. Fiqh-
based Islam is the legitimizing ideology of the Iranian State. But the 
State is now facing a crisis of legitimacy for the following reasons: a) The 
fuqaha have deviated from the precepts of the Sharia and have placed 
the most important precepts of fiqh in abeyance; b) The formulation, 
How are we to understand the Islamic 
Republic’s battle against women? Women who 
want gender equality are tried and given hefty 
jail sentences. By intimidation and detention, 
the regime forces women to observe the 
decreed head and body coverings. But why 
has the Islamic Republic gone to battle with 
women? The author argues that the issue is 
directly linked to the theory of the velayat-e 
faqih [rule by an Islamic jurist] and the 
legitimization of rule by Islamic jurists. Without 
gender apartheid, the velayat-e faqih would 
cease to have meaning.
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tion, reached a peak in Turkey, and were imitated by Reza Shah in Iran.
Extensive measures (known as “hujum” or “assault”) taken in Soviet 
Central Asia to force women not to wear the hijab reached a peak in 
1927. On the orders of the women’s section of the Communist Party, 
thousands of women threw their scarves and traditional garments into 
fires in public squares in some cities. However, the “liberation” of women 
by force never produced the desired results in the Central Asian repub-
lics. Douglas Northrop’s study on Uzbekistan showed that the “assault” 
did not succeed in producing a substantial change to the power rela-
tionship between men and women and that, in a paradoxical way, it 
increased Uzbeks’ propensity to wear the hijab as “a symbol of ethnic 
and national identity” and as a form of resistance to the Soviet state.3 
The Islamic Republic’s use of force in this respect has likewise produced 
an outcome that is the reverse of what the state intended.
In Turkey the creation of “a woman in line with civilization” was part 
of the authoritarian modernizing project of the Kemalist state. Ataturk 
used to say: “I’ve seen women … who throw a cloth or a towel over their 
heads to hide their faces and, when men pass by, they turn their faces 
and move out of the way … Gentlemen! Can the mothers and daughters 
of a civilized nation resort to this kind of strange behaviour and return 
to barbarous times? This is a scene that brings ridicule for the nation….”4 
How arrogant must a person be to describe half of his country as bar-
barous? This problem remains unresolved to this day. In May 2007, the 
Turkish army threatened the country’s parliament and said that it would 
not, under any circumstances, allow a man to become president whose 
wife observed the Islamic hijab. Turkey’s Islamists respect the separation 
of the state and religion, they do not seek to implement the precepts of 
the Sharia, and they approved all the laws relating to human rights and 
democracy which were endorsed by the EU. But the Kemalist establish-
ment refuses to tolerate the fact that Islamist politicians’ wives wear the 
hijab. Women do not own their own bodies; they have to present their 
bodies in a way that is in line with the commands of the Kemalist army. 
Here, the body is reduced to a product produced by power.
In order to solve this “problem,” Iran’s pseudo-modern government 
under Reza Shah devised the policy of the forced discarding of the hijab. 
Paternalistic and authoritarian elites, who thought they had the cures 
to all of humanity’s ills in their ideological pockets, decided to “liberate” 
women, who still did not have the right to vote and whose opinion no 
one ever asked, and thus to grant them “equality.” The radicals in the 
Islamic Republic are trying to “elevate women’s dignity and standing” in 
a similar authoritarian way. Apparently, they have not learned anything 
from history and continue to resort to force and intimidation.
The status of women during the early post-colonial era has been part of 
the discourse of power and the attempt to build states and nations “from 
above.” Creating “a woman in line with the ideology”—whether the ideol-
ogy is Bolshevism, secularism, Kemalism, Reza Shah’s brand of authoritari-
anism, or fundamentalist Islam—has always been part of the state-build-
ing project of authoritarian elites. In all these projects, states distinguish 
between “good women” and “bad women.” The discerning analyst can 
clearly see the power-gender relationship behind these structures.
Women’s liberation will be achieved when the plurality of women’s so-
cial identities is officially recognized and when the state stops imposing 
on women norms that suit the ideological preferences of ruling elites. 
Turkey’s Kemalists see women who observe the hijab as barbarous and 
Iran’s fundamentalists consider women who do not observe the hijab 
as similarly barbarous. But is barbarity anything other than a state that 
forces its citizens in a direction that they do not want to go? We must ac-
cept freedom of choice. Women must not be used as a means for achiev-
ing ideological ends. Freedom and equality have to be accepted so that 
everyone can live their lives on the basis of their own moral judgements. 
The modern individual is someone who creates him/herself as a work of 
art. Every work of art is different from every other work of art. Democ-
racy means recognizing differences and the right to be different and to 
think differently.
by religious intellectuals, of a modernist reading of Islam as opposed 
to the prevailing fundamentalist reading of Islam; c) The universality of 
democracy and human rights as values that legitimize political systems 
with which other ideologies are unable to compete; d) The fact that 
various sections of the population are turning away from the system’s 
legitimizing ideology.
As shown, the fuqaha have themselves deviated from the precepts of 
fiqh and the only thing that remains is the discriminatory precepts of 
fiqh on women. Now, women are standing up to these laws and are re-
jecting them. But their rejection should not be seen as a move against re-
ligion. On the basis of Mr. Khomeini’s view or, more importantly, religious 
modernists’ reading of Islam, women’s resistance can be seen as a move 
that favours religion. Concomitantly, the state’s opposition is not based 
on a defence of religion either. The state is opposing women’s demands 
because the only thing that justifies their authority is the implementa-
tion of fiqh and the only precepts that remain are the precepts that rule 
out freedom and equality for women. So, the quarrel is essentially not 
religiosity versus irreligiosity but rather democracy versus dictatorship, 
since equality is the shared foundation of democracy and human rights. 
The centrality of justice
If we want the Prophet of Islam to protect our dignity here and today, 
we must recognize that God sent us prophets so that they would spread 
justice, not so that they would implement precepts or force women to 
wear a hijab. Gender discrimination, owning slaves, and patriarchy did not 
conflict with people’s understanding of justice in pre-modern times. But 
based on a modern understanding of justice everyone is equal regardless 
of race, class, religion, or gender. If the Prophet of Islam were to appear 
today, he would undoubtedly defend equal rights for all human beings. 
Justice takes precedence over religion in two contexts. First, justice is 
the criterion for accepting or rejecting a religion. Secondly, justice is the 
basis for understanding religion. So, religion must be just and rational. 
Precepts that are not worship-related are for solving practical problems. 
Rational people in the past devised solutions to problems. Those solu-
tions do not solve problems today. Rational people today have presented 
new solutions to problems. Let us not forget that the Legislator follows 
the conventions of rational people, the conventions of rational people do 
not follow the Legislator. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women are the handiwork of rational people living in the modern world. 
They must replace the conventions of the seventh century.
Dressing codes and naked ideology
It goes without saying that men and women do not walk around total-
ly naked in any society. Convention and law have accepted a minimum 
of clothing. But this minimum is the product of long, historical experi-
ence in conditions of freedom. In Iran, people know that morality and 
religiosity are mere slogans of the government; power and pretentious 
religiosity have the last word. A despotic political system cannot decide 
unilaterally what people should wear and impose it by force. The ques-
tion of clothing must be left to male and female members of the public, 
so that they can reach a consensus, through dialogue, on the accepted 
minimum standard.
The regime’s battle to impose a dress code on women has nothing to 
do with a return to tradition. Rather, these imposed dress codes resem-
ble measures that were taken by other authoritarian regimes that used 
brute force to keep “a woman in line with ideology.” In Muslim societies, 
measures of this kind began in Central Asia after the Bolshevik Revolu-
notes on the repression
 of Women in iran
Akbar Ganji is Iran’s leading political dissident. He was recently 
awarded the 2007 John Humphrey Freedom Award, Canada’s most 
prestigious human rights and pro-democracy prize. 
Translation by Nilou Mobasser.
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interview soroush: 
Enlightenment & 
Philosophy in Islam
M i C h i e l  l e e z e n B e r g shortcomings in explanations of the 
Enlightenment that do not pay suffi-
cient attention to modern science; and 
from the scientific point of view, the 
Dutch contribution has been minor. On 
the other hand, Spinoza, Erasmus, and 
other Dutchmen have made important 
contributions to the Enlightenment.
I have a personal relationship with 
Spinoza; I feel a certain similarity in 
my fate with that of Spinoza: because 
of some of his unorthodox views, he 
was excommunicated, and had to leave his place of birth in Am-
sterdam. Of course, Spinoza’s was not a biblical God; I think it is 
very unfair, however, to call Spinoza an atheist. Some of his ideas 
are very relevant to the modern Muslim world: reconciling the reli-
gious law with democracy and providing a modern understanding 
of the state is much like what Spinoza has been doing. What makes 
Spinoza modern is that he historicizes all prophethood; but his 
ideas of prophethood are inspired in part by al-Farabi and Moses 
Maimonides.1 Like al-Farabi, Spinoza thinks that philosophy is prior 
and superior to prophethood: philosophers usually work with their 
speculative or intellectual faculty (‘aql), whereas prophets mainly 
work through the imagination; they cast the universal in particulars 
and symbols and thus make it accessible to the layman. All of this 
you can find in Spinoza, but the roots are in al-Farabi; Maimonides 
thinks that prophet Moses is above imagination, but for Spinoza, all 
prophets are on the same footing. 
More relevantly, Spinoza thinks that religion is not incompatible 
with democracy. He thinks about religious democracy. He shows 
that secularism is neither necessary nor sufficient for a democratic 
state. For example, in present-day Turkey, many people think that 
secularism is necessary for a democratic state; elsewhere, people 
seem to think that secularism is sufficient. According to Spinoza, 
however, you can be a democrat out of a religious motivation and 
out of religious obligations to spread democracy, to separate pow-
ers, and so on.
ML: Perhaps the distinction you make sheds a light on the differences 
between al-Farabi and Spinoza: you suggest that the Enlighten-
ment is not just a matter of political philosophy, but also involves a 
specific sense of rationality, and experimental natural science. Al-
Farabi sees rationality as superior to revelation, but he does not 
propagate democracy, and he does not talk about experimental 
science. Your suggestion that it was his Aristotelianism that blocked 
the development of experimental science based on nominalism 
might be worth pursuing.
AS:  I have done some work on the question of why empirical science 
in the modern sense did not develop in the Islamic world. The 
predominance of Aristotelianism does not explain it, because it 
dominated European scholasticism as well. Some historians of the 
Enlightenment argue that most of what we call Enlightenment and 
modernity was reaction against the idea of an omnipotent God; in 
Islam, Sufism rather than science was the reaction: it tried to make 
God a lovable rather than an omnipotent God. 
ML: Your critique reminds me of the way in which in the Indian subcon-
tinent, Muhammad Iqbal argued that it was Sufism, which he sees 
as a specifically Persian element in Islam that undermined every-
Just prior to Soroush’s departure from 
the Netherlands, Michiel Leezenberg 
talked with him about the philosophi-
cal origins and dimensions of mo-
dernity in the Islamic world. Soroush 
opened with some of his impressions 
of the Dutch public debate on Islam, 
democracy, and secularism. 
AS:  Maybe due to recent events, and 
maybe due to the media, Islamic 
identity has become very central 
to Muslims here; nevertheless, they 
consider themselves Dutch citizens. What worried them was that 
newspapers and television are very expressly inimical to Islam and 
give a distorted picture. Even Dutch academics, I found, are not 
very knowledgeable about both Islamic culture and lands. Local 
Muslims want to abide by the law, and want the authorities to re-
spect Islam just as much as any other religion, and to do full justice 
to secularism, i.e. impartiality towards all religions. In the United 
States, where I lived for five years, the whole atmosphere is more 
religious. In the Netherlands and France, it is not a very welcome 
thing to be a religious person.
ML: The Dutch press is not only dominated by a secular outlook, but 
also by the slogan that Islam has not yet had an Enlightenment. 
This has—in part inadvertently—been fed by studies like Jonathan 
Israel’s Radical Enlightenment (2000), which argue that the Enlight-
enment actually started in Holland, and more specifically in the cir-
cle around the Dutch philosopher Spinoza. According to this view, 
the truly radical Enlightenment of the Spinoza circle was expressly 
anti-clerical, atheist, materialist, and even feminist, and anti-coloni-
alist. What do you think of the idea that the Muslim world at large, 
or Islam as a religion, has not had this process of Enlightenment 
yet?
AS:  There has not been anything corresponding to the Enlightenment 
in the European sense in the Islamic world: neither modern phi-
losophy, nor modern empirical science, nor the modern notion of 
freedom. These only gained currency in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. I believe, however, that in the early twenty-first 
century, to blindly follow the eighteenth-century Enlightenment 
may not be defensible anymore. Enlightenment in the European 
sense has its historic specificity that cannot be recreated; a reform 
in Islamic lands would be by definition different from the European 
Enlightenment.
According to some historians, the Islamic Enlightenment oc-
curred much earlier, but due to historical reasons, it could not 
continue. We cannot say that rationalism or secularism was absent 
from the scene. In theology or kalam, you have the rationalist and 
quasi-secular Mu‘tazilites, who relied on reason in coming to know 
God and in moral thinking. Unfortunately the rationalism of the 
Mu‘tazilites was Aristotelian. This was very inauspicious: the Euro-
pean Enlightenment is based on a nominalist rationalism, whereas 
Islamic rationalism was Aristotelian and non-nominalist. Mulla 
Sadra’s philosophy, despite its appearance, is totally nominalistic; 
it might bring a kind of modern Enlightenment. 
Part of the Enlightenment, of course, is the advancement of mod-
ern empirical science, and therefore I have looked at the Enlighten-
ment through the spectacles of philosophy and science. There are 
Thoughts & Perceptions
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tions. One of the main functions is to liberate reason from greed, 
selfishness, and many other diseases; and through liberating rea-
son to create a liberated man, which is the main objective of all 
religion and all mysticism. I think everyone, everywhere at any time 
needs such kinds of teaching. 
ML: Does that fit in with your main criticism of Shariati? If I recall cor-
rectly, you reproach him for politicizing religion, whereas you think 
the core, not only of Islam but of all religions, is private faith (iman). 
Did you get that view from Rumi? It need not be a politically quiet-
ist faith, because it doesn’t exclude public or political action. 
AS:  I am not a person who lives in isolation, nor do I invite anyone to 
live an isolated life; and Rumi was not like that either. Even as a Sufi, 
you still have obligations, e.g. vis-a-vis justice. Shariati’s activism 
was very one-sided, as it was tilted towards politicized Islam and 
revolution. Islam also has a spiritual side. I think it is so powerful 
and so important that it has to be reintroduced in modern times. 
ML: You argue that the classical Islamic notion of justice (‘adala) as a 
hierarchical order imposed by a ruler in order to avoid social chaos 
overlaps with modern liberal rights-based conceptions of justice. 
Does that imply that modern Islamists and liberals are divided by 
a common language of rights? Would you suggest that you can 
speak of a common modernity shared between Islamists and secu-
lar liberals, or are there bigger differences between them? 
AS:  There are big differences, no doubt about it. In my own characteri-
zation, modern culture is a rights-based culture, whereas pre-mod-
ern or religious culture was duty- or obligation-based. It does not 
mean that these two are totally at loggerheads, but the emphasis 
is different. Modern man is seen as freed from the bondage of re-
ligion, and as having exiled God to the remote heavens; but he is 
very close to a morally deterring kind of egoism. In the religious 
atmosphere, you are supposed to be more humble and conscious 
of your obligations. Now can duty- and rights-based views be rec-
onciled? Both have their shortcomings. What we need is neither to 
combine nor to eliminate the two, but perhaps a third paradigm. 
Perhaps we should revalue the concept of virtue, which may do 
justice to both obligations and rights. 
During the ugly episode of the publication of cartoons of the 
prophet Muhammad, the people in favour of publication empha-
sized the publisher’s right to free speech. Although this argument 
is based on the language of rights, I find it very weak. Rights always 
give you a number of choices. You will not be prosecuted because 
you have published it, fine; but you had the right to publish or not 
to publish. The language of rights is not satisfactory in explaining 
what one has to do. The language of obligations has no such short-
coming: its explanatory power is much bigger than that of the lan-
guage of rights. In order to have both rights, which is a beautiful 
thing, and the more powerful explanation of obligations, we need 
a third paradigm; perhaps one of love, perhaps one of virtue. 
ML: You sound a bit like communitarians like Alisdair MacIntyre and 
Charles Taylor, who also argue that liberal individualism runs into 
contradictions. Would you say that today’s worldwide newly visible 
public religiosity has always been around but has found a new way 
of legitimately expressing itself in public (as has been said about 
the recent electoral victory of the Islamist AKP in Turkey), or would 
you take it as a sign that some of the classical ideals of liberal secu-
larism are untenable, or more dramatically, 
that liberalism has failed in some respects? 
AS:  Well, liberalism—as the culture of rights—has 
definitely failed in some respects, and I think 
the secularization thesis has proved wrong. 
People expected a continuous decline of re-
ligion in society, but now we see the reverse. 
We live in a postmodern era, one of the main 
blessings of which is that the sharp dichoto-
mies of the past, e.g. between secularism and 
religion, and even science and religion, are 
getting blurred. These are relics of the positiv-
ist era, and no longer tenable. 
thing that was activist and intellectual and modernist in Islam. For 
him, Sufism was egocentric, politically quietist, and otherworldly. 
Intriguingly, he pits Nietzschean views of the ego and the will 
against traditional mystical notions of self-annihilation (fana’).
AS:  One of the things I like in Iqbal is his emphasis on free will. I would 
like to suggest that free will has been a suppressed entity in both 
Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism. The Sufis are determin-
ists, even fatalists: they see human beings as toys in the hands of 
God, who cannot control themselves. In Islamic philosophy, the law 
of causality is so powerful that it, too, corners free will. Free will is 
part and parcel of the Enlightenment and of modernity. In Iqbal 
you see it maybe for the first time in Islam. In his magnum opus, The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, he proposes to reintro-
duce the idea of free will and an open future; and through this, he 
comes to a new conception of God and of religious interpretation. 
This is why Iqbal is so relevant for today’s questions; and mind you, 
it is also one of the Mu‘tazila’s ideas. They, too, emphasize free will 
(ikhtiyar).2 
ML: You yourself very often refer to Iqbal and Ali Shariati, who in turn 
gets many of his ideas from Iqbal. Has your reading of classical au-
thors like Rumi, Saadi, and Mulla Sadra been shaped by the ideas 
and concerns of these modernists, or did reading the classics con-
versely shape the way you understand modernists like Iqbal and 
Shariati, or even Anglo-Saxon philosophers like Quine, Popper, 
and Kuhn? And do you think that classical authors like Spinoza and 
al-Farabi can play a more than symbolic role in contemporary de-
bates?
AS:  I think our whole life is filled with infatuations: you come across 
somebody by chance, and then you become interested. I liked the 
argumentative character of Islamic philosophy. I also liked Anglo-
Saxon philosophy of science because of its analytical approach to 
problems; I am still using these analytical tools. Of course, neither 
Iqbal nor Shariati proceeded analytically. Iqbal was infatuated with 
Nietzsche and Bergson; Shariati had read Sartre and Fanon. I prefer 
Iqbal as a philosopher: he sometimes has very deep insights, and 
he is a poet of the first rank. Shariati was really a prophet in Spino-
za’s sense: a man of rhetoric and the imaginative faculty. He also 
turned Islam into an ideology, something that Iqbal never dreamt 
of doing. He had a very great influence in bringing about the Is-
lamic revolution; but nowadays, we have to be very critical about 
what he says, and not take him as a guru or a leader. 
I discovered Rumi quite early in my life. Rumi has a lot to say, not 
only to me, but to modern man, about the liberation of reason. Of 
course, he teaches about love; but for him, love has different func-
Thoughts & Perceptions
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Despite the high-decibel rhetoric about 
the Justice and Development Party 
(known by its Turkish acronym AKP) 
being an Islamist threat to Turkey’s de-
mocracy, the party won a resounding 
mandate in the July 22 parliamentary 
election. This means that the majority 
of Turks have rejected the politics of fear 
spread by AKP’s rivals and understand 
that the struggle in Turkey is not be-
tween Islamists and secularists, but be-
tween rival elites in a zero-sum game 
where the success of one diminishes 
the power and wealth of the other. Tra-
ditional republican elites entrenched in state institutions, business, and 
the military have been calling the shots for decades. The upstart AKP 
and the socially conservative majority that supports it not only have 
a corner on political power, but also have begun to do well enough 
to challenge the republicans in globalization and economic develop-
ment. The presence or absence of a headscarf has become emblematic 
of much broader issues in a power struggle between segments of the 
population. This election marks the high-water point for the AKP, but 
the politics of fear that preceded it continues to threaten Turkey’s hard-
won stability. 
Since it came to power in 2002 on a wave of popular revulsion against 
corrupt and ineffectual secular parties, AKP has initiated a courageous 
programme of reform in a bid to join the European Union. Ironically, 
those who continue to tout the superiority of a secular European life-
style are the least likely to appreciate the introduction of European-
inspired liberal values that loosen state control of religious practices 
and clothing (headscarves are currently banned 
in government institutions, including universi-
ties) and that expand the rights of Turkey’s ethnic 
and religious minorities. Some of the Turkish old 
guard view minorities like the Armenian, Greek 
Orthodox, and Jewish communities as a European 
fifth column intent on undermining Turkish terri-
torial integrity. Forced to play the nationalist card 
in the pre-election dust-up, AKP seems unwilling 
to challenge conservative forces blocking imple-
mentation of new laws that broaden ethnic and 
religious minority rights. 
The election hothouse
Since so much rested on this election, attempts 
to manipulate public opinion took a dangerous 
turn that threatened—and continues to threat-
en—both Turkey’s democracy and its chances for 
European Union membership. The most impor-
tant of these was the unexpectedly bold entry 
of Turkey’s military onto the political playing 
field after almost a decade of acquiescence to 
the elected government’s programmes. The last 
major military intervention in politics was the so-
called “soft coup” of 1997, in which the military-
dominated National Security Council, an advisory 
body to the government, pushed out an Islamist 
prime minister the army suspected of being insuf-
ficiently committed to the secular foundation of 
the state. Since then, the military’s power on the 
council and elsewhere has begun to be reduced 
in line with European Union requirements that a 
nation’s military be subordinate to its 
elected government. 
In the hothouse atmosphere preced-
ing the election, the army resorted to a 
new tool to influence politics—its web-
site www.tsk.mil.tr. On April 27, parlia-
ment had voted to put forward the 
name of the well-respected AKP for-
eign minister Abdullah Gül to replace 
Turkey’s strongly secular president, 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose term had 
come to an end. The opposition Re-
publican People’s Party (RPP) claimed 
the vote was invalid because it lacked a 
quorum. That night the military posted a memorandum on its website 
that has come to be called the first coup by website or “cyber coup.” In 
the unsigned statement, the army threatened to interfere if the elec-
tion of Gül, whose wife wears a headscarf, went ahead. In following 
weeks, further statements were posted. One called for a social reac-
tion against “forces who act in the guise of democracy and freedom 
of speech,” leading many to wonder if the army was urging a popular 
uprising against the government and liberal institutions. Millions dem-
onstrated in support of the military’s guardianship of secularism, but a 
new generation has come of age in Turkey with no experience of coups 
against elected governments (the last of which was in 1980) that was 
surprised and disturbed by such blatant intervention in the democratic 
process. This may well have had an impact on the election outcome—
AKP won 46.7% of the vote and 341 of the 550 seats in parliamentary—
as thousands of newly eligible young voters had their say.
As a result of the April 27 “cyber coup,” the government moved par-
liamentary elections that had been scheduled for fall to July 22 in the 
hopes that a larger AKP presence in parliament would ensure a quorum 
and make it politically difficult for the military to counter the wishes of 
a democratically elected government with a clear mandate. The AKP 
also put on the table a proposal to amend the constitution to allow 
the president to be elected by popular vote, a proposition recently ap-
proved by the Constitutional Court and which will be subjected to a 
popular referendum in October. Despite a higher percentage of votes 
than in the last election, however, AKP gained fewer seats in the new 
parliament due to the entry of a third party. The Nationalist Action 
Party (NAP), which has been associated with ultranationalist violence 
in the past, picked up 71 seats and will join the militantly secular RPP 
in opposition. Such a powerful nationalist coalition might well block 
future liberal reforms. If the new parliament is unable to elect a presi-
dent within sixty days, the Constitution requires that general elections 
be held again, prolonging the turmoil and uncertainty. In an interest-
ing development, 23 Kurdish nationalist members of the Democratic 
Society Party (DSP) were elected to parliament as independent candi-
dates, a ploy that allowed the Kurdish party to avoid the ten percent 
vote threshold for party representation in parliament. Surprisingly for 
socially conservative eastern and southeastern Anatolia, fifteen of the 
newly elected deputies from that region are women, most of them 
members of the DSP, rather than mainstream parties. The Kurdish DSP 
delegates are a wild card in future coalition building.
The military has put the AKP’s back against the wall by repeatedly 
and publicly asking the elected government to authorize a military op-
eration into northern Iraq to combat the PKK, a banned Kurdish sepa-
ratist organization that is using the region as a base from which to at-
tack Turkey. The AKP government so far has resisted, arguing that the 
Kurdish problem should be addressed first on the Turkish side of the 
border, but its refusal to authorize military action in Iraq makes it look 
soft on terror. If the government does authorize a military incursion, it 
The controversies surrounding the Turkish 
elections should not be seen as a clash between 
secularists and Islamists, but rather as a 
struggle between various elites. In fact, the 
disavowal of its Islamist agenda has enabled 
the AKP to occupy the centre of the political 
spectrum formerly held by the Kemalist 
establishment. These shifts and turns have 
come at a price: nationalism and corruption 
seem to be on the rise. The author concludes 
that the real danger is that these power 
struggles will disable Turkey to develop its 
global, liberal democratic credentials.
Coup.com: turkey Conquers 
the Politics of Fear
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Ironically, those 
who … tout the 
superiority of a 
secular European 
lifestyle are the 
least likely to 
appreciate the 
introduction of 
European-inspired 
liberal values …
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guardian of Ataturk’s dream of a westernized Turkey, must now decide 
whether the project of joining the West (in the form of the EU) will be 
a sufficient safeguard of Turkish national identity and secular lifestyle 
that they can permit themselves to be slowly shorn of power. Anyone 
witnessing the struggles that have convulsed the EU about the role of 
religion, minorities, and fears about loss of national sovereignty and 
identity can well understand the Turkish military’s scepticism and re-
luctance to take the dream of westernization to its conclusion. 
What is most frightening to Turkey’s old elite is AKP’s increasing 
ability to occupy the centre, where most Turkish voters’ interests lie. A 
popular and centrist AKP devoted to liberal values is much more of a 
threat to the secularist, westernized, but essentially illiberal establish-
ment than an AKP harbouring a secret Islamist agenda. AKP has been 
successful where the old guard has not—at least not since the 1980s—
in uniting Turkey's fractious political field and occupying the centre. 
The establishment’s response has been to spread fear that secularist 
lifestyles are in danger and the nation is being undermined by foreign 
powers. The AKP has been forced to turn aside from its own reform 
agenda to prove itself to be as nationalist as its opponents. Nationalism 
has shown itself to be a dangerous force in the past, used to manipu-
late public sentiment that all too easily can spill over into violence. The 
real question is whether post-election Turkey can get back to the busi-
ness of developing its global, liberal democratic credentials or whether 
the pre-election games of Turkey’s embattled elites will have damaged 
the social fabric and the democratic process to such an extent that Tur-
key’s future will be derailed.
will damage relations with the United 
States and the EU and potentially open 
the door to a regional conflagration 
between Turkey (a NATO country) and 
the Iraqi Kurds, whom Turkey accuses 
of aiding the PKK, possibly engaging 
the central Iraqi government and even 
U.S. forces. A Turkish incursion would 
give tacit permission for other neigh-
bouring countries like Iran to enter 
the Iraqi quagmire ostensibly to hunt 
down their own terror candidates. The 
Turkish military, which does not like 
the AKP government, will continue to 
apply pressure, aided by the RPP and 
NAP. In the meantime, it continues to 
mass troops and equipment along the 
Iraqi border.
Immediate and potential 
dangers
A further aspect of Turkey’s politics 
of fear are the links emerging between 
ultranationalist violence and a group 
of former military officers. The alliance 
between Kemalist extremists and ul-
tranationalists suspicious of religious 
and ethnic minorities runs deep. Evidence emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s of something Turks call the “deep state,” a mysterious group of 
conspirators with connections high in the state and military bureauc-
racy that over many years funded and protected violent groups that 
killed Kurdish leaders, leftist intellectuals, journalists, judges, and other 
broadly defined “enemies of the state.” Recently links have been found 
between these former officers and suspects in the murder of Turkish-
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and several other political murders 
over the past year. There also appears to be cross-fertilization between 
ultra-nationalists and fringe radical Islamists, the outlines of which are 
only now becoming clear. 
While the more immediate threat to Turkish democracy appears to 
be coming from the secular camp, creeping conservatism, corruption 
and the dangers of political monopolization are legitimate causes for 
concern that are driving the campaign against AKP. People fear that the 
AKP will consolidate power over all branches of government, leaving no 
counterbalancing power. (The opposition RPP lost votes in this election 
and is widely viewed as lacking leadership or new ideas.) The AKP has 
disavowed Islam as a political ideology, yet contains under its broad 
umbrella a core group of committed Islamists who would like to ban 
the sale and consumption of alcohol in public places, hold conserva-
tive ideas about gender roles and are unwelcoming of women in the 
public arena or in positions of authority and power, and who are gener-
ally as intolerant of secular lifestyles as Kemalists are of Muslim ones. 
Nevertheless, the AKP fielded more female candidates in this election 
than the RPP and the number of women legislators doubled to over 
eight percent. But conservative and nationalist influences have under-
mined the implementation and effectiveness of many of the liberal 
laws passed by the AKP as part of its alignment with EU requirements, 
particularly those broadening ethnic and religious minority rights. 
The dangerous hot and cold games the EU has been playing with 
Turkey’s membership bid have exacerbated Turkish suspicions about 
Europe’s ultimate aims in the region, inflamed nationalist sentiment, 
and emboldened ultranationalists whose actions, in a self-fulfilling 
cycle, add to Turkey’s negative tally on the part of Europeans who do 
not wish to see the country join the EU. The United States also has been 
unwilling or unable to pressure Iraqi Kurds to stop the PKK from cross-
ing into Turkey. In Turkey, this seeming disregard of Turkey’s own terror 
situations appears unforgivable and is a major cause for the growth of 
anti-U.S. sentiment. 
In his post-election speech, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan re-
committed to the path of EU membership and reform. General Yasar 
Buyukanit, the chief of general staff, however, also reiterated the army’s 
position regarding Gül’s candidacy. Gül has signalled he still wishes to 
run for the presidency, keeping the government on a collision course 
with the army. Turkey’s military establishment, which sees itself as the 
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The emergence of a new actor, the Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP), upset 
the balance of forces in Turkey at the 
turn of the millennium. In the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, the 
main opposition was organized by the 
Welfare Party (RP), which ran on a plat-
form of social justice, anti-Westernism, 
and Islamic morality. After the secu-
larist military closed this party down 
twice, a new generation of leaders split 
to form the AKP. They received a warm 
welcome from liberals, business circles, 
and the West, to whom they promised 
market reforms and democratization.
Neo-liberal democratization
The rigid secularist bureaucrats and middle classes remained incred-
ulous; they feared a gradual transformation to an Islamic regime when 
the AKP came to power in 2002 with the support of the business class, 
the media, religious communities, the USA, and the EU. Yet, four and a 
half years of AKP rule were marked by extensive privatization and lim-
ited democratization, rather than Islamization. The Turkish economy 
grew steadily, while inequalities rose sharply. The ruling party empha-
sized democratization, but tended to restrict this with the needs of the 
market.
Between 2002 and 2006, torture declined. The government granted 
the Kurds the right to receive private education in their own language. 
Turkey’s ratings in human rights indices improved. These steps, along 
with economic reforms, sent the global business world the image of 
a liberalizing country. Foreign capital flowed in. However, the govern-
ment took no concrete steps to integrate the Kurds into the system. 
The 10% election barrier, which kept Kurdish nationalist parties out of 
the parliament for years, is still in force. The major legal Kurdish organi-
zation (Democratic Society Party, DTP) received severe blows in the first 
months of 2007. During the same year, the government itself made at-
tempts to overturn some reforms concerning the Kurds, under pressure 
from the Army. The AKP cooperated with the secularist CHP (Republi-
can People’s Party) to erect yet other institutional impediments in the 
way of a DTP success at the polls in 2007.
More important for the markets, the AKP government crushed strikes 
and Prime Minister Erdoğan labelled any popular resistance against 
privatization as “communist.” On May Day 2007, the Istanbul Governor 
and the police heavily cracked down on demonstrators. Zaman, the 
newspaper of a pro-AKP religious community, even called for military 
action against the non-violent demonstrators.
Finally, the willingness of the top AKP leaders to participate in West-
ern military action against Middle East countries, despite strong pub-
lic opinion, bolstered the image of the government as pro-Western,1 
thereby making the country even more attractive for Western transna-
tional capital. At the same time, transactions with Muslim countries 
also increased, as the ruling party converted its Islamist past into new 
business ties. In sum, the AKP government pursued democratization 
and Islam in so far as they served the country’s integration with world 
markets.
In the absence of democratic mass forces, all the social ills that neo-
liberal democratization fostered led to the public questioning of de-
mocracy rather than a criticism of neo-liberalization. The resulting trend 
of authoritarianism was also due to disappointment with EU accession. 
In the last several years, the AKP enacted major democratic reforms 
also as a part of the EU accession process. European reluctance regard-
ing Turkish membership despite the reforms increased the number 
of anti-EU nationalists in the country. 
The nationalists perceive especially 
the Kurdish reforms as intended to 
first weaken, and then to partition Tur-
key, in line with alleged European and 
American desires.
Nationalist mobilization
In April 2007, Turkey witnessed its 
history’s biggest rallies. Hundreds of 
thousands gathered in many major cit-
ies against the possibility that the next 
Turkish president could have a veiled 
wife. Izmir, the pinnacle, boasted a 
total of one million demonstrators. Yet, 
the veil was not the only item on the agenda of the secularist organ-
izers. Actually, the government had taken only timid steps towards in-
creasing the role of Islam. Together with this concern about moderate 
Islamization, the rallies also raised issues about the government’s pro-
market and democratic reforms. The Ataturkist Thought Association 
(ADD), one of the two primary organizers of the events, emphasized its 
stance against the “global exploitation system” and Turkey’s increasing 
foreign debt in its call for the event. Despite this apparent social justice 
orientation of the organizers, Turkey’s major unions did not support 
the rallies, publicly announcing that they would not be on the same 
side with “coup-mongers.”
As the union leaders hinted, the ADD is a part of a network of civil 
society organizations and political parties which have been resisting 
democratic reforms. This network includes the CHP as well as smaller 
secularist parties, associations of nationalist professionals, and some 
paramilitary nationalist groups. All of these organizations are worried 
about pro-Kurdish reforms of the government, its dialogue with Arme-
nians, its liberal policies regarding Cyprus, its privatization of natural 
resources and strategic public companies, and what they perceive to 
be the increasing salience of Islam in Turkey. Some of them have called 
for more military involvement in the regime. The Turkish press has 
uncovered evidence about the nationalist paramilitary organizations’ 
involvement in several assassinations, including the slaying of the Ar-
menian journalist Hrant Dink. 
Dink’s killing was a link in a series of nationalist murders in 2006 and 
2007, which targeted intellectuals, activists, and missionaries seen as 
agents of the West. This ferocious campaign, coupled with the rallies, 
raised concern among Turkish intellectuals regarding the possibility of 
a fascist regime. Indeed, as several analysts pointed out, the parallels 
with historical fascist mobilization are striking. The nationalist organi-
zations tap into a popular feeling of national humiliation at the hands 
of the European Union, just like interwar fascisms erupted after mili-
tary and diplomatic defeats. They are fiercely against the government’s 
“concessions” to minorities. They voice the fears of some middle class 
sectors and soldiers who find themselves jammed between global cap-
italism on the one hand, and Kurdish and Islamic movements on the 
other. Fascisms of yesteryear similarly gave voice to the middle classes 
squeezed between big business and militant working class move-
ments. Similar to classical fascism, the new nationalism in Turkey com-
bines social justice rhetoric with nationalist authoritarianism. Maybe 
more important than anything else, the nationalist organizations are 
all fired up over the possibility of an independent Kurdish state, and 
want the military to intervene in Northern Iraq, using Lebensraum-like 
arguments. Just like in interwar Europe, the main leaders of these para-
military organizations are retired soldiers. Finally, as in interwar Italy, 
many of the top leaders are also converts from the socialist left. These 
ex-socialists are dismayed with the democratization and internationali-
Turkey is going through hard times. 
The  bastion  of secularism in the Middle 
East is forced to make a choice between the 
hand of the market and the boot of the army. 
The AKP’s conservatives gain momentum by 
building Islamic and liberal consent for the 
market option. The opposition, aligned behind 
the army and nationalist parties, lacks a clear 
economic alternative, while it mobilizes around 
anti-market and anti-Islamist slogans. The  
electorate heavily weighed on the side of the 
market in July 2007. Yet, the military and its 
allies still threaten to destabilize the AKP’s neo-
liberal democratization.
the hand of the Market 
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and more links of the military with political murders and paramilitary 
organizations. Also, pro-AKP sources revealed that the Turkish military 
was consulting with neo-con think tanks in the U.S., discussing bloody 
conspiracies to thwart the AKP government. After these dark dealings 
of the military were made public, the nationalist mobilization lost mo-
mentum. The June rallies that the generals had incited could gather 
only a few thousand people. In the meantime, the liberal think tanks in 
the U.S. started to openly support the AKP. The party also gave a posi-
tive message to Washington by liquidating the (ex-Islamist) members 
of parliament who had voted against letting the Americans use Tur-
key’s borders for attacking Iraq.
Self-defeating anti-imperialism 
After the invasion of Iraq, there was a sharp anti-American turn in 
public opinion in Turkey. The nationalist parties used this public sen-
timent as a weapon against the AKP, and after 2003 politics shaped 
around taking the right position with respect to the U.S. Yet, the real 
issue in Turkey is not a choice between pro-Americanism or anti-
Americanism, as recent developments demonstrated. Different wings 
of the Turkish ruling bloc have been negotiating with different wings 
of the American elite, whether overtly or covertly. The Army itself ap-
peared anti-American and thus appealed to street-level anti-imperi-
alism, while working with the U.S. In this contradictory atmosphere, 
more anti-imperialism led to more American control. For the first time 
in Turkish history, the battles between American think tanks were in 
the centre of Turkish politics and public debate. The new wave of na-
tionalism was strengthening the imperialism it claimed to be fighting 
against.
The secularists’ shallow anti-imperialism eventually backfired: as a 
reaction against the authoritarianism of the secularists, a wide array of 
forces (liberals, Islamists, conservatives) united their forces at the ballot 
on July 22. The AKP increased its votes from 34% to 46% in four and a half 
years. More interestingly, the AKP nearly doubled 
its votes in the Kurdish southeast despite its slug-
gish human rights record. About half of the Kurdish 
population gave the message that it counts on the 
pro-American (and potentially pro-Barzani) foreign 
policies of the party rather than on the guerrilla-
supported DTP’s secular nationalism.
EU representatives, the Western financial press, 
and Western governments enthusiastically ap-
plauded the victory. But so did Middle Eastern 
governments and Islamist newspapers world-
wide. When the AKP’s foreign minister Abdullah 
Gül officially declared on August 13 that he was 
still the party’s presidential candidate, both Eu-
ropean and Turkish liberals, and local Islamists 
were jubilant; the former interpreted this step 
as a guarantee that Turkey would stick to demo-
cratic reforms, while the latter saw this as an au-
gury of coming Islamization. The success of the 
AKP lies in being able to cash such combined 
democratic and Islamic support into market re-
forms. For example, immediately after its elec-
tion victory, the party signalled that it is going 
to change the constitution to allow the privatiza-
tion of lakes and rivers. 
However, the game is not over yet. Kurdish nationalist politicians entered 
the July elections as independent candidates to overcome the 10 per cent 
barrier. Now, there is a strong DTP contingent in the parliament. The mili-
tary and its allies are likely to use Kurdish nationalism, the yet unresolved 
presidential crisis, and the spectre of Islamization as excuses to take anti-
democratic steps. Given Turkey’s present political cartography, there is no 
concrete alternative against neo-liberalism, but authoritarian actors still 
have the power to destabilize market reforms. 
zation of the Turkish left. The new nationalists fight these “aberrations” 
by building purified organizations to which non-Turks are not allowed.
However, all of this does not mean that a fascist takeover is immi-
nent. There is currently no Duce who can turn this loose network of 
nationalist organizations into a single fascist party. Attempts to forge 
a grand coalition of secular nationalists (the Kemalists) and more reli-
giously oriented extreme nationalists (the Grey Wolves of the National-
ist Action Party, MHP) have so far failed. The Kemalist perception of the 
Grey Wolves as religious fanatics prone to senseless murder prevents 
any smooth coalition of all nationalist forces. This perception emanates 
both from Kemalists’ secular elitism and from the grey wolves’ murder 
record in the 1970s. Moreover, what combined millions in the rallies 
was by no means a clearly defined racist ideology, even though the 
paramilitary groups have been circulating racist documents for a while. 
Finally, as different from interwar fascisms that had a clear corporatist 
alternative to liberal capitalism and socialism, the nationalists of Tur-
key have no well-defined economic programme beyond an anti-neo-
liberal rhetoric. Hence, there is (as of yet) no united political will that 
can thoroughly transform Turkey in a fascist direction. 
What seems more possible is a decisive shift in the direction of an 
authoritarian regime. In that regard, the mobilization succeeded only 
partially. Ever since mid-April, the military has been intervening in 
politics via ultimatums, both supporting and being supported by the 
nationalist street. Taking its lead from the rallies and a military ultima-
tum, the Constitutional Court cancelled presidential elections. The na-
tionalists thereby initially succeeded in blocking a veiled, neo-liberal 
presidency.
Two campaigns: chauvinism and demilitarization
Both the neo-liberals and the nationalists centred on the July elec-
tions to resolve the presidential crisis. The election campaigns shaped 
up as a competition between extreme nationalism and democratiza-
tion (bounded by neo-liberalism). While the only 
major representative of the second option was 
the AKP, the CHP, the MHP, and the Young Party 
(GP) competed for nationalist votes. Along with 
anti-Islamism and anti-liberalism, the national-
ist parties built their platform on the widespread 
worry that the federal structure of Iraq is not sus-
tainable. Northern Iraq would inevitably become 
an independent Kurdish state, they believed. An 
independent Kurdistan, in turn, would lead to the 
demise of the Turkish Republic, as the Kurds in 
Turkey would eventually split and join their breth-
ren in the south. 
The military chief Büyükanıt publicly asked the 
government to send the military into Iraq, both to 
stop attacks by the Kurdish guerrilla positioned in 
Northern Iraq and to prevent the formation of an 
independent Kurdish State. The AKP responded 
by announcing that it did not receive any official 
request from the military. The major nationalist 
parties and media channels held the government 
responsible for dragging its feet regarding an 
operation. In the weeks before the elections, the 
visual media and the press drummed up public 
support for operations in roundabout ways. One 
example was the unusual airtime devoted to funeral ceremonies of 
soldiers killed by the guerrilla. The top generals as well as AKP minis-
ters joined these funerals, along with thousands of people. Nationalist 
crowds chanted in favour of the generals and booed the ministers. 
In this atmosphere, it would be difficult for any political party to pro-
tect the democratic reforms, let alone pass new ones. The AKP itself 
gave in to pressures by reversing some of the reforms (e.g. by expand-
ing police capacities against “terrorism”). Today, torture is again on the 
rise in Turkey. Counter-insurgency in the southeast already has a lot 
of street support behind it, and the army has been asking for more. 
In early June 2007, Büyükanıt demanded mass reactions “against ter-
rorism.” 
Nevertheless, the AKP’s hands were not tied in the face of this cam-
paign. While avoiding any public confrontation with the military, the 
ruling party indirectly undermined the military’s authority. Closer to 
the elections, the conservative police forces started to uncover more 
Note
1. See also Cihan Tuğal, “NATO’s Islamists: 
Hegemony and Americanization,” New Left 
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a tale of two trajectories
Debate about “democratic deficit” in the 
Middle East is not new. What is novel is 
the excessive attention given to Islam as 
a factor that is said to hinder democratic 
reform. With its emphasis on God’s sov-
ereignty and patriarchal disposition, 
Islam is argued to be essentially incom-
patible with democracy. Even though 
many Muslims refute the charge by 
suggesting that God has granted sov-
ereignty to humans to govern them-
selves, and that Islamic justice disallows 
discrimination based on class, race, or 
gender, the debate has in general been bogged down in entirely tex-
tual and philosophical terrains, with little effort to understand the poli-
tics of religious affiliation, and how in practice Muslims perceive their 
religion in relation to democratic ideals.
In Making Islam Democratic I suggest that the question, raised so per-
sistently, is not whether Islam is or is not compatible with democracy 
(itself a convoluted concept), but rather how and under what condi-
tions Muslims can make Islam embrace democratic ethos. Nothing in-
trinsic to Islam—or any other religion—makes it inherently democratic 
or undemocratic. It depends on the intricate ways in which the living 
faithful perceive and live through their faiths: some deploy their reli-
gions in exclusive and authoritarian terms, while others read in them 
justice, representation, and pluralism. As to why individuals and groups 
perceive and present the same scriptures differently is a most intrigu-
ing and complex question, one that depends largely on their different 
biographies, social positions, and interests.
While much is discussed about the “fundamentalist Islamist” trends 
that draw often on puritanical and exclusivist interpretations of the 
doctrine, little is known about the social movements, what I call “post-
Islamism,” that aim to bridge the gap between Islam and democracy. 
Grown out of the anomalies of Islamist politics, “post-Islamism” repre-
sents an endeavour to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, 
Islam and liberty. It wants to turn the underlying principles of Islamism 
on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of 
singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scripture, and 
the future instead of the past.
Whether or not Islam corresponds to democratic ideas depends 
primarily on whether advocates of these perspectives—Islamism and 
post-Islamism—are able to establish their hegemony in society and the 
state. The history of socio-religious movements in Iran and Egypt since 
the 1970s offers a fertile ground to examine the logic, conditions, and 
forces behind rendering Islam democratic or undemocratic. In Iran, the 
1979 Revolution and establishment of an Islamic state set conditions 
for the rise of post-Islamist ideas and movements that aimed to tran-
scend Islamism in society and governance. In their daily struggles, as I 
show in detail, Muslim women, youth, students, religious intellectuals, 
and other social groups incorporated notions of individual rights, tol-
erance, gender equality, and the separation of religion from the state 
into their faith; by their active presence and promotion in society, they 
compelled religious and political leaders to undertake a paradigmatic 
“post-Islamist” shift. The reformist government of President Khatami 
(1997–2004) represented only one, the political, aspect of this perva-
sive trend.
In Egypt, on the other hand, and instead of an Islamic revolution, there 
developed a pervasive Islamist movement with conservative moral vision, 
populist language, patriarchal disposition, and adherence to scripture. 
Engulfed by the pervasive “Islamist mode,” major actors in Egyptian socie-
ty—the intelligentsia, the new rich, Muslim women activists, al-Azhar, the 
ruling elites, and the state—all converged around the language of nativ-
ism and conservative moral ethos to configure Egypt’s religious “passive 
revolution.” This Gramscian “passive revolution” represented a managed 
Islamic restoration in which the state, the original target of change, suc-
ceeded to remain fully in charge, while marginalizing critical voices, in-
novative religious thought, and democratic demands.
Thus neither did Egypt’s Islamist move-
ment succeed in fully “Islamizing” the 
Egyptian state, nor Iran’s post-Islamism 
in democratizing the Islamic Republic. 
Both movements encountered stiff op-
position from their respective power 
elites. In other words, the political im-
passe in these countries has been less 
a function of religion per se than of 
structural impediments and the long-
time vested interests of ruling elites. 
To what extent then social movements 
can, without resorting to violent revo-
lutions, alter the political status quo in the Middle East—a region en-
trapped by the authoritarian regimes (both secular and religious), ex-
clusivist Islamist opposition, and blatant foreign domination?
Pervasive social movements are not single-episode expressions 
that melt away under an act of repression. Rather they are prolonged 
multifaceted processes of agency and change, with ebbs and flows, 
whose enduring “forward linkages” can revitalize popular mobilization 
when the opportunity arises. Through their cultural production—es-
tablishing new lifestyles and new modes of thinking, being, and doing 
things—movements are able to recondition, or socialize, states and 
political elites into the society’s sensibilities, ideals, and expectations. 
Socialization of the states—this concept might offer a clue as to how to 
understand the effect of social movements and an “active citizenry” to 
bolster a democratic turn in Muslim societies.
However, social movements do not evolve in a vacuum; they need fer-
tile intellectual grounds and basic critical sensibilities, which can not only 
nurture a collective movement for change, but also embrace democratic 
institutions. After all, change in societies’ sensibilities is a pre-condition for 
a sustainable democratic turn. Such change is triggered not only through 
information and education, but especially by the active citizenry of ordi-
nary people (teachers, students, the young, women, workers, artists, and 
intellectuals) who in their everyday lives voice their demands, broadcast 
violations, fulfil their responsibilities, and excel in what they do. Muslim 
citizens cannot spearhead a democratic shift unless they master the art of 
presence—the skill and spirit to assert collective will in spite of all odds by 
circumventing constraints, utilizing what is possible, and discovering new 
spaces within which to make themselves heard, seen, and felt. Through 
their active presence in every available social space, ordinary citizens can 
transform their society into one that dejects authoritarian personality, 
surpasses its governing elites, and becomes capable of enforcing its col-
lective sensibilities on the state and its henchmen.
In this article Bayat challenges the widespread 
assumption that Islam is incompatible with 
democracy and argues that analysis should 
focus instead on the conditions in which 
Muslims can make Islam embrace democratic 
ethos. Detailing the different trajectories 
of Iran and Egypt, the article concludes that 
the extent to which Muslim citizens gain 
the skill and spirit to assert collective will, 
in spite of constraints—that is, master the 
art of presence—proves crucial in the road 
towards democratic polity. 
Asef Bayat is Academic Director of ISIM and holds the ISIM Chair at Leiden University.  
His latest book, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn, 
has been published by Stanford University Press, 2007.
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In 2002 the Supreme Court was con-
fronted by a case that questioned the 
validity of a marriage that had already 
been dissolved through divorce.2 The 
claim was raised through doubts about 
the legitimacy of a divorce dissolved 
at a Sharia court in a Muslim-majority 
country prior to a marriage contracted 
in a Norwegian mosque. Muslims in Nor-
way have the right to solemnize mar-
riages in accordance with their own cus-
toms and traditions, while separation and divorce only can be granted 
by the county governor or by the court. The discrepancy in the status 
of religious marriage and divorce can lead to complicated situations 
in court. Such situations, in turn, offer insight into the possibilities 
and limitations of “legal pluralism.” The case at hand revolves around 
Ahmed and Laila (pseudonyms), both of whom are Muslims with an 
Arab background. Each is also middle-aged and had been married be-
fore. Laila has adult children from a previous marriage, one of whom 
lives in Norway. After a short marriage to Ahmed, Laila filed for divorce 
in Norway. In this way, she received permanent residence in Norway 
and could continue to live with her daughter. She could even remarry 
her first husband if she pleased. Ahmed on the other hand seemed to 
have gained little from his marriage with Laila. His subsequent actions 
revealed that he felt deeply humiliated by the whole situation. As the 
parties solemnized their marriage in a mosque in Norway, he may mis-
takenly have expected that Norwegian law allowed for Islamic divorce 
procedures as well. This may well be the reason why Ahmed started a 
court case in defence of his “honour,” expecting justice from the Nor-
wegian Court. One could also assume that Ahmed did not want to pay 
alimony to Laila, but as the couple did not have children together this 
point is moot. 
The male perspective
After many rounds in court, Ahmed, who had permanent residence in 
Norway, appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that “his marriage to 
Laila was invalid since she never seriously intended to marry him.”3 He 
meant that she contracted a marriage of conven-
ience (pro forma) in order to obtain legal residence 
in Norway. He also questioned the authenticity of 
Laila’s divorce papers, implying that she had com-
mitted polyandry, a serious crime both in Norway 
and her country of origin. Ahmed concluded that 
the case had “important legal and social compli-
cations for him personally and that he risked the 
death penalty or at best life-long imprisonment, 
in those countries that apply Sharia (Islamic law) 
such as the country in which his family is cur-
rently living.” Ahmed obviously attempted to gain 
sympathy and support for his case by invoking a 
media discourse that presents Sharia in its most 
extreme forms. 
The Supreme Court agreed with Ahmed that 
the case involved the material invalidity of the 
marriage and not a divorce or dissolution as in § 
24 of the Marriage Act, as the High Court of Ap-
peal mistakenly had assumed. The Supreme Court 
thus dissolved the judgement and returned the 
case to the High Court of Appeal. In May 2003 a 
new round started up, during which Ahmed presented new informa-
tion and documentation. He explained that Laila and her first husband 
Khalid have a daughter in Norway who had moved there several years 
earlier after marrying a Norwegian 
Muslim citizen. He suggested that this 
might have been the reason why they 
had both earlier applied for residence 
in Norway. 
He also revealed some details about 
the context of his marriage. In 1999 he 
had first met Khalid and told him about 
his wish to remarry a woman who al-
ready had children. Afterwards Khalid 
had contacted his wife and they had 
agreed upon a divorce in order for her to marry Ahmed. Laila’s brother 
had represented her husband at the local Sharia court and all parties 
had agreed. Ahmed called the whole procedure a “farce” and intimated 
that the divorce was to be understood as mukhala‘a, not talaq.4 He also 
meant that a divorce should be initiated by men in order “to be accept-
able by Islamic Law.” This opinion is also generally supported by Islamic 
countries that do not recognize Norwegian divorces when they are ini-
tiated by Muslim women without the approval of their husband. 
Ahmed also questioned the legitimacy of the divorce for the follow-
ing reasons: Firstly, Laila already had her foreign divorce approved in 
Norway before she met Ahmed, meaning that she already may have 
had plans to remarry in Norway. Secondly, the authorized translation 
was dated two weeks earlier than the original divorce papers. Thirdly, 
Ahmed presented the Court a certificate from the local Arab register of 
population which confirmed Khalid’s civil status as still being married. 
Ahmed further claimed that he and Laila never actually lived togeth-
er and that “she was always covered and seemed unwilling to fulfil her 
marital duties.” As a result of the marriage and the following divorce 
Ahmed felt deeply humiliated and concluded once more by express-
ing his fear of prosecution (“stoning or even worse”) the next time he 
visited his family. In classical Islamic law the concepts of adultery are 
a part of criminal law and are regulated by the hadd punishments. As 
these punishments are generally more severe they also require a more 
rigorous standard of proof. Since this standard is difficult to meet, the 
normal practice is to apply milder punishments, such as imprisonment, 
lashes, or a fine.5 Ahmed’s fear of prosecution thus seemed exagger-
ated.
The female perspective
Laila did not contest that her marriage with Ahmed may have been 
pro forma, but considered this irrelevant, as it had been dissolved al-
ready. Neither did she contest that Ahmed would have committed 
adultery (zina) if he married an already married woman. “This would 
be the case whether they had had sexual relations or not,” she said, 
“Because if they were married everyone would believe that they had 
had sexual relations.” Both parties agreed that according to the formal 
Sharia law of their country of origin, a marriage had to be consummat-
ed in order for it to be valid. At the same time, Laila appealed to Nor-
wegian law, which does not require the consummation of a marriage 
for it to be regarded as legitimate. She asserted that, “there would be 
many illegal marriages in Norway if marriages without sexual relations 
were invalid.” Laila thus attempted to strengthen her own position by 
appealing to a broad spectre of social, cultural, and religious conven-
tions. As the marriage was contracted in Norway the issue of consum-
mation did not carry any formal weight, but was still deemed of some 
importance by both parties. 
During the court sessions Laila rejected Ahmed’s fear of prosecu-
tion as being unsubstantiated. She presented a letter from the Nor-
wegian Embassy which explained the workings of her kind of divorce 
(mukhala‘a), i.e. one that is based on mutual agreement. “The fact that 
she initiated the divorce at a Sharia court did not mean that her former 
Immigration and other aspects of globalization 
have brought a wealth of new ideas, norms, 
and values into Norwegian society and into 
its courtrooms as well. Analyzing a court case 
in which a Muslim man tried to invalidate a 
marriage that had already been disbanded, the 
author looks at how boundaries between legal 
systems can grow blurred, and how competing 
discourses are mobilized in order to influence 
the judicial process.1
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did it respect the different social, cultural, and religious norms and values 
that both parties clearly expressed? How did the Court meet the different 
expectations of justice as illustrated by the example of Ahmed and Laila 
and did it meet these different feelings of justice with tolerance? 
A plea for openness and knowledge
The court-case described above shows the com-
plexity of cases with an international dimension 
as they arise before domestic courts. Such cases 
require more knowledge and openness from Nor-
wegian judges in relation to other cultures and a 
willingness to cross the borders of their national 
law. In a global world, it is no longer possible to 
see national law as an isolated unity. Its internal 
sovereignty is continuously challenged by ex-
ternal factors, like European law, human rights, 
or religious law that are not bound by national 
borders. These developments challenge the tra-
ditional studies of law that are used to think in 
terms like “rules of law,” “validity,” and “principles 
of law,” while discourses like “conflict,” “process,” 
“function,” and “group” are considered irrelevant.
Today, Norwegian courts face the complications 
of a multicultural society where certain “groups” 
have their own ideas and norms. Such “groups” 
can be a nation, an ethnic group, or a subculture.7 
Norwegian Private International Law allows judg-
es to apply foreign law when a case has a stronger 
connection to another country, thus opening up 
possibilities for legal pluralism. Still, Norwegian 
judges continue to strictly arbitrate according to 
Norwegian rules of law, without paying heed to 
the underlying ideas, norms, and values that exist 
in certain groups from different cultures. This may 
be due to lack of awareness about the existence 
of different perceptions of justice. It may also be 
caused by the lack of knowledge about different 
law cultures or simply a way to protect their na-
tional culture of law. 
husband could not have pronounced a 
talaq earlier in order to free himself from 
her,” Laila added. It is indeed not unusual 
in Islamic countries for Muslim women to 
seek judicial divorce in order to receive a 
divorce registration. Some men deliber-
ately fail to register talaq at the local au-
thorities in order to escape the obligation 
to pay alimony.6 
Laila admitted that the translation may 
have been incorrect, but claimed that the 
divorce papers were originals. “The fact that 
a year after the divorce her former husband 
[Khalid] still was registered as married by 
the local authorities does not prove any-
thing because it is unclear when this infor-
mation was received,” Laila asserted. 
Laila consistently emphasized the dif-
ference between “pro forma” and “forced" 
marriages, invoking a discourse that is often 
staged on the political level with the goal 
to limit further immigration. Laila explained 
that it is possible to contract arranged mar-
riages in Norway as long as they are not es-
tablished under coercion. “As a rule, these 
marriages also function well and if not, 
both parts can file for separation and later 
divorce in accordance with Norwegian law,” 
she added, possibly referring to herself. 
Additionally, Laila presented the Court a letter by a mother’s shelter 
which confirmed that she had come to it asking for help when in a poor 
physical and mental shape. Ahmed had treated her badly, she argued, 
and this had been the main reason why she had left their marital home. 
Indeed, Laila suggested that this court case was just another brick in 
his game to harass her and her family. 
Final judgement of the Court
The High Court of Appeal explained in its judgement that, according 
to the Marriage Act and its later amendments, marriages can be an-
nulled only when coercion and severe abuse of the institution of mar-
riage are involved. Even if Laila had only married Ahmed to improve her 
immigration status, this would not be sufficient to nullify the marriage, 
according to the Court.
Norwegian law allows all parties to freely provide evidence to sup-
port their cases. Eventually, the Court decides which arguments have 
most evidential force. In this case the Court relied, not surprisingly, 
heavily on the documentation provided by the Norwegian Embassy. 
The documentation provided by the Muslim authorities (population 
register) was not given any weight. The Court, furthermore, confirmed 
that consummation is not a marriage condition in Norwegian law and 
that disappointment about unfulfilled expectations in this sense is not 
a reason to declare the marriage void. 
Overall the Court seemed to be more on the side of the female party, 
considering her the weaker part. The Court continuously argued out of 
Norwegian perceptions of justice and Norwegian customs rather than 
observing the underlying conflict between the parties, or trying to find 
solutions that could meet the expectations of all parties involved. The 
Court did not deny that Ahmed could be exposed to prosecution, but 
did not find this fact, of itself, a sufficient reason to declare the mar-
riage invalid. Ahmed thus did not succeed in his petition to annul the 
marriage and he was ordered to cover all legal costs both for himself 
and Laila. Ahmed appealed the decision one final time to the Supreme 
Court, but his appeal was rejected. 
The question pertaining to the nature of Ahmed’s motive to go to 
court and risk such financial losses cannot be answered with full cer-
tainty. Was it out of “revenge” or was it in expectation of receiving com-
pensation for his loss of social status both in Norway and in the tran-
snational context? Did he feel betrayed by Laila who had divorced him 
after such a short period of marriage? As Norwegian law does not allow 
women to claim alimony in cases where they do not have children to-
gether, this issue did not play a role here. 
The case also raises other and more important questions. Did the Court 
actually observe the notion of legal pluralism that came to the surface and 
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While Malaysian society is praised as a 
harmonious and peaceful patchwork of 
identities, religious issues are causing 
social strains. Some sections of the Ma-
lay-Muslim community have begun to 
challenge the official stance on aposta-
sy. The Badawi government’s awkward 
silence reveals its unwillingness to take 
a position on this issue, as any step for-
ward would certainly cost it the loss of 
its Malay constituency. There is now a 
real struggle within civil society between those advocating complete 
freedom of religion and those condemning apostasy. The two main 
contenders in this debate are those defending the constitutional free-
dom of belief, brought together in the coalition named “Article 11,” and 
the neo-conservative parties represented by the “Allied Coordinating 
Islamic NGOs” (ACCIN). This article looks at the debate on apostasy in 
Malaysia, focusing primarily on the neo-conservative Islamic move-
ments that wish to turn Malaysia into a modern Islamic state. 
From semantic to legal ambiguity
Malaysian society has a long history of religious and cultural pluralism. 
All Malaysians, be they of Chinese, Indian, or Malay background, are uni-
fied under the banner of their common universal Malaysian citizenship. 
While some non-Muslims find themselves dubbed kuffar (non-believers) 
and, therefore, treated as second-class citizens, apostates who leave Islam 
are perceived as traitors to the faith. Because Islam is inscribed in the con-
stitution as the official religion of the federation,1 religion has become 
overtly politicized. 
The emergence of a third category of citizen, the Malay non-Muslim, 
blurs the margins of a previously clear religious distinction. Malaysian 
apostates are a minority of Muslims who have renounced Islam. In the 
Malaysian context this decision has far-reaching consequences: it has 
taken them on a journey through a legal and social imbroglio.
According to the National Constitution of 1956, a “Malay is a person 
who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, 
[and] conforms to Malay customs.”2 This legal definition means that the 
term “Muslim” cannot be disassociated from the category “Malay.”3 Ac-
cordingly, ethnicity is the determinant of religious confession: a Malay 
has to be Muslim and popular conventions consider any Muslim as Malay. 
Therefore, the different usages and meanings of the term Malay create a 
major ambivalence: being a Malay could entail that someone is (1) a son/
daughter of the soil or a Bumiputera, (2) a Muslim, or (3) both. This ho-
mogenized definition of “Malay,” one that blends religion, tradition, and 
culture, is central to a heated debate. 
The term Malay leads us into numerous ambiguities. The primary mean-
ing of the word “Malay” describes the son/daughter of soil known as bu-
miputera. Nevertheless, the term “Malay” hijacked by the constitution and 
popular conventions is now widely synonymous to Muslim. Thus, the so-
called “Malay category” includes Chinese, Indian, and, of course, Malay 
bumiputeras who also happen to be Muslim. In this category where Islam 
is the matrix, one may easily ask whether there exists any expression of 
ethnic differences. 
The term Malay has been detached from its original meaning and is in-
appropriate to describe the Muslim community as a whole. For example, 
the Chinese Muslim association of Malaysia encounters problems when 
it comes to conversion. By converting to Islam, commonly defined as 
“masuk malayu” (literally “entering the Malay community”), they will in 
fact become “Malay.” The new converts to Islam fear a loss of their Chinese 
cultural background. The Malaysian Chinese Muslim association, MACMA, 
has tried to counter the apprehension of new converts by stressing that 
being Muslim does not, of itself, entail being Malay.
Nevertheless, this semantic route is 
not a major problem within the com-
munity itself. Ethnic differences do 
not readily lead to tensions within the 
Muslim community. Islam represents a 
link between people of different ethnic 
origins and tends to be a prime qual-
ity minimizing cultural differences. The 
tensions emerge when it comes to po-
litical issues and, of course, apostasy.
The challenge of deserting Islam in Malaysia
The religious distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims has been 
institutionalized by the federal government: the word “Islam” appears on 
the national identification card of each Malaysian citizen professing Islam 
as his/her religion. Effectively, this ties the individual to the version of Is-
lamic law active in their place of residence. Every Malaysian professing 
Islam is officially registered as “Muslim” and placed under the authority 
of the religious department and the Sharia court. This means that his/
her life, from birth to burial, will be guided according to both Islamic and 
federal law. Consequently, Muslims who have renounced Islam find them-
selves occupying an abyssal legal zone. 
Due to the federal system of governance in Malaysia, each state is al-
lowed to introduce and implement Islamic laws of its own: in the year 
2000, the state of Perlis, under the rule of the ruling UMNO party, intro-
duced its own faith protection bill proposing apostates be sent to faith 
rehabilitation centres. According to Article 4, the federal law edited in the 
constitution is supreme. Nevertheless, the conservatives claim that no law 
can supersede Islamic law, which they consider divinely sealed. Referring 
to Article 160 of the federal constitution, the renunciation of Islam by an 
ethnic Malay jeopardises the integrity of the legal category to which this 
individual belongs. At the same time, Article 11 paradoxically guarantees 
that each Malaysian citizen must be left to enjoy freedom of belief. 
In all cases, conversion out of Islam is interpreted as a way of escaping 
the “Muslim administrative and legal category.” Today, dozens of Malay-
sian citizens have been denied the right to change their religion and to 
practice the religion of their choice as allowed by the federal constitu-
tion.4 For a more precise idea of the various ins and outs of apostasy in 
Malaysia, consider the case of Lina Joy.
Azlina Jailani, converted to Christianity in 1998, changed her name to 
Lina Joy and wanted to marry a Roman Catholic. The National Registra-
tion Department (NRD) accepted the change to her name, but did not 
remove the word “Islam” from her identification card. In 1999, Lina Joy 
filed a first complaint against the NRD and simultaneously asked for an 
official declaration from the federal territory religious department testi-
fying her renouncement of Islam. Lina Joy subsequently entered—and 
promptly lost herself within—an administrative jungle: the federal court 
refused to take any decision as long as her renouncement was not certi-
fied by the religious department. The verdict of the federal court in May 
2007 confirmed the fact that civil court has no jurisdiction in this matter. 
Therefore, the case has been left to the Sharia court even if the defendant 
claims not longer to be Muslim. 
In other words, Muslims cannot rely on Article 11 relating to freedom 
of worship, while Sharia law does not allow them to convert from Islam 
to another religion. Consequently, the supremacy of the constitution is 
challenged and this decision will impact on other cases waiting for de-
cisions from lower courts. Apostasy has now become a social and legal 
challenge. 
The power rise of a neo-conservative Islamic civil society 
In Malaysia, the concept of “civil society” emerged in the 1990s and 
was promoted by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, dur-
In Malaysia, legal definitions of the religious 
category “Muslim” and ethnic category “Malay” 
imply each other. Consequently, Muslims who 
have renounced Islam find themselves in an 
abyssal legal zone. The legal intricacies and the 
media representations surrounding apostasy 
reveal tensions between “the secular” and 
“the religious,” thereby providing insight into 
the imbalanced and bifurcated nature of civil 
society in Malaysia. 
apostasy & islamic Civil 
society in Malaysia
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Demonstration 
held by ACCIN, 
BADAI, and 
PAS members, 
Penang, 14 May 
2006
and to promote their respective positions. The rule of the game con-
sists in organizing attractive events bankable for the media: “media 
coup.” The “media coup” strategy then leads the organization to reach a 
large audience and overthrow the other party. 
“Article 11” started a road show entitled “Federal Constitution: pro-
tection for all” about freedom of religion in Malaysia. As the forum 
started to gain resonance among the public and increasingly received 
attention in the national media, ACCIN and its allies organized protests 
in front of the venues where the public talks were held. The forums in 
Penang and Johor had to be aborted by the police because of secu-
rity risks, due to the tensions growing among the protesters. The event 
made the front page of the main newspaper exaggerating the num-
bers of demonstrators from 200 to 400. 
Following the event, the government urged “Article 11” to end the 
discussion and stop its forums, seen as a threat to social peace. A few 
days later, ACCIN and its co-allies, the youth branch of the ruling party 
(UMNO) among them, organized a massive public meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur. The subject of the forum was: “Challenge to the Rights of Mus-
lims.” 
ACCIN coalition is using the media strategically 
by organizing spectacular demonstrations, such 
as that occurring on May 14 in Penang. Actually, 
the media scene represents a virtual room of de-
bate for both coalitions playing the game of prov-
ocation and answers through the Internet, news-
papers, newsletters, etc. and providing a tool of 
propaganda by which neo-conservativs aim to 
create a virtual common front. Without minimiz-
ing its importance, the debate on apostasy must 
be seen as a pretext (similarly to the debate in the 
film The Da Vinci Code, or during the crisis stirred 
up by cartoons of Muhammad) to affirm their ex-
istence and to announce a wake up call to the en-
tire Muslim community. The media are a channel 
to reach an international audience and the “Mus-
lim public sphere.”9 
The rise of power of “neoconservative” fronts 
supported by political allies signifies the imbal-
anced nature of civil society, which, in turn, un-
derlines the frail balance of Malaysian society. 
The recent denouement in apostasy cases has not 
pacified the debate; rather, it has intensified the 
division between Muslims and non-Muslims. The 
verdict of the Federal court in Lina Joy’s case re-
fusing the recognition of her conversion to Chris-
tianity and highlighting the fact that Sharia court 
is the only jurisdiction with any authority on this 
matter reveals the perversion of a dual legal sys-
tem. From both legal and social perspectives, this 
decision has limited the debate on apostasy to an 
exclusively Muslim sphere.
ing his programme of Islamization. Civil society, or Masyarakat Madani, 
was a way of “rethinking and refashioning modernity for Muslim so-
ciety” that would pave the way for Islamic principles in an imagined 
modern future.5 According to this way of thinking, civil society is in-
trinsically linked to religion and particularly to Islam; it is the reflection 
of the binary Malaysian society. Malaysian society and civil society are 
divided in two parts: Islamic and non-Islamic. In fact, the Malaysian civil 
society is intrinsically linked to religious issues. Among those represent-
ing human rights, women rights, consumer rights and so on, numerous 
Malaysian NGOs are religious and a majority of them are Muslim.6 
Malaysian Islamic NGOs play a key role in diffusing the Islamic mes-
sage in Malaysia and encouraging conversions to the official line: 
Sunni, Shafi‘ite thought. For example, some of the organizations within 
ACCIN coalition are offering Islamic teaching classes to Muslim families 
and, targeting non-Muslim Malaysians and foreigners, special courses 
to “discover Islam.” The first government of Malaysia has created its 
own conversion organization. Nowadays, this NGO is still funded by 
the state. Of course, this fails to fit with the Western definition of NGOs 
according to which political independence is vital. In fact, many NGOs 
(in particular Islamic ones) in Malaysia tend to be linked to political 
parties and/or the government. Conversely, on the grounds that (1) 
some of their members belong to political parties and (2) their official 
statements often reflect the programmes or interests of specific po-
litical parties their claim to be apolitical is mere rhetoric. For example, 
local political figures and members of the Islamic party (PAS) joined the 
demonstration held by members of ACCIN in Penang in May 14 2006. In 
this context, one in which members of an NGO may also be members 
of a political party and another NGO at the same time, measuring the 
significance of Islamic civil society with any degree of accuracy is hard 
to do. 
Only one Muslim organization, Sisters in Islam (SIS), joined the coa-
lition “Article 11” in favour of the freedom of religion. SIS represents 
a real exception because it is the only Islamic NGOs fighting with the 
liberal front. The main Islamic organizations which joined ACCIN (the 
neoconservative coalition) consider SIS' positions extremely liberal and 
even deny its Islamic attribution. 
ACCIN is an umbrella for no less than 14 NGOs. Their members are 
mostly from the urban middle class, students or professionals, but the 
branches spread throughout the country allow them to reach people 
from most, if not all, social backgrounds. Their activities range from Is-
lamic and general education, social help, to proselytizing. Generally, 
their funding comes from their members and they have their own web-
site and newsletter. 
ACCIN: support and actions 
ACCIN’s common enemy is the “Article 11” coalition and their parti-
sans. ACCIN’s ambition is clearly to put an end to the discussion initi-
ated by “Article 11” and counter their arguments in favour of freedom 
of renunciation of Islam. ACCIN has taken the view that “Article 11” is a 
threat to Islam and to the right of Muslims to live under Islamic princi-
ples and laws. 
The defensive strategy of ACCIN is defined by its committee mem-
bers, presided over by Yusri Mohammed, head of the country’s largest 
Islamic organization Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM).7 Two impor-
tant NGOs not directly related to ACCIN support its activities: Peguam 
Pembela Islam, commonly known as Pembela or PPI, and Badan anti-
IFC, or BADAI. Pembela was created in 2006 by a group of 100 lawyers 
willing to fight against the Malaysian Bar council members siding with 
“Article 11.” 
BADAI was created to undermine the project of an Inter Faith council 
(IFC) which aimed at creating a space where religious issues could be 
discussed openly. The IFC project was abandoned in 2005 because the 
main Islamic organization, led by Abim and Jemaah Islah Malaysia (JIM)8 
were opposed to having their own religious principles challenged. 
BADAI and its members initiated numerous actions set up in order to 
reach a large audience through massive media coverage. 
A media strategy
The Malaysian media scene broadcasts in all of the languages used 
in the country (Chinese, Malay, English, Tamil, Hindu). The media voice 
is controlled by severe rules embodied in the Freedom of Information 
Act. Nevertheless the coverage of the debate on apostasy is massive. 
Media provides a useful tool for civil society to reach a large audience 
apostasy & islamic Civil 
society in Malaysia
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Situated on the west bank of the Me-
kong less than 50 kilometres north 
of the provincial capital of Kampong 
Cham, Phum Trea is only accessible 
by boat or mopeds using muddy, and 
during rainy season hardly traversable, 
pathways. However, the visitor, after 
stepping from the ferry and walking 
past typical wooden houses on stilts, 
is soon struck by the sight of Cambo-
dia’s largest mosque. Given its modest 
surroundings, the huge white building 
makes a strong impression, albeit ap-
pearing slightly out of place. In fact, 
in many other rural Cham villages in 
Cambodia, the recently built mosques, 
replacing their mostly wooden prede-
cessors (most of which were destroyed 
during Khmer Rouge rule), are the only concrete buildings to be seen. 
Yet, none of these can match Phum Trea’s mosque 
which has recently replaced Phnom Penh’s Arab-
financed International Dubai Mosque as the larg-
est place of Muslim worship in deeply Buddhist 
Cambodia.
The village’s location in Kampong Cham prov-
ince is crucial, as eastern Cambodia was always 
the country’s Cham stronghold. Even today, 
around a third of the greater than 400,000 Cham 
Muslims reside in this province along the banks of 
the Mekong. Even though, or perhaps because, it 
is so far removed from the Cham agglomerations 
in several suburbs of Phnom Penh, Phum Trea has 
maintained its status as the Chams’ spiritual cen-
tre, a position which was already noticed by the 
early French ethnographers.
Islamic values and the appearance of 
Islamic modernism
Whereas, since the relocation of the court from 
Oudong to Penh Penh in the 1860s at the latest, 
the highest Muslim dignitaries were residing in 
Chruy Changvar in the proximity of the court, re-
ligious authority was traditionally wielded by the 
most eminent teachers (sg. guru). Indeed, in the 
1930s neither Chruy Changvar nor An Giang in 
modern-day Vietnam—both renowned centres of 
Islamic learning among the Chams—could match 
the prominence of Phum Trea with its foremost 
Mecca-educated teacher Hajji Osman. By then, the latter had allegedly 
already taught generations of students from all over the country.
Predominantly due to Malay influence, in the 1930s the Cambodian 
Chams were engaged in heated discussions regarding the details of 
proper religious observance. Even though the same period also wit-
nessed fierce opposition between the religious establishment and 
adherents of Islamic reformism influenced by Muhammad Abduh and 
Rashid Rida (kaum tua – new group) mainly in the Dutch East Indies and 
the British Straits Settlements, the nature of the Chams’ disagreements 
was still more fundamental. Perhaps 
these can most profitably be compared 
to the antagonisms between observ-
ant Muslims (santri) and abangan or 
Javanists in Java. Indeed, among the 
Chams, the split was caused by dis-
cussions revolving around the basic 
tenets of Islam, such as the number of 
daily prayers. Within these debates the 
language of religious instruction was 
of crucial importance: the representa-
tives of traditional distinct Cham Islam 
insisted on the use of rudimentary Ara-
bic and Cham language, as preserved 
in Cham manuscripts; whereas a new 
generation of scholars, partly edu-
cated in Kelantan or Patani, came to 
rely on Malay language and materials 
for their religious instruction.1 Eventually Malayization prevailed over 
Cham Islam. Yet, the latter has survived as a distinct minority within the 
Cambodian Chams (at times referred to as Jahed), whose leader, like 
the majority’s grand mufti, has been awarded an honorific title by the 
Cambodian king.2 Naturally Phum Tria and its Hajji Osman must have 
played an instrumental role in the advance of more orthodox teach-
ings. The mentioned controversies among the Chams were not yet as-
sociated with the spread of Islamic modernism in Southeast Asia. How-
ever, as a major demand of the latter reform movement was not only 
the improvement of religious instruction, but also the introduction of 
mixed curricula featuring secular subjects, it is important to note that 
Phum Tria housed Hajji Osman’s famous madrasa as well as a similarly 
renowned religious school, the first among the Cham community to 
rely on such a mixed curriculum.
Eventually in the 1950s, reformists educated in modern religious 
schools in Kelantan and Patani (and in certain instances even India), 
also came to criticize allegedly un-Islamic and backward practices in 
Cambodia. Elsewhere these purification campaigns led to intra-com-
munity strife. In Kroch Chmar village (located in Phum Trea’s neighbour-
ing district), the activities of two reformist imams, who had returned 
from studies abroad, created dissension and ultimately led to violence. 
In response, the government chose to have both imams deported from 
Cambodia in 1960.3
Phum Trea as Cambodia’s Tablighi Jamaat stronghold
Beginning in the 1960s, the impact of foreign influences, so deci-
sive for the developments within the Cambodian Cham community 
outlined above, was sharply reduced, and eventually petered out al-
together over the following decade. Indeed, with the beginning of the 
second Indochina war in 1964, it became increasingly difficult to main-
tain foreign contacts. Civil war and US bombing in Cambodia in the first 
half of the 1970s worsened the situation; and Khmer Rouge rule, from 
1975-1979, led to the almost complete physical elimination of Cham 
religious scholars and leadership as well as to the destruction of most 
religious infrastructure, and the death of a large portion of the Cham 
population.4 Obviously, these were not times destined for major devel-
opments within the religious community. Due to armed resistance by 
the remnants of the Khmer Rouge, notwithstanding the return of Cham 
refugees, this state of affairs continued throughout the 1980s. Yet, at 
The village of Phum Trea, located in rural 
Kampong Cham province, has long been known 
as the spiritual centre of Cambodia’s Muslim 
minority, the Chams. As such, the religious 
currents in Phum Trea reflect broader trends 
of religious change in the region. In fact, many 
of these currents have manifested themselves 
most visibly in Phum Trea and its vicinity. 
Apart from presenting an overview of major 
developments within Cambodian Islam, this 
article argues that certain developments, 
such as the arrival of Islamic modernism 
and the emergence of Tablighi Jamaat as a 
locally relevant mass movement, exemplify 
the traditionalist reaction to other currents 
of Islamic internationalism, currents that are 
presently reshaping Cambodian Islam. 
Cambodia’s Phum trea 
as Mirror image of 
religious Change
P h i l i P P  B r u C k M a Y r
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[T]he Tablighi 
centres appear to 
be self-sufficient 
communities 
focused on the 
preservation and 
cultivation of 
Islamic and Cham 
identity.
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Cambodian boy 
leaves a mosque 
closed down for 
alleged links 
with Jemaah 
Islamiyah.
continuing appeal of the movement testifies to the successful imple-
mentation of these directives.
However, this new wave of religious change has also been criticized. 
The movement has been opposed by modernist Muslims as well as 
villagers, both of whom view its sectarian character with suspicion. 
Whereas Cham NGOs such as the Cambodian Muslim Development 
Foundation as well as Arab charities are promoting both religious and 
secular education, interaction with the Khmer majority, and participa-
tion in politics, with its mostly rural and suburban base, the Tablighi 
Jamaat is steering a potentially isolationist course by emphasizing reli-
gious education alone after primary school as the best means to avoid 
Khmerization.
The arising conflicts are strongly reminiscent of clashes between 
modernists and traditionalists in the preceding century. In both in-
stances, such clashes have brought about the division of entire villages, 
as mosques and schools have been fought over. Often, the situation 
can only be resolved through the establishment of parallel structures. 
Similarly, Sulaiman’s attempt to monopolize worship in Phum Trea’s 
huge mosque, built with donations from local and exile Chams, and 
according to certain reports also with financing from Pakistan, was met 
with opposition. Consequently, the construction 
of small, independent mosques in the proximity 
of their giant counterpart was already begun be-
fore the completion of the latter.
Today the fates of the Tablighi Jamaat in Cam-
bodia and Phum Trea are closely intertwined, and 
the future of the latter appears heavily dependent 
on that of the former. However, given the Tablighi 
movement’s mass appeal among the rural Chams, 
an instrumental role in future developments 
within Cambodian Islam will certainly be ac-
corded to Phum Trea. Nevertheless, as with the 
case of a similar dakwa group in Malaysia (namely 
the Darul Arqam), it is very likely that the move-
ment will soon gain ground among urban Chams 
of the middle and higher strata of society. This, 
in turn, could lead to a rethinking of Tablighi ef-
forts regarding the capital. Similarly, the expand-
ing network of modern Muslim schools under the 
direction of modern oriented Cham NGOs into 
the rural areas may decrease the demand for the 
purely religious education espoused and champi-
oned by the Tablighis. 
the same time, the first trickle of small-scale international Islamic aid 
started to arrive from the Islamic Development Bank and private busi-
nessmen based in Dubai. Such developments foreshadowed important 
changes in the 1990s and beyond. 
During the 1980s, urban Chams actively sought attachment to and 
aid from the wider Muslim world; by the early 1990s, the number of 
foreign contacts was on the rise again, and soon reached an unprec-
edented level.5 Significantly, since the 1993 elections, numerous Saudi-
Arabian, Kuwaiti, and Malaysian NGOs have built mosques, schools, 
and orphanages in Cambodia, and, in doing so, have exerted consid-
erable influence on the face of Cham Islam in Cambodia. During the 
UN peace-keeping mission from early 1992 to summer 1993, Kampong 
Cham province and Phum Trea were located in the Indian sector and, 
strikingly, the da‘wa (or dakwa) movement, Tablighi Jamaat, with its In-
dian roots had just started to gain notoriety in the area.
The movement first made its appearance in Cambodia in 1989, when 
the far-travelled Imam Sulaiman Ibrahim returned to Cambodia after 
almost two decades abroad. After his flight from Cambodia he studied 
in, among other places, Medina and Malaysia, where he first came into 
contact with the dakwa movement. In the following years, he visited 
affiliated institutions in India and South Thailand. Upon returning, he 
set out to spread the movement’s message in his homeland, and in ad-
dition to the mandatory preaching missions, he taught in the village of 
Chumnik, situated like Phum Trea in Kampong Cham’s Kroch Chhmar 
district. However, as Sulaiman’s teachings quickly drew large numbers 
of students, he relocated to Phum Trea in 1992, where he built a large 
madrasa with donations from Malaysian supporters and exile Chams.
With its strong sense of community coupled with an emphasis on 
individual piety and activism, the movement spread rapidly among the 
Cambodian Chams, and by now has 20 provincial chapters. It seems 
that it is exactly this form of community mobilization with its focus 
on personal religious observance instead of forced efforts to come to 
terms with the demands of contemporary Cambodian realities, which 
accounts for the movement’s mass appeal. The Tablighi Jamaat’s char-
acter of a mass movement within Cambodian Islam is most obvious 
in the large crowds of people spending Thursday nights at associat-
ed mosques, when itinerant preachers are holding sermons. Perhaps 
an even more visible sign of Tablighi influence is constituted by their 
particular style of dress, namely long white robes and turbans, which 
stands in marked contrast to the traditional Cham attire of sarong and 
white skullcap, or the western dress of many urban Chams. This con-
trast is even more noticeable in respect to women’s dress: while, since 
the early 1990s, Cham women have increasingly donned the hijab, it 
is predominantly in villages with a strong Tablighi influence, that one 
sees completely veiled women. Such attire was unknown in Cambodia 
until recently.
Despite its origination as an offshoot of the Indian reformist Deoban-
di movement, the Tablighi Jamaat appears in Cambodia with a dis-
tinctively Malay and traditionalist face. Foreign itinerant preachers are 
often Malays from South Thailand, and thus share a common back-
ground with the Chams, both belonging to a Muslim minority in a pre-
dominantly Buddhist country. Moreover, the Tablighis’ ostentatiously 
Islamic style of dress stands in marked contrast to the Western costume 
mostly worn by representatives of Arab or Malay NGOs as well as by 
figures of the Malaysian political spectrum (either UMNO or PAS), who 
are similarly visiting Cambodia to aid the Chams.
Due to its emergence as a centre for Tablighi activities, Phum Trea has 
also regained its role as spiritual centre, at least as far as rural Cambo-
dia is concerned. Although the centrally located mosque of Prek Prah 
in Phnom Penh is referred to as the focal point of the movement in 
Cambodia, it is beyond doubt that Phum Trea reigns supreme in terms 
of popular appeal. After all, it houses Cambodia’s largest mosque and 
Tablighi madrasa; the latter draws students from all over the country 
and is staffed mostly by Chams educated in Southern Thai schools that 
are affiliated with the movement. Phum Trea also enjoys the presence 
of Imam Sulaiman. Moreover, situated in the historical Cham strong-
hold of Cambodia at some distance from the Khmer centres, its location 
is also an advantage as it lends support to its claim to be at the heart 
of “pure” Islamic learning. Similarly, the local strength of the movement 
serves to compensate for the relative neglect of the rural Chams by for-
eign charities and the politically active “big power” Muslims. Generally 
the Tablighi centres appear to be self-sufficient communities focused 
on the preservation and cultivation of Islamic and Cham identity. The 
Society & the State
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Ethiopian 
women on their 
way to church in 
Sana’a, Yemen
In pre-revolutionary Yemen it was 
relatively common to allocate domes-
tic tasks to people of lower social sta-
tus but only elite families in the cities 
had permanent servants. They were 
mostly coming from rural areas and 
stayed with the family till they married 
or died. In addition, slavery was legiti-
mate in Yemen until the early 1960s, 
yet only families of high social status, 
and particularly those living in the coastal areas, made use of slaves. 
With the overthrow of the Imamate in 1962 and the development of a 
nation-state, slavery was abolished. The equality of all citizens was em-
phasized and laid down in the constitution. Since then economic class 
has gradually become more important than social background. One of 
the reasons for this monetarism of the economy was that larger num-
bers of Yemenis of different social backgrounds migrated to Saudi Ara-
bia and the Gulf States in the early 1970s, where the sudden increase of 
the oil prices resulted in a high demand for (unskilled) labour. This led 
to a growth of the Yemeni economy and enriched people regardless 
of their social status. A new middle class emerged of people actively 
involved in trading, business, and the professions. While the impover-
ishment of rural areas forced people to 
migrate to the cities, returned migrants 
often decided to settle in cities as well. 
In particular, families of qabilis (tribes-
men) became part of the new middle 
classes having changed from a rural to 
an urban lifestyle.
The emergence of this new middle 
class in the cities has had a major im-
pact on women’s lives. For a number of 
Yemeni women migration to the city meant a decrease in workload as 
they lost their agricultural tasks and their work became restricted to do-
mestic work and childcare. Yet, other women experienced an increase 
in workload. In many cases domestic tasks could no longer be divided 
between adult women living in the same household—with the young-
er ones doing the heavier tasks—but falling instead on the shoulders 
of one woman. In addition, because of the increased school enrolment 
of girls in urban areas, daughters were no longer automatically avail-
able for household chores. Moreover, in the past thirty years a growing 
number of urban women engaged in voluntary work or took up profes-
sional work in education, health care, administration, and other em-
ployment sectors. For these women combining their activities in and 
outside the home became a challenge for which employing 
domestic workers offered a solution. Employing domestic 
labour was and is only affordable for the middle and upper 
classes. Upper class families live in villas and multi-storey 
houses that require a lot of housework, and often have an 
active social life visiting relatives and friends and receiving 
guests at home. Because employing domestic workers facili-
tates a particular lifestyle, it has increasingly become a sign 
of social status. Employing migrant women as domestics is 
an even stronger sign of social status.
Despite the increased demand for paid domestic labour 
and the deterioration of the economy, few Yemeni women 
are employed as domestics. In addition to the historically 
low status of service professions, practices of gender segre-
gation affect Yemeni women’s willingness to work as domes-
tics in the houses of unrelated men. But Yemeni families are 
also not in favour of employing Yemeni domestics. “Yemeni 
domestics are not clean” was one of the main reasons given 
in response to my query. This statement does not only refer 
to the fact that Yemeni women do not know how to clean, 
as they are often not acquainted with modern cleaning ma-
terials, but also to their social background. It refers to the 
old status hierarchy in which people carrying out service 
professions were of lower social background and were for 
this reason stigmatized as “dirty.” In addition, in the old hi-
erarchical system of social stratification status differentials 
between people were very clear and well-established. With 
the social and economic upheavals that have taken place in 
Yemen since the 1970s, such as the official abolishment of 
slavery and the enrichment of people of various social status 
groups, social boundaries between people of different social 
classes are less clear. The new middle classes are afraid of a 
blurring of class boundaries and therefore prefer not to em-
ploy Yemeni women. Instead, migrant women of different 
racial, religious, and national backgrounds are employed.1
While the presence of Asian women working as 
domestics in the rich countries of the Arabian 
Peninsula is a well-known phenomenon, it is 
less known that also in Yemen a similar trend 
has occurred. The majority of these women 
come from Somalia and Ethiopia, but there are 
Asian women as well. Why are migrant women 
employed as domestics? And which role does 
religion play in their employment?
Migrant Domestics 
and religious 
Closeness in Yemen
M a r i n a  D e  r e g t
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Distance and closeness
The worldwide employment of migrant women as domestic work-
ers is not accidental. In many countries there is a shift from employing 
local domestic workers to migrant domestic workers. Increasing levels 
of education and consequent access to higher skilled jobs has made 
domestic labour an unattractive option for local women of lower social 
classes, and resulted in an increasing demand for migrant women as 
domestics. Moreover, the fact that these migrant women often lack citi-
zenship rights and are therefore easier to manipulate is a key factor for 
their being in demand. As Anderson states: “Racist stereotypes inter-
sect with issues of citizenship, and result in a rac-
ist hierarchy which uses skin colour, religion, and 
nationality to construct some women as being 
more suitable for domestic work than others.”2 
Given that paid domestic labour takes place in the 
private sphere of the employer, which is the pub-
lic sphere for the domestic, boundaries have then 
to be strictly drawn. Physical boundaries are thus 
used to underline inequality. In many cases do-
mestic workers do not eat together with their em-
ployers and are not allowed to enter certain places 
in the house. When they live with their employers, 
domestics sleep in rooms in the basement, on the 
roof, or on the compound. By employing domes-
tic workers who are different from themselves 
with respect to class, ethnicity, and nationality, 
employers emphasize those social boundaries. The threatening close-
ness that is an intrinsic element of paid domestic labour is then easier 
resolved. Domestic service “can only operate smoothly when servants 
and employers are considered different from each other.”3
Accordingly, in Yemen there is a clear hierarchy between domestic 
workers, and this hierarchy coincides to some extent with the class 
position of the employer. Asian women, such as Filipinas, Indian, and 
Indonesian women, are employed by the upper classes for cleaning, 
cooking, child care, and elderly care. Ethiopian women are mainly em-
ployed by the upper middle and middle classes, to also do cleaning, 
cooking, and care-taking jobs. Both Asian and Ethiopian women often 
live with their employers. Somali women are the predominant group of 
domestic workers employed by middle class families. Somali women 
never cook but always do cleaning jobs and they rarely live with the 
families of their employers. Yemeni women occupy the bottom of the 
ladder. They are employed as cleaners and for particular tasks such as 
baking bread or cleaning water pipes. 
This hierarchy raises additional questions about the role that religion 
plays in the preferences of employers for domestic workers of a partic-
ular background. Asian and Ethiopian women, who are predominantly 
Christian,4 are higher valued than Somali and Yemeni women who are 
Muslim. Does this mean that being Muslim is a negative factor in paid 
domestic labour in Yemen, and if so, how can this be explained?
Religious closeness
When I asked Yemeni employers if religion played a role in their pref-
erence for certain domestics, many of them stated that this was not 
the case: “It doesn’t matter if she is Christian or Muslim or whatever, 
as long as she is God-fearing” was an answer I often received. A small 
number of employers expressed a preference for Muslim domestics: “I 
feel more at ease when I work together with a Muslim woman. I un-
derstand her and she understands me. I feel better that way.” A third 
group of employers preferred Christian women as domestics: “Chris-
tian women are honest, you can trust them, but Muslim women are 
unreliable, they come and go when they want.” Hana, an upper class 
woman in Hodeidah, told me that her mother used to employ a Mus-
lim Ethiopian domestic worker. But the young woman never wanted to 
accept orders and was very stubborn. “She did not want to be called 
“shaghghala” (houseworker) and at a certain moment, when we were 
talking about the washing machine that was not working (shaghghal), 
she started to shout and threatened to run away. She felt insulted be-
cause she thought that we were talking about her.” Muslim women who 
are similar to their employers with regard to social and cultural back-
ground, educational level, and descent do not accept the hierarchical 
relationship with their employers, a reluctance which may be related 
to the emphasis placed on equality in Islam. “She should not think that 
she is better than me” often expressed Muslim domestic workers’ sen-
timents. In response, they use different strategies to undermine this 
hierarchy, such as coming late to work, not showing up, and avoiding 
certain tasks. As a consequence they are stereotyped as “unreliable,” 
“unclean,” and “lazy.” Somali women in particular are stigmatized in this 
way, which is also related to the fact that they are refugees and there-
fore seen as a threat and an intrusion.5 
The intricate ways in which employers prefer domestics that are “re-
ligiously close but socially distant” manifests itself in the increasing 
employment of Indonesian women by upper class families. Indonesian 
women are attractive as domestic workers because they are not part of 
the local community and therefore do not chal-
lenge social boundaries, while being religiously 
close. “They have the same religion as Yemenis 
and that is why there is a demand for them,” Fadl, 
a recruitment agent of mixed Yemeni-Indonesian 
background, told me. He is regularly approached 
by upper class families looking for Indonesian do-
mestic workers.
As Muslim women of a different nationality and 
ethnicity but coming from a country with which 
Yemenis historically had close contacts,6 Indone-
sian women are attractive domestic workers. In-
donesian women are employed as live-in domes-
tic workers and as cooks, nannies, and caretakers 
of the sick and the elderly. They have replaced 
Filipinas, who not only have become too expen-
sive because of the high inflation rates in Yemen but who are also seen 
as too assertive and too “open-minded,” a complaint which points to 
a stronger emphasis on conservative (Muslim) values among certain 
families. In addition, Indonesian women have a weak legal position and 
do not claim citizenship status, which implies that they are easier to 
control. 
Employers’ preferences have therefore less to do with the religious 
background of the domestic worker as with the extent to which they 
can maintain distance and assert control and authority over their do-
mestics. Employers who explicitly prefer non-Mus-
lim domestic workers do so to create distance, yet 
employers who prefer Muslim domestics do not 
do so to reduce distance. Instead, they are com-
promising some of the features of distance for 
various reasons. The fact that Indonesian women 
are cheaper than Filipinas is, for example, for some 
employers, a reason to employ them, while other 
employers prefer Indonesian women because per-
sonal care of the elderly or of children is involved. 
Religious closeness becomes then more impor-
tant. Protecting the reputation of the family may 
be another reason to employ Muslim domestics, 
and in doing so avoid discussions about possible 
“inappropriate” behaviour of male relatives or of 
domestics. Employers prefer to employ domestic 
workers who are socially, culturally, and religiously 
distant, but they might feel a need to compromise 
this preference and opt for an intricate balance of 
closeness and distance.
[E]mployers prefer 
domestics that are 
“religiously close 
but socially distant” 
…
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Modernization theory rests on the as-
sumption that to be modern is to be 
secular, and that state secularism and 
societal secularization is an inevitable 
outcome of modernization processes. 
Developments have long since demon-
strated the fallacy of these assumptions. 
The organizing master narrative for so-
cial science analysis of developments 
in the “Muslim world” since the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 and the re-Islamization “from below” of large parts of 
the “Muslim world” since then has, if anything, been that of an Islamic re-
surgence which sweeps away everything that stands in its way. Hence, in 
a by no means uncharacteristic assertion, Mahmood sweepingly claims 
that there had been “two decades of the ascendance of global religious 
politics” prior to September 11 2001.1
Such master narratives provide powerful explanatory paradigms and 
historical narratives for the organization and structuring of disparate 
experiences. But much like modernization theory, these particular mas-
ter narratives tend to start from the inherently flawed epistemological 
premise that there is but one “royal road” to the understanding of Mus-
lims and the “Muslim world.” More often than not, they miss the fact 
that the secular and the religious are deeply implicated in one another 
in any given societal context, and the extent to which resurgent Islam 
and re-Islamization are in themselves phenomena of secularization—
the latter understood as an increasing differentiation of spheres.2 Nor 
does it provide a useful framework for distinguishing between secular-
ism as a theory and a practice in particular contexts, or for that matter 
for distinguishing between nominal and practising Muslims.
Prominent post-structuralist and post-colonial anthropologists like 
Asad and Mahmood3 have provided legitimacy for the construction of 
these master narratives. Asad and Mahmood both tend to posit Mus-
lims as pre-eminently and determinatively religious, and to see Islam 
as a religious tradition which articulates a radical difference or alterity 
to secular liberalism. This is apparent from Asad’s statement to the ef-
fect that “the Islamic tradition ought to lead us to question many of 
the liberal categories themselves” and Mahmood’s call for a “critical 
scrutiny” of liberal notions from the “standpoint of Islamic traditions.”4 
Such statements are premised on a notion of secularism and liberal-
ism as being of “Western” origin and anathema to Islamic traditions—as 
well as a fundamental “ethnographic refusal” to engage with Muslims’ 
actual experiences with secularism and liberalism, and to explore non-
“Western” genealogies of secularism. Asad argued in his programmatic 
statement from 1986 that “one should go beyond drawing parallels 
and attempt a systematic exploration of differences” between Islamic 
and other traditions. Furthermore, “for the anthropologist of Islam, the 
proper theoretical beginning is therefore an instituted practice … into 
which Muslims are inducted as Muslims.”5 
Foundational religious texts play a crucial role in Asad’s concept of 
an Islamic tradition, as they do for Mahmood. The problem here is of 
course that Asad’s formulation of what a supposed anthropology of 
Islam ought to be about predetermines the outcome. The anthropol-
ogy of Islam, it seems, ought primarily to be about practising Muslims 
and their embodied and discursive engagement with foundational re-
ligious texts, period. But surely the question as to whether a Muslim is 
practicing or not is a question to be determined in the course of the 
empirical enquiry, and not at the outset? This is perhaps particularly 
so in contexts in which Muslims live as 
minorities in secular and liberal socie-
ties, contexts in which the “cognitive 
contamination” from non-religious 
normative models can seldom be shut 
completely out, and in which religious 
faith as practice ceases to form part of 
the doxic or “taken-for-granted.” 
Perhaps it is time to replace the mis-
nomer of the so-called “anthropology 
of Islam” with the “anthropology of Muslims.” In my Ph.D. dissertation6 
I problematize master narratives premised on the incompatibility be-
tween secularism and Islamic traditions by exploring the responses of 
Muslims in Cape Town, South Africa to the advent of a post-apartheid 
society. Post-apartheid South Africa is a society in which dominant 
sections of the new social and political elites subscribe to the secular 
and liberal values enshrined in the 1996 Constitution, and it is also a 
society which has seen a process of a contested secularization since 
1994. My findings suggest that there has been an ambiguous accom-
modation on the part of Cape Muslims and their ulama with the new 
social and political regime. This ambiguous accommodation is based 
on an appreciation of the fact that the post-apartheid state is prem-
ised on a secular principle of neutrality as between religions and their 
adherents—which the apartheid state, with its privileging of reformist 
Protestant Christianity, was not. Muslim ulama have selectively appro-
priated a discourse of human rights and constitutional values in order 
to advance the religious rights of Muslims in the realm of family law 
and in state institutions, at the same time as they have contested the 
constitutional and human rights values that they see as anathema to 
Islamic normativities—such as the legalization of same-sex practice 
and relationships, abortion, and pornography and the abolition of the 
death penalty. But this ambiguous accommodation is also based on 
the fact that secularization among Muslims in hybrid and multicultural 
Cape Town predates the advent of a post-apartheid society, and is im-
plicated in the practical accommodations between Muslims and non-
Muslims in underprivileged communities, townships, and informal set-
tlements on the Cape Flats (the vast area outside the City Bowl where 
most of Cape Town’s population live). Cape Muslims are therefore in 
profound ways entangled in the secular logic of a secularizing state.
A short history of Muslims in Cape Town
Cape Town, with an estimated 3.1 million inhabitants, has had a Mus-
lim presence at least since 1658. It is home to approximately 47% of 
South Africa’s Muslim population. Muslims made up 1.46% of the na-
tional population in 2001. Cape Muslims are predominantly Shafi‘i. The 
largest and most influential Sunni ulama organization in Cape Town is 
the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), established in 1945. In Muslim social 
imaginaries in South Africa, Cape Muslims are, much like the cityscape 
of Cape Town itself, often thought of as “liberal.” This imagined “liberal-
ness” makes reference to the fact that many Cape Muslim females are 
employed outside the home (by choice or necessity), that there is often 
a remarkable absence of strict gender segregation in private and pub-
lic spheres among Cape Muslims, but also to a more lax and permis-
sive attitude toward morality and sexuality among Cape Muslims of all 
social strata (but perhaps more so among Muslims in underprivileged 
and mixed neighbourhoods in Cape Town). Cape Town’s Muslims are 
fractured by social status, ethnicity, and religious orientation. A view to 
Secularism is often seen as anathema to Islamic 
traditions. The findings from research on the 
responses of Muslims in Cape Town to state 
secularism and societal secularization in post-
apartheid South Africa indicate the emergence 
of an ambiguous accommodation between 
Muslims and the secular state, and thus 
challenge reductionist assumptions about the 
relation of Islamic traditions to secularism. 
s i n D r e  B a n g s t a D 
how “islamic ” 
is secularism? 
Lessons from Cape Town
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lonial and non-“Western” genealogies of secular-
ism, and the actual experiences with secularism 
of Muslims in particular contexts (particularly in 
minority contexts), and in so doing, subscribing 
to what essentially amounts to an ethno-centric 
view of secularism.7 There can be no doubt that a 
secular state like the South African post-apartheid 
state is premised on a differentiation between 
secular and religious spheres, and as such delimits 
the legitimate expression of religious sentiments 
in the public and political spheres. But given the 
fact that 86% of South Africans declare them-
selves as religious, South African state secularism 
cannot be seen as determinative on the level of 
individual consciousnesses, and essentially re-
mains contested. State secularism and societal 
secularization in post-apartheid South Africa can 
in a certain sense be seen as having set in motion 
a process of re-Islamization among Cape Muslims. 
It finds its most visible articulations among Cape 
Muslims in the expansion of religious education, 
the proliferation of Muslim media, in greater iden-
tification with a global imagined community of 
Muslims, the ummah, and an increased emphasis 
on appropriate dress for female Muslims. 
If we venture beyond the ideologization of sec-
ularism and of Islamic traditions in the works of 
some post-structuralist anthropologists of Islam, 
we might discover that secularism has in some 
contexts provided a defence of the rights of reli-
gious minorities of the kind that Muslims in post-
apartheid South Africa constitute. For all their 
contestations of a particular law sanctioned by 
the Constitution of 1996 and of the secularization of South African soci-
ety in general, it seems that it is precisely this that mainstream Muslims 
in contemporary South Africa have come to discover. Secularism may 
therefore in practice, if not necessarily in theory, be more “Islamic” than 
what is commonly assumed.
Sindre Bangstad was Ph.D. Fellow at ISIM from 2003 to 2007 and recently defended his 
dissertation Global Flows, Local Appropriations: Facets of Secularisation and Re-Islamization 
among Contemporary Cape Muslims (Amsterdam University Press, 2007).
Email: s.bangstad@gmail.com
the effect that Islam is determinative for the actions and behaviours of 
Cape Muslims therefore does not bring us very far. Most Cape Muslims 
are classified as coloureds for the purposes of censuses, followed by 
South African Indians and black Africans. The latter group has seen the 
strongest growth in the number of adherents to Islam, as obstacles to 
proselytization and interaction under apartheid have disappeared, and 
as Muslims from other parts of the African continent have established 
a presence in Cape Town. 
Research on Islam in prison
An exploration of the transformation of the religious rights of Muslim 
inmates in a prison in Cape Town provide vistas to the ways in which 
post-apartheid secularism has generated new openings for the recog-
nition of what many Cape Muslims regard as “Muslim religious rights” 
within state institutions. Under apartheid, the prison service had been 
an instrument in the state-supported empowerment of white Afrikan-
ers: in 1990, 90% of senior prison officers where white, and many of 
these had a background in Christian churches. In 2005, I found that 
there were only a handful of prison warders and officials who were 
Muslims. Christian chaplains still had a privileged position within the 
prison service. Still, there had been significant achievements as far as 
the recognition of Muslim inmates rights to religious practice in the 
course of the 1990s. These were the heydays of “human rights talk” in 
post-apartheid South Africa. Guarantees for freedom of religion for in-
mates in South African prisons were provided under Section 14 (1–4) 
of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. On the basis of tactical 
alliances with post-apartheid prison managers with a background in 
the anti-apartheid struggle and as such sympathetic towards the in-
vocation of human rights discourse, and in spite of strong internal op-
position to these measures, voluntary Muslim prison imams and the 
ulama organizations on the outside had managed to ensure the rights 
of Muslim inmates to regular provisions of halal (ritually clean) food, to 
being serviced by a Muslim chaplain (from 1998), and to the use of a 
prison hall for the purpose of weekly zuhr (midday) prayer (from 1999). 
Post-apartheid secularism and the nominal state commitment to neu-
trality between the adherents of the various religions in South Africa 
that this entails in this case seems to have provided a grounds from 
which arguments for greater religious rights for South African Muslims 
could be made. 
New framework for thinking the secular and religious
Inasmuch as the post-structuralist and post-colonial anthropology 
of Islam of, for instance, Asad and Mahmood is premised on a fixation 
with Muslims’ radical alterity and difference and is anchored in the view 
that secularism is “Western” in its origins, it constitutes secularism as 
anathema to Islamic traditions. It can only do so by neglecting pre-co-
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The late Shaykh Mitwalli al-Shaarawi is 
one of the preachers most connected 
to the “repentance” of Egyptian artists. 
In the TV serial about his life “Imam al-
Da‘ah” his influence on artists is repre-
sented through the character of Badri-
yya. Badriyya is a good-hearted poor 
girl from the Shaykh’s natal village. At a 
young age she starts working in a cof-
feehouse and eventually becomes the 
owner of this coffeehouse. She con-
stantly feels remorse and does not want 
her child to be raised in a coffeehouse. 
Instead of opening a “proper” business 
she is tempted to invest in the lucrative 
but “sinful” branch of entertainment 
and opens a nightclub. During her 
meetings with Shaykh al-Shaarawi she 
expresses her sincere intention to veil, 
to leave the sinful profession, and to 
open an orphanage but it takes many 
years and encounters with al-Shaarawi 
to finally “repent.” 
Whereas Shaykh al-Shaarawi has 
always been modest about his influ-
ence on the repentant artists—stating 
that guidance is from God—many 
artists acknowledge his influence on 
them. Interestingly this also holds 
true for some of the leading actors 
and actresses in the TV serial. Shaykh 
al-Shaarawi is played by the actor Has-
san Yusf who stopped performing for 
a while after he and his wife Shams 
al-Barudi met with the shaykh. In the 
serial, Shaykh al-Shaarawi’s wife is 
played by Afaf Shoeib. She also met 
with al-Shaarawi and stepped down in 
1992. She returned after ten years and 
started acting with a veil. Badriyya, 
played by the actress Sawsan Badr, also stepped down but returned 
unveiled. 
Shaykh al-Shaarawi’s view on the shamefulness of art has apparently 
waned and new discourses on art and religion have gained relevance. 
Two decades later the star preacher Amr Khaled even begged the re-
pentant artists to return and to use their God-given talents in support 
of the nahda, the Islamic revival.
Two decades of “repentant” artists1
Shams al-Barudi was the first artist to publicly announce her re-
pentance in 1982. During her pilgrimage to Mecca she had several 
spiritual experiences after which she totally changed her life from a 
seductive actress into a devoted believer, mother, and housewife. The 
dancer Hala al-Safi left the profession in 1986 after a vision in which 
the Prophet covered her loose hair. Actress Hanaa Tharwat and her 
husband quit immediately after their meeting with Shaykh al-Shaara-
wi. The singer Yasmin al-Khiyyam, daughter of the renowned Quran 
reciter Shaykh al-Hosari, continued until 1990 despite the pressure of 
al-Shaarawi who deemed Yasmin’s profession a disgrace for his friend 
Shaykh al-Hosari. She eventually left due to her responsibilities as 
manager of the charity organization al-Hosari, named after her late 
father.
In the early 1990s, a “caravan” of singers, 
dancers and actress “repented,” probably 
speeded up by the 1992 earthquake. 
Dancers Amira and Sahar Hamdi as well 
as actresses Shahira, Afaf Shoeib, Soheir 
al-Babli, Sawsan Badr, and Soheir Ramzi 
veiled and stepped down. They were ac-
cused of being paid by “Islamist groups” 
and forced to defend their genuine de-
votion. Spiritual experiences featured 
less prominently in their stories. Con-
tacts with other repentant artists who 
gave religious lessons, preached, and 
invited preachers such as Omar Abd al-
Kafi were crucial.
In the mid 1990s, young singers Hanan 
and Mona Abd al-Ghani, and actresses 
Abir Sharqawi, Abir Sabri, and Mayar 
al-Bablawi caused another shock in the 
secular press when they announced 
their decision to veil and to step down. 
Yet most of them returned after a few 
years of religious study and contempla-
tion as a veiled actress or TV presenter 
of religious programmes. This inspired 
the older generation of stepped-down 
artists to return as well and presently 
Afaf Shoeib, Mona Abd al-Ghani, Soheir 
Ramzi, Soheir al-Babli, and Shahira are 
back on screen, the latter with a reli-
gious programme in Amr Khaled style. 
The latest case of “repentance” by an 
actress was Hanan Turk. Interestingly, 
she did not even retire but immediately 
started acting with a veil. Whereas ini-
tially it was difficult to find appropriate 
roles with a veil—it is forbidden on the 
Egyptian channels except in religious 
and historical plays—presently many se-
rials and programmes financed by Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf States find their way into the Egyptian homes of the 
lucky “dish”-owners. During my fieldwork in 2006, a new Saudi channel, 
al-Risala, was opened and many veiled artists I had interviewed paraded 
on the screen.
From Shaykh al-Shaarawi to Amr Khaled
The return of artists is partly related to a more relaxed religious dis-
course on art that emerged in the late 1990s. Whereas the repentant 
artists of the 1980s and early 1990s were mainly inspired by the con-
servative Shaykh al-Shaarawi and Omar Abd al-Kafi, around the turn 
of the century the moderate Islamist al-Qaradawi and young preacher 
Amr Khaled are favoured.
Shaykh al-Shaarawi (1911–1998) was venerated by many and died 
with an almost saintly radiation. He did not extensively tackle the 
topic of art but generally held that art is like a glass or knife. It can be 
used for good purposes or for bad ends. Female artists, however, are 
“itching the sexual instincts.” Shaykh al-Shaarawi was generally unfa-
vourable towards work by women except out of sheer necessity. Cit-
ing that God rather prefers a woman’s prayer to be in her house than 
in the mosque, in her room than in her house, and in her bedroom 
rather than in her room, he concluded that acting, even with a veil, is 
not permitted.
Since the 1980s, many Egyptian singers, 
dancers, and actresses, donning the veil, 
stepped down and publicly denounced art 
as shameful. Recently, such performers have 
reappeared veiled on screen. This article 
highlights the changing discourses on art that 
inform the artists’ choices. These celebrities 
have been instrumental in fashioning Islamic 
lifestyles suitable for the higher classes, 
a phenomenon which ultimately gave birth 
to a market for pious performances.
From repentance to 
Pious Performance
k a r i n  v a n  n i e u W k e r k
Uncommon Media
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Veiled artists reflect the changing 
tides, yet they have also been influ-
ential in changing this tide. When the 
general climate and discourses on 
art and gender were restrictive, they 
stepped down. Like many women they 
veiled, followed religious classes, and 
became pious. Yet, if celebrities choose 
to veil and to leave the spotlights for 
the mosque it has an enormous im-
pact on millions. They are trendsetters 
whether in fashion or veiling, in trendy 
lifestyles or in Islamic ways of lives. The 
early repentant artists started “Islamic 
salons,” a new venue for displaying re-
ligious sensibilities and socializing for 
the bourgeoisie which is nowadays a 
widely-spread phenomenon in upper-
middle class neighbourhoods. Sev-
eral studied at Da‘wah institutes and 
established themselves as preachers 
or—after returning to the screen—as 
televangelists such as Shahira. They 
decided which preachers were given 
the floor: first Omar Abd al-Kafi and 
later Amr Khaled. They started to work 
in Islamic businesses: Soheir al-Babli 
in Islamic fashion, Hassan Yusif started 
an Islamic film company, Hala al-Safi 
opened an Islamic school, and Yasmin al Khayyam has been influential 
in promoting preachers and in spreading Islamic charity to the higher 
classes. Artists have thus been influential in Islamizing the higher class-
es to which they themselves belong.6
When the market was open for Islamic recreation they were eager to 
return. When the options to return as a veiled performer increased, de-
spite the discouragement of the Egyptian regime, they were happy to 
develop Islamic productions. They are no longer 
repentant artists but multazim or pious perform-
ers. Soheir al-Babli stipulates conditions in her 
contract: only with a veil, not being touched or 
embraced by men, except 
for a kiss on the hand or the 
forehead if the play needs it. 
The texts should only con-
tain respectable dialogues 
on themes which make 
sense to people. Besides, 
the play should be about 
important themes in the 
Arab world and not a plain 
imitation of the West. Pious 
performers try to develop 
new Islamic aesthetics. 
When I asked them to men-
tion good pious produc-
tions, the list was still fairly 
short. The TV serial on the 
life of the venerable Shaykh 
al-Shaarawi, though, was 
one of them.
Uncommon Media
Dr Omar Abd al-Kafi was born in 1951 
and is a modern-looking shaykh with-
out the customary imam head-cov-
ering and caftan. He has become (in)
famous for his lectures on Judgement 
Day and “the torments of the grave.” 
He was banned by the government. 
Although in general he holds that art 
is creativity whose right is right and 
wrong is wrong, he calls cinema the 
devils’ home. Like Shaarawi his view 
on work for women is that the best 
place for them is to be protected at 
home.2
Dr Yusuf al-Qaradawi is considered 
a moderate Islamist belonging to the 
wasatiyya movement.3 He is very in-
fluential through new media such as 
al-Jazeera and Islam Online. Several 
pious performers presently consider 
his views on art authoritative and final. 
He firmly states that there is no conflict 
between piety and moderate enter-
tainment. Reasoning that everything is 
permissible except if it is clearly stated 
that something is haram, he infers that 
art is mubah, permitted. Diversion is 
essential to recreate but one should 
find a balance between religious obli-
gation and recreation. The present state of art, however, is totally cor-
rupt and needs immediate repentance. Also his gender discourse is not 
encouraging for working women. He considers the home their “great 
kingdom.” Anyone attempting to remove women from their kingdom 
in the name of freedom, work, or art is the enemy of women and is 
rejected by Islam.4
His younger colleague satellite preacher, Amr Khaled, is a rising star. 
In 1995, he entered the religious arena without re-
ligious education. He was banned by the govern-
ment but through his connection with Yasmin al-
Khayyam, he started working in her mosque. When 
he was faced with another prohibition, he left 
Egypt and now works for Dream TV and Iqra satel-
lite channel. Amr Khaled treats women as serious 
believers and is not against women’s participation 
in work on the condition that they are veiled. He 
emphasizes the immense importance of art. Beauty 
is essential in Islam and the Prophet enjoyed beauty 
and art. The Prophet did not reject the art present 
at his time but turned it into a tool for building and 
vitalizing the new community. This is according to 
Amr Khaled exactly what needs to be repeated at 
present. He calls upon all male and female artists to 
return and support the Islamic revival. 
Trend watchers and trendsetters
Although the discourse on art became more 
encouraging, the discourse on gender initially 
remained conservative. It is only with preachers 
such as Amr Khaled that ideas on gender, reli-
gion, and art are favourable for women’s veiled 
return to art. The current stage of Islamization in Egypt is described as 
“post-Islamist”: “thick in ritual, thin in politics” and mockingly referred 
to as “air-conditioned Islam.”5 After a period of violent clashes with 
militant Islamists, the broad piety movement that had been waxing 
in the form of mosque attendance, religious lessons, and religious 
literature and cassettes came to the fore. It did not only involve the 
lower and lower-middle classes but also reached the higher echelons 
of Egyptian society. Yet upon reaching the higher classes, the Islami-
zation of life style got a distinctive flavour. It became comfortable 
and not too strict. To be wealthy, have fun, and recreate is no longer 
perceived as contradictory to piety. The post-Islamist trend created a 
need and a market for art and recreation in accordance with Islamic 
sensibilities. 
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In the “journey of modernization,” 
starting from the last days of the Ot-
toman Empire and heading towards 
an unknown and indefinite future, 
Turkey has had to re-sketch the place 
of religion in different spheres. After 
declaring the Turkish Republic in 1923, 
the state elites gained some success in 
establishing secularism à la turca. In 
contrast to Western style secularism, 
which requires the total withdrawal of the state from religious affairs, 
the Turkish elites asserted that all religious activity would be controlled 
by the state alone. Another side to this success story occurred precisely 
as a result of these very interventions to regulate individual private re-
ligious spheres. For such interventions, aimed at transforming the daily 
practice of Islam within the public sphere, have rarely left any room 
for negotiation. Eventually, transformations in the 
daily religion occurred, but these were not in ac-
cordance with the original aims of the state elite. 
Due to the interventions, daily religion has found 
new and “modern” ways of expression far re-
moved from the expectations and wishful think-
ing of those so determined to remove the remains 
of the past.
Modernization is associated with the loss of 
enchantment because the most significant in-
dications of religion—such as heavenly miracles 
or devastating catastrophes caused by sinful-
ness—are now appreciated as natural and more 
important, explicable phenomenon. This article 
explores one of the instances in which the failed 
transformation proposed above, has been occur-
ring and has, in some points, resulted in a proc-
ess of re-enchantment. The re-enchantment is 
presented in new visual settings while employ-
ing the original religious plots—which are no 
longer visible to us—mainly as media represen-
tations of religious miracles. Television series in 
focus narrate little stories that make us believe 
in the (im)possibility of worldly justice and inject 
our sense of our own beings as a part of a greater whole in which 
good is rewarded and evil is punished. The following example, taken 
from Büyük Buluşma on Samanyolu TV, helps the reader to imagine 
the re-enchanting power of the media. 
Islamic science fiction 
A woman (called Yildiz) is about to wake up on a platform floating in 
the middle of the sky. A man dressed in white, called Amil, informs her 
that she is dead. In the background, there is rock music; some notes are 
highlighted by ney, a traditional (and spiritually symbolic) flute promi-
nent in Middle Eastern music. The verses remind us “you cannot escape 
from the final judgement; turn back and watch your life.” Amil starts 
to interrogate Yildiz about the life she has lived, while the audience is 
shown fragments from her past: She has a sick son, who is in need of 
constant care, but Yildiz is bored of being at home and asks her hus-
band to buy her a computer. Initially dismissing her request and com-
plaining at the vices of computers, her husband eventually gives in. It 
proves to be a turning point in Yildiz’s life. Subsequently, she starts to 
neglect her duties at home and becomes increasingly engrossed in the 
Internet. The treacherous qualities of the net soon reveal themselves. 
Her net contacts deceive and swindle her, and Yildiz dies while trying 
to trace them back. 
Amil confronts Yildiz with the mistakes 
she has made; she, in response, admits 
her guilt, repents and asks for forgive-
ness. Thereupon, all those who had 
prayed for the deceased woman fol-
lowing her death encircle her, and sud-
denly there is a splendour of light on 
the screen. A book gently falls from the 
sky into her arms rays of light erupting 
from it. Yildiz has been given the “book 
of light,” an indication that her soul will go to heaven. The episode 
ends showing Yildiz with a modest and devout smile walking towards 
a green-lit door. 
For the last six years, Turkish television channels have been flooded 
by series such as this one, all heavily influenced by Islamic ideas of jus-
tice. The trend first started with Sır Kapısı and Büyük Buluşma1 on Sa-
manyolu tv, followed by Kanal 7’s Kalp Gözü. These 
series were produced and broadcasted by Islamist 
channels.2 Interestingly, secular television chan-
nels also joined to benefit from this trend. As a re-
sult, in 2005, the same show was broadcast on five 
different Turkish channels: two Islamist and three 
secular ones. Secular channels changed the con-
tent to some extent, but the framework remained 
virtually identical. 
Secular counterparts 
Though secular television channels are known 
for their harsh criticism of the Islamists they did 
not hesitate to start their own versions of this 
kind of series. They show miniseries which are 
the replicas of Sır Kapısı or Kalp Gözü, even if they 
have refrained from copying the “science fiction” 
shows such as Büyük Buluşma, described above. 
The example below, taken from the programme 
Gizli Dünyalar shown on Show TV, serves to illus-
trate the links, similarities, as well as differences 
between the two types of channel. 
In one series, a girl named Aygul from the prov-
inces arrives in Istanbul to start living with her 
sister’s family. Soon she takes up a job as a secretary in an unnamed 
company. Aygul starts flirting with a young man from her office and, 
before long, the two are living together. This is problematic: extra-mar-
ital relations violate established norms concerning what is legitimate 
in Turkish society. The man had managed to persuade her to agree to 
this arrangement only after promising that he would marry her within 
a few months; unsurprisingly, he does not keep his promise. Rather, he 
starts gambling and courting other women, and paying less attention 
to Aygul. The series reaches its climax when Aygul tells her lover that 
she is pregnant, after which he kicks her out of the house. Even her sis-
ter does not accept to take Aygul back into her house. Aygul is home-
less until an old couple takes her into their home, and they end up be-
coming her new parents. When the couple dies, she and her son inherit 
their restaurant business. In the final scene, the boy’s father, physically 
disabled and looking miserable, comes to the restaurant and asks for a 
bowl of soup. The moral message is obvious: as a result of gambling or 
drinking, he has lost everything while Aygul has redeemed herself. 
These series were broadcast on Show TV, Star TV, and ATV. However, 
ATV’s interpretation was different. Here, the main focus was not justice, 
but love. Thus, whereas the others were concerned with showing how 
the unjust and immoral will eventually be punished, this one told the 
audience that lovers would always re-unite. The basic format of these 
Focusing on the increasing popularity of 
Turkish TV programmes in which miracles, 
morality, and virtue play prominent roles 
the author describes the re-enchantment of 
modern media in Turkey. Moreover, while in 
Turkey divides between the “religious” and the 
“secular” are assumed to be particularly stark, 
the TV programmes reveal a vibrant cross-
fertilization between Islamists and secularists.
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From the series 
Büyük Buluşma 
on Samanyolu 
TV
One conclusion to be derived from the content explored is the extent 
to which the religious and secular circles were able to influence each 
other under a system that is, to a very large degree, prone to polariza-
tion between the two. However, in this article another broader argu-
ment has been raised on the role the Turkish media plays in re-enchant-
ing by means of religious and/or moral appeal. Until these series, the 
appearance of Islam in the Turkish media was either through instruc-
tive and mostly unpopular documentaries or through news broadcasts 
that ridiculed most traditional practices and stressed their vices. Now, 
by contrast, religion has become popular in a modern sense. Yet, this 
article also asserts that this popularity, although relating to religion, 
does not solely concern religion. Rather, it concerns how the ability of 
symbols to appeal to our imagination has shrunk, so to speak, due to 
disenchantment caused by modernization. Thus, when the spiritual 
phenomenon becomes visible to our eyes, even in the television se-
ries, the audience enjoys some form of catharsis by identifying himself/
herself with the plot and the characters displayed. Accordingly, some 
sort of enchantment occurs. This is not the direct result of an actual 
religious experience—as used to be the case before modernity—but 
as a result of the reproduction and visualization of the virtual miracles 
of religion. 
series, however, did not differ at all. In 
all of them, a male announcer, filmed in 
a mysterious, historical setting swirling 
with mist, gives a short outline of the 
coming episode, and when this ends, 
he explains the story’s moral message. 
The plots are not original, but variations 
of main themes: a woman cheated on 
by a man, or a man trapped by alcohol 
or gambling. In the background, we in-
variably find figures of pity—such as a 
penniless old man or woman, denied 
the respect their age deserves. 
Symbols, judgement, 
and endurance 
In both the secular and Islamist ver-
sions, the narration relies on overt and 
often very similar symbols, yet the 
symbols correspond to different sets 
of values. Whether the images show 
styles of dress, manners of speaking 
and behaviour, or even new technolog-
ical devices, these are all placed on a 
moral continuum and valued either as 
good or bad. As a result of the pressing 
concern with morality, the characters 
in the series become caricatures acting 
within an “ideal” reality offering one-dimensional, therefore very famil-
iar, answers and guidelines. 
Drinking alcohol and smoking are obviously bad, whereas praying 
and obeying the elders are valorized practices. Symbols related to ideas 
of proper femininity centre on obedience to a husband or a father. In 
the Islamist broadcast, a woman is either veiled or moderately dressed. 
If she has a job, this is usually the result of poor economic conditions, 
and she is likely to face problems at the workplace. In secular interpre-
tations, women can work and this is not necessarily degrading. They 
may dress in a more liberal manner, but they are still responsible to 
their husbands. Symbols that signal moral deprivation include the ex-
cessive use of make up, consumption of alcohol, or loud laughter. The 
portrayal of a daughter typically includes complaints about her father’s 
poor financial status. In all cases, morally deprived women corrupt men 
around them. On the other hand, men are corruptible beings. 
Submission is another key symbol. In both types of series, the charac-
ters suffer from the cruelty of other people. Their misfortunes are pre-
sented as opportunities to pass God’s test on earth. Rather than com-
plaining, the unfortunate pray to God for salvation and forgiveness. It 
may take many years, even generations for eternal justice to take place, 
but in the end, God’s justice will prevail. This ultimate divine justice is 
contrasted with the justice of men or the state, which is open to abuse 
by the powerful. 
Symbols are also important for laying out the variables for the con-
cept of justice. While in Islamist series, the characters are judged ac-
cording to their compliance to the Quran and religious requirements, 
in secular counterparts, we do not see explicit references to religion. In-
stead they aim to present “controversial issues, with a mission to make 
conscience and reason meet.”3 Accordingly, the judgement is reached 
through a set of established moral rules derived from reason and con-
science. Yet, we know that the final judgement is identical in both, 
whether derived from moral or religious rules, which in effect overlap 
and construct each other.
Islamists vs. secularists/reality vs. fiction?
The original series shown on the Islamist channels are efforts to cre-
ate Islamic mythologies. Whether they reached their aim or not, they 
certainly succeeded in attracting public attention, and even triggered 
another section of society to create similar mythologies. Although usu-
ally stressing the virtues of secularism, the secular channels have found 
it appropriate to model their own series on those of the Islamist chan-
nels. They have softened the religious flavouring but preserved the un-
derlying morality of the original. This interaction was not one sided. 
The Islamists were also influenced by the modernist approaches, which 
we tend to associate only with the secular public.4 
Notes
1. The names chosen for these series also have 
religious or mysterious tones. Sır Kapısı is 
“Door of Secrets” and Kalp Gözü means “The 
Eye of the Heart.”
2. In this article, the channels established by 
Islamic capital are considered Islamic. The 
secular channels dealt with here are the 
ones that rely on other kinds of capital and 
those that define themselves as secular.
3. http://www.showtv.net.
4. For an account of the relation between 
modernity and Islam, see: Nilüfer Göle, 
Forbidden Mahrem: Civilization and Veiling 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1996).
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How can reporting be improved? Do 
emulation-worthy examples exist? This 
article argues that in his 1997 book, 
Covering Islam, Edward Said provides 
valuable insights into Islam and Mus-
lim life that could inform a meaningful 
reporting on the subject. It then points 
out one rare instance of reportage 
where those insights have been put 
to use—“Islamophonic,” a weekly info-
tainment podcast started this January 
by the London-based Guardian group 
of publications. By analyzing three re-
porting samples from the podcast, this 
paper illustrates how a sophisticated 
and responsible reporting about Is-
lamic issues and Muslims is realized by 
“Islamophonic.” I conclude by drawing 
attention to how such reportage could contribute to creating better 
inter-community relations in a multicultural and multiethnic society 
like the UK.
Understanding Islam
Edward Said suggests in Covering Islam that Islam ought to be viewed 
at least at three broadly different, yet inter-linked, levels. First comes 
the Quran itself, the central religious text of the faith. Second is the 
broad interpretive frameworks: the huge corpus of Quranic commen-
taries (tafsir), the various biographies of the Prophet (sira), the tradi-
tions of the Prophet (Hadith) and the various schools of Islamic law. 
Third, and the most crucial, is the level in “which the various ideologies 
have been lived, the practices to which they have been linked, prac-
tices which certainly influenced them if they 
did not inspire them.”1 That is, the realm of the 
faithful—Muslims. Here the faith exists in its most 
complex and diverse forms, making reductionist 
generalizations, based exclusively on the first two 
levels, meaningless. However, all the three levels 
constantly interact and cannot be mechanically 
separated from each other. Said also notes how 
Islam cannot be used as a catch-all term to explain 
everything that happens in the lives of Muslims. 
Representing Islam: the Islamophonic 
example2
Islamophonic started podcasting on 24 January 
2007. Anchored by a young Muslim woman report-
er of the Guardian, Riazat Butt, it is probably the 
first and only one of its kind produced by a Western 
media outlet not owned by a cultural or religious 
minority. A Guardian report (22 January 2007) an-
nouncing the launch of Islamophonic quoted Riazat 
Butt as saying that the podcast would “go beyond 
typical current affairs coverage” and would deal 
with “how Islam is lived and breathed in this country [Britain].” To date, 
in over 20 episodes (of an average 20 to 25 minutes duration), podcast 
once a week (on Wednesdays), Islamophonic has touched upon various 
issues related to Islam in Britain—extremism, alcohol use among Mus-
lims, Islamic music, Islamic finance and banking, Muslim magazines, dat-
ing culture among British Muslims, etc. Initially, each episode was roughly 
divided into three parts: reporting and discussion of a core issue (e.g., 
extremism), a “fatwa focus” (fatwas are given against specific questions 
asked by listeners), and a brief telephonic interview on current affairs with 
Above all, the 
reporting proves 
the impossibility 
of explaining all 
these diverse 
experiences using 
the term “Islam.”
a Guardian reporter based in a Muslim-
dominated country or region. Of late, 
this structure has been dropped and 
the whole episode focuses on one topic. 
Let us begin with the episode of 7 Feb-
ruary that focuses on alcohol and Islam. 
The reporter (Riazat Butt) goes to Man-
chester’s Curry Mile to interview young 
Muslims who celebrate the Islamic fes-
tival of Eid by getting drunk. The first 
two to five minutes of the podcast are 
particularly striking. People shouting, 
horns blaring, and ear-breaking music 
played on car stereos from a heavily 
crowded street (“thousands of young 
Muslims,” according to the reporter) and 
interviews with young Muslim revel-
lers alternate with recitations from the 
Quran by an imam of the local mosque and a local restaurant owner’s 
complaints about how business is affected by the revelry. The imam re-
cites a verse from the Quran and explains: “Islam is completely and to-
tally against involvement in any form or any shape with the business of 
alcohol. Islam outrightly [sic] and completely forbids alcohol usage.” The 
narrative cuts to the reporter asking the young Muslims on the street 
why and whom they drink with. One of them says: “We are away from 
home and we are just enjoying ourselves … See, all these lads, all are 
Muslims; they are good lads as well.” This is juxtaposed with a local res-
taurant owner’s angry remarks: “The way they [the youngsters] celebrate 
is just drive up and down the road flashing off their dads’ flashy cars … 
They block the traffic and our English clientele can’t come through …” 
But he, being a Muslim, has his own dilemmas. He said he sold alcohol 
in his restaurant, as did the majority of other Muslim-owned restaurants, 
and added that there was tension between restaurant-owners and their 
families, some of who refused to eat there. When the reporter asks if he 
serves alcohol to his Muslim customers, he replies: “The first thing they 
come in and ask you is ‘Is the food halal?’ and we say ‘yes’. After that they 
ask for a couple of pints of lager. And we don’t understand that logic …” 
Be it celebrating Eid or the demands of business, both provide contexts 
to flout clerical and textual directives outlawing alcohol as haram. Is al-
cohol an exception? What about other things traditionally considered to 
be haram? 
The episode of 28 February deals with Islamic music. It begins by 
playing samples of Islamic music from across the world and the re-
porter asks an imam for expert opinion on what the religion says about 
music. The imam explains: 
 Muslim scholarship has been divided about the rulings relating to 
music … The basis for those who feel or believe that music is forbid-
den in Islam is [a] number of sayings from the Messenger Muhammed 
(peace be upon Him) in which musical instruments are likened to the 
tools of Satan … There is a group that says that string and wind instru-
ments are forbidden; however, the drum is allowed. There is another 
school of thought that says that … contemporary music is forbidden; 
however, music which enhances one’s spiritual well-being is allowed 
… 
This is followed by an interview with a member of the British Nasheed 
group Shaam. He speaks about how his group is adapting Nasheed to 
British conditions: 
 Lot of the traditional material is from many hundreds of years ago. 
What we try to do is to introduce that to a Western, younger listening 
audience. Because we were born and raised in the West we add a con-
temporary touch to our music … We are trying to have a East meets 
West kind of thing.
n a n D a g o P a l  r .  M e n o n
Uncommon Media
The role of the European media in reproducing 
and reinforcing stereotypes and negative 
images of religious and ethnic minorities, 
particularly Muslims, is well documented. Since 
the media are the main sources of information 
about minority communities for majority 
groups, negative coverage has a potentially 
huge impact on inter-community relations 
in a multicultural and multiethnic Europe. 
While it remains important to challenge 
and falsify inaccurate and stereotypical 
media coverage, there is also a need for 
new forms of reporting that are sensitive to 
ambiguity and variation, and thereby promote 
intercultural understanding. The Islamophonic 
initiative offers an intriguing approach 
to such challenges.
islamophonic:
New Styles in Reporting
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ish conditions. In short, Islamophonic brings to light the rich 
tapestry of and the many shades of green in British Islam. 
The episodes on music and alcohol almost exactly follow 
Said’s model: What the Quran says and its interpretations 
(the imams’ interviews), and how the beliefs are lived and 
practised (the youngsters on the street of Manchester, the 
Nasheed group singer and the hip-hop artist). Islamophon-
ic’s style of presentation—for instance, in the episode on al-
cohol, continuously alternating among the comments of the 
imam, the revelry on the street and the complaints of the res-
taurant owner—is equally important. Fürsich writes: “Juxta-
posing the traditional dichotomized images with fluid hybrid 
images smashes the monolithic totality of those images.”3 
Especially noteworthy is the quotidian life of Muslims re-
vealed in the reporting examples. The revellers in Manches-
ter who have no qualms in identifying themselves as Mus-
lims, but also get drunk; the customers who ask for “halal 
food,” but also demand a “few pints of lager”; and the res-
taurant owner’s dilemma in reconciling his Islam with sell-
ing alcohol—all this points to a very personal negotiation 
and redefinition of the faith, relatively free from any overall 
control of clerical or textual authority, that exists in British 
Islam. Much of this happens also because of the changed 
circumstances (Western/English) that Muslims find themselves in. 
The Nasheed group singer and the Shia Islamic scholar speak about 
how English is being increasingly used to win new listeners and to 
bridge the divide among linguistically different Shia communities re-
spectively. To make sense of their religion in a Western context, they 
have to interpret their traditions and adapt them to the new situation. 
Above all, the reporting proves the impossibility of explaining all these 
diverse experiences using the term “Islam.” For instance, to understand 
the relative marginalization of the Afghani Shias within their own re-
ligious community, we have to understand their class status and lin-
guistic differences. No amount of theology or religious history alone 
can help us to get a full grip on it. Similarly, the music of Aki Nawaz 
has more to do with a very Leftist brand of angry, anti-establishment 
politics than Islam. And even if the imams, the revellers, the Nasheed 
group singer, and the Shia scholar, all lay claim to represent Islam, we 
will have to look elsewhere, to social and historical factors, to make full 
sense of the diverse behaviours and views.
Conclusion
The power of negative media coverage is such that even when prox-
imity with the “Others” (in our case, Muslims) is a reality—for exam-
ple, in a very multicultural and multiethnic society like Britain, where 
at least some sort of familiarity (e.g., at work places) with Muslims 
exist—it is insufficient to challenge that coverage. Poole writes: “To 
override dominant media representations, the contact must include 
dialogue that encourages an understanding of 
Islamic beliefs and practices, and a sense of how 
these are interpreted through one’s own cultural 
frameworks.”4 By focusing on aspects of Islamic 
life mostly ignored by the media, representing 
them in all their complexity and shunning the 
obsession with “problem-news” when it comes 
to Muslims, Islamophonic might be doing what 
Poole is recommending. Islamophonic’s reporting 
also raises some other important questions—Is 
there a British/European Islam, distinct from its 
counterparts in other parts of the world? What 
does it mean to be a Muslim in the UK/Europe? 
Moreover, significant is the fact that such an initia-
tive has been taken by a mainstream media group 
which owns one of the world’s most accessed and 
trusted newspaper websites. The result could be 
that the message would reach more people and 
have more impact. 
From the spirituality of the Nasheeds and Qawwalis the focus switches 
to heavily politicized Islamic hip-hop and rap. Aki Nawaz, mainstay of 
the band Fun-da-Mental, speaks about his politics, religion, and music:
 If you talk about politics in my work, politics comes before the music 
and it has always done. You find that politics, religion, culture, rac-
ism, identity, and sexism has [sic] always been a part of our vision … 
My work is a soundtrack to the reality that is going on around us … 
In terms of zikr, Allah and all that stuff, I think our work is based on 
love anyway, but we will go to war for love. That is the difference. We 
are not passive people. 
The problems inherent in jumping to conclusions about day-to-day 
Muslim life by relying solely on what the Quran or religious scholars 
say are clearly illustrated by the last two reports on alcohol and music. 
Now, let us look at another newsworthy aspect of Islam, especially so 
given the strife in occupied Iraq—sectarian differences. The podcast of 
21 March gave an overview of the historical and theological evolution 
of the Shias and delved into the lives of the Shia Muslims in Britain. 
Constituting a minority within a minority (Muslims in Britain), the Shiite 
presence in Britain dates back to only the early 1970s. After a detailed 
description of an Ashura ceremony among Birmingham-based Shias 
originally hailing from Afghanistan, a relatively underprivileged group 
within the community when compared to those who have an Arab and 
Persian background, the reporter speaks to an Afghani Shia community 
leader. He explains their situation: 
Community Leader: We don’t have any place [of worship] … We don’t have 
anybody to go to … and to ask … to help us to settle ourselves here. It 
is very hard. 
Reporter: What kind of help do you get from other Shia communities?
CL: The problem is the language. We cannot communicate very easily with 
them. They have their own culture, their own agenda … 
R: Is there a class difference as well?
CL: They [the non-Afghani Shias] are a settled community … Most of us 
are workers, not professionals … Working in factories, as security of-
ficers …
Accepting that the larger Shia community has to help the Afghans, a 
Shia Islamic scholar interviewed for the podcast points to an important 
emerging trend in his community in Britain: 
 [New] communities [are coming up] which are multiethnic, which 
focus their rituals and practices around the use of English … And there 
are particular centres, groups which are pretty much focused on the 
use of English to spread understanding of the faith. [This] includes the 
[celebration of ] Muharram rituals and the Ashura in English [with] the 
chanting of English verse along with flagellation. 
The British Islam that emerges from Islamophonic’s representation is 
quite complex. There is no overarching, one-size-fits-all definition to 
explain every aspect of British Muslim life; communities are divided and 
subdivided along class, ethnic and linguistic lines, making the talk of a 
monolithic “British Muslim community” impossible. At least some of the 
teachings of the faith are observed more in breach than in practice and, 
moreover, they have been adapted to meet the requirements of Brit-
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Before the advent of the satellite era, 
state television channels did (and con-
tinue to) broadcast religious genres of 
music during major Islamic religious 
holidays and during the month of Ra-
madan. These songs are usually older 
recordings in classical Arabic, with lim-
ited instrumental accompaniment and 
juxtaposed with montages of low-qual-
ity, stock images—primarily of natural 
phenomena, religious sites, Arabic cal-
ligraphy and the Quran, and Muslims 
engaged in ritual acts such as circu-
mambulation of the Kaaba in Mecca. 
Very rarely are the singer or singers (fre-
quently, but not always, male) depicted 
alongside the images, and in general, these videos convey a sense of 
solemn religiosity set apart from the ordinary rhythm of daily life.
In contrast, popular pan-Arab satellite music video channels such as 
Mazzika, Melody, and Rotana broadcast a new style of religious music 
video that combines lyrics in colloquial Arabic in praise of God and the 
prophet Muhammad with shababi (youth) style instrumental music 
and a new set of high-quality, commercially appealing images and sto-
rylines in contemporary settings. Although they are broadcast more 
frequently during the month of Ramadan and religious holidays, the 
most popular songs appear throughout the year and like other music 
videos that circulate within the prospering satellite television-mobile 
phone economy, they are available for downloading as ring tones or 
videos onto viewers’ cell phones. 
This new trend of commoditized religious music video emphasizes 
the dignity and humanity of Islam and its harmonious integration 
with a comfortable, middle-class modern lifestyle. The popular Egyp-
tian boy-band WAMA, for example, 
released in 2005 the popular hit Kan 
Nifsi (I wish that I could)—a slow, lyri-
cal song with no musical features to 
mark it as “religious” except the faint 
sounds of the call to prayer, set against 
the background noise of a busy metro-
politan city, that begin the track. Using 
the simple colloquial language that 
predominates in shababi music, the 
four university-aged members of the 
group take turns singing of their de-
sire to meet the prophet Muhammad, 
to sit with him and his companions in 
heaven, and to follow his path in Islam. 
Dressed in chic, all-white casual cloth-
ing, the boys wander among the golden sand dunes of a beautiful re-
mote desert location, the kind that financially comfortable Egyptians, 
not just foreigners, increasingly frequent as the national tourist indus-
try taps into the disposable incomes of the new moneyed classes creat-
ed by the neo-liberal economic policies of the past three decades. The 
video ends with the boys walking into the sunset shoulder to shoulder, 
conveying a message of brotherly unity in Islam. 
Pious performers
Although many of these stylish religious songs, like the WAMA video 
described above, present male homosocial worlds and bonding expe-
riences in Islam, others prominently feature female performers. One 
example is the song Illa Ibn Abdallah (Except for the Son of Abdallah), 
which was first aired around the time of the Prophet’s birthday cel-
ebration (Mawlid al-Nabi) in 2006. A response to the Danish cartoon 
controversy, the video features a large group of pan-Arab singers stag-
ing a peaceful protest to express outrage over the deroga-
tory treatment of the Prophet and their love and respect for 
the son of Abdallah (the name of Muhammad’s father) and 
his religion. The female performers, dressed in fashionable 
white veils, sing in the chorus and alternate with their male 
counterparts as soloists; one of the female singers, Sahar 
Fadil, is a “repentant” artist who used to star in racy music 
videos of the variety referred to by critics as “burnu klibhat” 
(porno clips). Another example from Ramadan 2006 is the 
song Khaliha ‘Ala Allah (Leave the Matter to God), performed 
by the respected Syrian singer Assala Nasry. The lyrics in 
Egyptian colloquial praise God and describe the singer’s 
pious love and devotion, and the images depict her (veiled) 
in prayer and (unveiled) reading the Quran, donating food, 
and breaking the Ramadan fast with her children in her well-
appointed home.
The growing number and popularity of songs such as 
these reflect the broader trend toward public displays of Is-
lamic piety and increased support for Islamist socio-political 
visions that have marked Arab society as a whole since the 
1970s. But it must be stressed that the Islamic Revival has af-
fected the Arab world’s entertainment industry, in particular 
its twentieth-century capital, Egypt, in a number of different 
ways (see Van Nieuwkerk’s article in this issue for further dis-
cussion of this history). In the 1980s and early 1990s, popular 
With the proliferation of music video channels 
on pan-Arab satellite television in the past 
decade, new styles of religious-themed videos 
are appearing on these alternative outlets 
to state television broadcasting. The growth 
and popularity of this new genre of religious 
music videos, along with “clean” cinema and 
Islamic satellite television productions, reflects 
shifting discourses concerning the arts and 
entertainment within the Islamic Revival. This 
essay explores the appearance of these music 
videos within a particular cultural moment 
in the Arab world in which popular culture 
is increasingly the site of ethical-aesthetic 
interventions aimed at moral and social reform. 
satellite tv & 
islamic Pop Culture 
in Egypt
P at r i C i a  k u B a l a
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The video of “al-Mu‘allim” juxtaposes English 
and Arabic lyrics in praise of the prophet Muham-
mad with images of a chic young photographer, 
portrayed by the singer, going about his daily life; 
working in his studio in his large, well-appointed 
suburban Cairo home; behaving kindly to his veiled 
old mother and the people in his community; and 
teaching religious lessons to children amidst the 
splendour of Islamic Cairo’s medieval architectural 
heritage. At the end of the video, he drives off in 
an SUV to undertake a solo photography shoot in 
the desert, and in the darkness, he captures on film 
the image of a glowing, Kaaba-like structure radi-
ating light, perhaps meant to symbolize al-nur al-
muhammadi (the primordial light of Muhammad). 
The video thus emphasizes the special role that the 
artist, in this case a photographer, plays in devoting 
his talents to expressing the beauty of God’s crea-
tion and the truth of the Prophet’s message. At the 
same time, he leads an exemplary and pious life in 
his community, all the while enjoying the techno-
logical amenities and comforts of a modern, cos-
mopolitan lifestyle. In this way, Yusuf’s on-screen 
music video persona embodies the ideals of al-fann 
al-hadif—tasteful art with an appropriate message 
of moral respectability and social responsibility—a 
persona that is reinforced by the singer’s interviews 
and website statements that articulate his dedication to working for the 
well-being of the Muslim ummah.4
Importantly, the music video as a genre on the whole stands in sharp 
contrast to the moral parameters of al-fann al-hadif in the minds of many 
viewers in the Arab world. The same satellite music 
channels that broadcast the new style of religious 
videos also broadcast a notorious and controversial 
style of racy music videos, labelled “burnu klibhat” 
(porno clips) by critics, that the genre of music vid-
eos as a whole has become associated with. While 
the banal lyrics, hackneyed tunes, and apolitical 
nature of these videos also draw criticism, what 
audiences and critics object to most are the reveal-
ing clothes and overtly seductive dance moves of 
the female models and singers. These sexualized 
representations of female entertainers, as well as 
the considerable outcry against them, echo the 
centuries-old debate in the Islamic tradition over 
the moral character of artists and the potentially 
dangerous affect of music and entertainment upon 
the subjectivity of the audience.5 As the work of 
Karin van Nieuwkerk, among others, demonstrates, 
female entertainers are regarded as particularly 
threatening because the improper display of their 
bodies is understood to easily tempt male specta-
tors to commit adultery and other grave sins.6
By adhering to the chaste conventions of the 
clean cinema genre, which many television dra-
mas as well as the new style of religious music videos also uphold, male 
and female entertainers and media personalities distance themselves 
from the cultural association of art with immorality. While representa-
tions of women as mothers, devout believers, and socially responsible 
members of their communities and the Muslim ummah are common 
in the religious videos, depictions of women in sexual relationships as 
lovers or even wives are scarce. In this way, female singers and mod-
els in religious songs mark out a respectable place for themselves in 
a media genre (the music video) that has become overwhelmingly as-
sociated with immodesty and sexual immorality. As the pop religious 
music video genre evolves with the shifts in the Islamic Revival and 
local and international political events, the gender dynamics currently 
on display can also be expected to shift. 
Egyptian cassette and television preachers such as Shaykh Abd al-Ha-
mid Kishk, Shaykh Muhammad Mitwalli al-Shaarawi, and Shaykh Omar 
Abd al-Kafi criticized Egypt’s national entertainment industry as mor-
ally harmful to Muslim audiences and called upon performers to re-
pent and retire from their professional activities.1 The Egyptian national 
press sensationalized cases of these “conversions” and attributed them 
to the spread of extremism and corrupting Gulf influences on Egyp-
tian society. While male stars were also part of this phenomenon, the 
veiling and repentance of female entertainers by far received the most 
attention in the popular media. Although most of these “repentant” fe-
male artists left the entertainment industry, a few, such as Huda Sultan, 
donned the veil but continued to work under conditions acceptable to 
their new sense of religiosity. 
Since the late 1990s, many male and female performers and media 
personalities have embraced the latter alternative. The advent of tran-
snational satellite television broadcasting in the Arab world in the late 
1990s has been accompanied by an explosion in private, commercial 
television productions with Islamic themes. Muslim scholars, popular 
preachers, and producers are actively encouraging the creation of alter-
native forms of pious entertainment, and the growth of religious satel-
lite television programming in the last decade has provided numerous 
opportunities for formally retired male and female media personalities 
to utilize their talents, but this time appearing in Islamic-appropriate 
dress as preachers, hosts of talk show programmes, or actors in televi-
sion serials with suitably pious roles. In the Egyptian cinema industry, 
a growing number of filmmakers, actors, and actresses, veiled and un-
veiled, refuse to visually portray sexually explicit scenes, appear in im-
modest clothing, or depict immoral characters. The new regime of mor-
ally disciplined representations in the “clean cinema” trend, as Egyp-
tian critics have dubbed it, marks a shift in the Islamic Revival towards 
regarding the entertainment industry as an arena for refashioning 
religio-ethical norms, particularly ones surround-
ing the female body and sexuality. In this new site 
of social reform, as Karim Tartoussieh notes in a 
perceptive recent analysis of clean cinema, “The 
sinfulness of art—a discourse that was prevalent 
in the 1980s and resulted in many female actors 
renouncing their artistic careers and veiling—is 
replaced by a different discourse that is amicable 
to popular culture as an arena of social purity and 
morality.”2 This alternative discourse of al-fann al-
hadif (purposeful art) stresses the responsibility 
of the artist to serve as a model of moral decency 
and to convey socially constructive messages in 
his or her work. 
Purposeful art
The increasing presence and popularity of re-
ligious videos on satellite music television chan-
nels reflects this shift towards al-fann al-hadif 
within the Islamic Revival’s discourse regarding 
entertainment and the arts, a discourse that is 
often reflected in the images and narrative tropes 
of the music videos themselves. Sami Yusuf’s hit 
music video al-Mu‘allim (The Teacher) provides 
an exemplary illustration of the proper relationship between artists, 
social responsibility, and Islamic piety articulated within the discourse 
of al-fann al-hadif. A transnationally acclaimed British artist of Azeri 
origin, Yusuf was introduced to Arab satellite television audiences by 
the popular preacher Amr Khaled, whose discussions on culture and 
media on the programme Sunna‘ al-Hayah (Lifemakers) encouraged 
young Muslim artists not to retire but to use their God-given talents 
in the service of strengthening the Muslim community.3 A trained mu-
sician and composer but not a native Arabic speaker, Yusuf’s albums 
blend primarily English lyrics with Arabic, Turkish, and Hindi vocals and 
refrains, and his compositions employ a range of Middle Eastern and 
Western instruments, rhythms, and melodic themes. The singer’s first 
album, entitled al-Mu‘allim (The Teacher)—referring, of course, to the 
prophet Muhammad—was released in 2003, and a music video of the 
title track was shot in Egypt using an Egyptian director (Hani Usama) 
and production team. It debuted on Arab music satellite television sta-
tions during Ramadan 2004, and it has remained one of the most popu-
lar and frequently aired religious music videos since then.
Notes
1. For an insightful analysis of these figures’ 
critiques of secular media culture, see 
Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: 
Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 
in particular, chapter 4.
2. Karim Tartoussieh, “Pious Stardom: Cinema 
and the Islamic Revival in Egypt,” Arab 
Studies Journal 15, no. 1 (2007): 41.
3. See the English-language transcript of this 
programme available from Amr Khaled’s 
official website, http://www.amrkhaled.net/
articles/articles406.html.
4. Sami Yusuf’s website—www.samiyusuf.
com—posts statements by the singer on his 
music and current events and also includes 
links to several interviews with the press.
5. A concise summary of medieval and modern 
Muslim viewpoints on this issue is found in 
Lois Al-Faruqi, “Music, Musicians, and Muslim 
Law,” Asian Music 17, no. 1 (1985): 3–36.
6. Karin van Nieuwkerk, “A Trade Like Any 
Other”: Female Singers and Dancers in Egypt 
(Cairo: The American University in Cairo 
Press, 1996).
[E]ntertainers 
and media 
personalities ... 
distance themselves 
from the cultural 
association of art 
with immorality.
Patricia Kubala is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Anthropology, University of California, 
Berkeley.
Email: pkubala@berkeley.edu
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islamic Charitable ngos
On 14 June 2007, ISIM, co-sponsored by HIVOS, organized the con-
ference “Islamic Charitable NGOs: Between Patronage and Empower-
ment.” The event provided a forum for scholars and practitioners to ad-
dress the perception held among Western development agencies that 
Islamic NGOs engage in charitable work primarily as a means of da‘wa, 
and that they reinforce dependence, rather than promote empower-
ment. 
In his presentation, Egbert Harmsen discussed if and how Islamist 
NGOs empower their beneficiaries. Drawing on a case study of Islamist 
NGOs in Jordan he suggested that although the Islamic discourse of 
these NGOs carries the message of individual and collective empow-
erment, they fail to actually challenge existing systems of patronage 
and dependency. Rather, Islamist NGOs seem to hold on to the (rather 
romantic) notion that empowerment will be realized through the har-
monization of Muslim society. 
Focusing on social activism in Egypt and Jordan, Sara Lei Sparre and 
Marie Juul Petersen discussed the role of youth in bringing about social 
change in Middle Eastern civil society. They questioned whether the 
empowerment the new movement claims to deliver is accomplished 
through encouragement of political participation of the underprivi-
leged and challenging patronage patterns and gender stereotypes.
Sheila Carapico shifted the focus of the debate to the relationship 
between Western donors and Islamic charitable NGOs. Exploring why 
only a few religiously oriented NGOs in the Middle East have succeeded 
in obtaining funds from Western donors, she suggested that a main 
reason for the reluctance of Western players is the perceived risk of 
sponsoring terrorism. In addition, Islamic NGOs are reluctant to accept 
“Western” money, as they do not wish to be (seen as) tools in spreading 
resented Western influence. Barriers set by Arab governments and the 
failure of Muslim NGOs to meet Western requirements further limit co-
operation. Nevertheless, she noted in her conclusion, cooperation be-
tween Islamic NGOs and Western based donors exist through indirect 
channels, even if the parties involved are not always aware of it. 
Attitudes to Islamic charities should be understood within the broad-
er framework of international politics, as Jonathan Benthall showed in 
his presentation. He argued that global changes after 9/11 have had 
negative repercussions on the functioning of Islamic charities. At the 
same time, the international community increasingly recognizes that 
Islamic NGOs are important grass root players with access to broad lay-
ers of the population. A possible way out of this deadlock would be to 
promote dialogue between various humanitarian cultures and to im-
prove the accountability of Islamic NGOs.
Khaled Hroub discussed links between the rise of Hamas in Pales-
tine and its decade long welfare activities. He noted that the drive 
to empower Palestinians against the occupation succeeded in build-
ing a horizontal network among Palestinians, thus freeing them from 
dependence on the occupiers. On the other hand, the by-product of 
Islamic empowerment and welfare is a deep rupture between the reli-
gious and the secular part of society.
Nigel Dower in his concluding remarks commented on some of the 
most debated issues of the conference. Do Islamic charities facilitate 
empowerment or dependency? Do they motivate social change or re-
inforce gender stereotypes and patronage? What is the impact of glo-
bal changes after 9/11 on the functioning of Islamic charities? He sug-
gested that charity as a means of da‘wa does not necessarily prevent 
empowerment of the underprivileged and that thus the goals of Islamic 
charities and Western donors do not need to be mutually exclusive.
Maria Kekeliova was an intern at ISIM from April through July 2007.
M a r i a  k e k e l i o v a 
“We are doing innovation and not ijtihad,” said Nasr Abou Zayd in the 
discussion in the morning session, meaning by ijtihad something that 
is limited to fiqh only.1 However, people striving for equal rights for 
women may wish to go beyond this. This may vary from endorsing a 
historical critical approach to tradition, as Abu Zayd does, to raising 
the question of whether taking human rights conventions as a point of 
departure is strategically more effective in advancing women’s rights 
than the reinterpretation of religious texts. 
This and similar issues were addressed at the ISIM Conference on “Re-
defining Boundaries: Muslim Women and Religious Authority in Prac-
tice,” organized in cooperation with the Amsterdam School of Social 
Science Research in Amsterdam on Sunday 24 June 2007. The purpose 
of the conference was to bring together some leading female Muslim 
intellectuals and activists to explore the theme of Muslim women and 
religious authority. The speakers were Asma Barlas (Ithaca College, New 
York, USA), Amel Grami (University of Manouba, Tunis, Tunisia), Qudsia 
Mirza (University of East London, UK), Lily Zakiyah Munir (Centre for 
Pesantren and Democracy Studies, Indonesia), Ceylan Pektaş-Weber 
(Al Nisa organization for Muslim women and youngsters, The Neth-
erlands), and Nayereh Tohidi (California State University Northridge, 
USA). The conference formed part of the ISIM research programme “In-
dividualization, Fragmentation of Authority, and New Organizational 
Forms among Muslims in Europe,” which is funded by the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research NWO.
The Quran is “what God has chosen to give us” and constitutes for 
Asma Barlas the basis of her academic and spiritual endeavours. Lily 
Munir considered ijtihad, “free and independent thinking to arrive at a 
juristic ruling on issues over which the Quran and Hadith are silent,” as a 
strategically important tool for women’s empowerment and change of 
Muslim society in general. Similarly, according to Amel Grami, women’s 
emancipation in Muslim societies can be achieved only by changing 
the terms of the theological-juridical debates and developing “fresh” 
interpretations of the Quran. She emphasized, however, that in her ex-
perience voices calling for legal reform in favour of women are often 
silenced and she wondered if the time was ripe for cooperation of 
secular women and Islamic feminists. Qudsia Mirza also recognized 
the importance of “feminist interpreters of the scripture.” However, she 
pointed out, among others by equating Islamic feminists to Islamists, 
that it is important to realize that the strategy of locating gender equal-
ity within Islam has its limitations and may not result in equality for 
all women in the Muslim world. Ceylan Pektaş-Weber, approaching the 
theme of the conference from a different angle, explored the mean-
ing of khilafa (vicegerency or agency) for women from a theological 
perspective. Religious authority is for her an important tool in the fight 
against inequality and injustice, but acquiring it should not become a 
goal in itself. This, she argued, would do no justice to Islamic views of 
agency. Nayereh Tohidi exemplified all of the above views very clearly 
in her warning against sectarianism: she emphasized the importance 
of openness towards, and cooperation between, women activists of 
various ideological inclinations.
Nathal Dessing is Researcher and Educational Coordinator at ISIM.
Email: n.m.dessing@isim.nl
Notes
1. A shortened version of Asma Barlas' paper appears on page 32 in this issue. In 
conjunction with the conference, the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company NMO 
produced a series of television documentaries on Asma Barlas, Amel Grami, Lily 
Zakiyah Munir, and Nayereh Tohidi. A master class on the theme of the conference 
led by Asma Barlas and Nayereh Tohidi was held in Leiden on Monday 25 June 2007.
redefining Boundaries
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– Umut Azak (Visiting Fellow)
 Sacred Spaces of Secularism: Neo-
Kemalism and Transformation of 
State Rituals in Turkey
 1 September – 30 November 2007
– Cédric Baylocq Sassoubre 
(Visiting Fellow)
 Imam Tareq Oubrou and Young 
French Muslims: Anthropology of 
Religious Negotiation in a Context of 
Reform of Islamic Law
 1 September – 31 December 2007
 
– Carmen Becker (ISIM/Radboud 
Ph.D. Fellow, funded by the 
Netherlands Organization for 
Scientific Research NWO)
 Salafism: Production, Distribution, 
Consumption, and Transformation 
of a Transnational Ideology in the 
Middle East and Europe
 From 1 September onwards
– Ernesto Braam (Affiliated Fellow)
 Islamic Reformism as a Global 
Phenomenon and its Impact on the 
Three Predominantly Malay Muslim 
Provinces of South Thailand
 1 August – 31 December 2007
– Alexandra Brown (Junior Fellow)
 Diversity and Uniformity: The 
(Re)Presentation of the Muslim 
Canadian Community
 1 September – 30 November 2007
– Kamenko Bulic (Visiting Fellow)
 Bosnian Islam at a Crossroads: 
Islamic versus Secularist Factors in 
Current Post-War Developments in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
 1 September – 30 November 2007
– Sheila Carapico (Visiting Fellow)
 Mission Democracy: Mixed Messages 
to the Middle East
 1 – 31 October 2007
– Ramin Karimiyan (Visiting Fellow)
 Iranian Journalists’ Associations: 
A Survey on their Function and 
Performances: 1997-2007
 1 September – 31 December 2007
– Michiel Leezenberg (Sabbatical 
Fellow)
 Genealogies of the Modern Muslim 
World
 1 February 2007 – 31 January 2008
– Brigitte Maréchal (Visiting Fellow)
 European Muslim Brotherhood 
Members as an Argumentative 
Network: Production, Relationships, 
and Change 
 6 October 2007 – 31 March 2008
– Julie McBrien (Visiting Fellow)
 Imagining and Enacting 
Womanhood in Kyrgyzstan
 1 September 2007 – 31 January 
2008 
– Eric Roose (Visiting Fellow)
 Recent Developments in Dutch 
Mosque Designs and Muslim 
Identities
 1 August – 31 December 2007
– David Waines (Visiting Fellow)
 The Past in the Present: Muslims and 
“the Other”
 1 September – 31 December 2007
ISIM is pleased to announce the winners 
of the first ISIM Review Young Scholar 
Awards. The jury made its selection 
based on the quality and originality of 
papers and their suitability for publica-
tion in the ISIM Review. The first prize of 
€ 1,500 was presented to Nandagopal 
Menon for the paper “Islamophonic: 
New Styles in Reporting”; the second 
prize of € 1,000 went to Sophie Lem-
ière for her contribution “Apostasy and 
Islamic Civil Society in Malaysia”; and 
the third prize of € 750 went to Philipp 
Bruckmayr for his essay “Cambodia’s 
Phum Trea as Mirror Image of Religious 
Change.” All prize-winning essays are 
published in this ISIM Review issue.
28 September 2007 – 31 January 2008
Exhibition
Multiple M: Moslims, Mode, en Muziek
Organizer: Imagine IC, inspired by ISIM research
Venue: Imagine IC, Amsterdam
ISIM Lecture Series at Utrecht University:
1 November 2007
Accommodating European Muslims:  
The Role of Pluralism, Law, and Liberal Politics
Lecture by Maleiha Malik
22 November 2007
Shaping the Future of Islam in Norway:  
Religious Revival and Identity Politics 
among Muslim Youth and Students in Oslo
Lecture by Christine Jacobsen
29 November 2007
Power, Knowledge and Discourse in a Transnational Muslim 
Organization-Network: The Case of the Milli Görüş
Lecture by Werner Schiffauer
13 December 2007
Ibn ‘Arabi Meets New Age? Sufism and Sufi Spirituality in the West
Lecture by Suha Taji-Farouki
21 February 2008 – 24 February 2008
Workshop
Transnational Circuits: ‘Muslim Women’ in Asia
Convenor: Annelies Moors
Organizer: Social Science Research Council
Venue: International Conference on Inter-Asian Connections, Dubai
12 March 2008
Workshop
Everyday Cosmopolitanism:  
Living Together through Communal Divide
Convenor: Asef Bayat
Venue: 9th Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence & Montecatini Terme
I S I M  P H . D .  A N D  S T A F F  S E M I N A R S
Venue: Leiden University
– 23 October 2007
 Patronizing Women
 Lecture by Sheila Carapico
– 6 November 2007
 Constructions of Islam in the Canadian Public:  
Multiculturalism and the Controversy of Religious Arbitration
 Lecture by Alexandra Brown
– 20 November 2007
 Islamic versus Secular Currents in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Lecture by Kamenko Bulic
– 4 December 2007
 French Muslims and Islamic Reform:  
Tareq Oubrou and the Local Context
 Lecture by Cédric Baylocq Sassoubre
– 18 December 2007
 Iranian Journalists’ Associations:  
A Survey on their Function and Performances, 1997–2007
 Lecture by Ramin Karimiyan
 For more information on these and other events please consult the ISIM 
website or contact the secretariat at info@isim.nl.
I S I M  E V E N T S
N E W  F E L L O W S
ISIM Review
Young scholar awards
Erratum
A minor error occurred in ISIM Review 19.  
Last-minute language corrections altered the 
intended meaning of a sentence in Jouili’s article 
(p.33, before last paragraph). In the printed 
version it reads as if the author argues that 
da’wa was understood by the involved women 
as “cultivation of virtues,” while instead these 
women understood it as “representing Islam.”
ISIM E-News
This summer ISIM launched 
the ISIM E-News, a digital news 
bulletin that provides up-to-date 
information on our research 
projects, publications, upcoming 
events, and fellowships. For free 
subscription to the e-news, simply 
see ‘publications’ on the ISIM 
website www.isim.nl.
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ISIM/Conference
M a r t i j n  D e  k o n i n g In September 2007, Roel Meijer and Martijn de Koning of ISIM and Rad-
boud University Nijmegen organized a conference on “Salafism as a Tran-
snational Movement.” This conference brought together international 
experts on Salafism to explore the ways in which Salafi movements have 
been successful in maintaining and disseminating their global message 
while adapting to the local. Twenty-one papers were presented before 
an audience of sixty, mostly, journalists and policymakers. The first day 
focused on the concepts of Salafi transnationalism and a critical debate 
on the works of Salafi activists, which highlighted the contribution of the 
intellectual dimension of Salafism to its success. Thomas Hegghammer’s 
presentation critically analyzed the term “Jihadi Salafism” proposing a 
new typology of militant Islamist actors to capture the different political 
behaviours of the different Salafi movements. Contributions dealing with 
Salafism in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf region 
emphasized the local context. 
On the second day, an examination of the expansion of Salafi move-
ments in the West Bank, Gaza, and Palestinian camps in Lebanon showed 
that the flexibility of Salafi movements in merging the universal mes-
sage of Salafism with local circumstances was critical in their prolifera-
tion in different areas of the world. The paper presented by Hugh Rob-
erts revealed the importance of being critical of voices ascribing specific 
political manifestations to Salafism, as local regimes often manipulate 
these movements for their own political ends. Presentations on Salafism 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, 
Ethiopia and Tanzania expounded the interplay between Salafi thought, 
ethnicities, and local politics and culture. This interplay results in plural-
ism that is intensified through the role of the Internet that is instrumental 
in the successful spread of Salafi movements, as became all too apparent 
in Reuven Paz’s contribution. 
On the third day, presenters again emphasized the importance of local 
and regional contexts and dynamics—documenting the competition 
between different Salafi movements as well as rising tensions within 
those movements over legitimate representation. Discussing the case 
of Indonesia, Noorhaidi showed that these tensions can lead to frag-
mentation of Salafi organizations. Another scenario unfolded in Paki-
stan where, as Miriam Abou Zahab pointed out, the Deobandi and Ahl-e 
Hadith partly merged with local movements. The rivalry between move-
ments at the local and global level also brought about a competition for 
constituency as apparent in the French case. Again the Internet plays an 
important role, as Ruud Peters showed in his analysis of the Dutch case 
of Theo van Gogh’s assassin who, despite a limited knowledge of Arabic, 
was able to spread and justify his violent interpretation of Salafism. 
Questions such as why Salafi movements are successful cannot be un-
derstood from the perspectives of the religious and political authorities 
of these movements or the political and societal circumstances alone. Ex-
perts showed how Salafists in the UK, France and the Netherlands actively 
create their own notion of what the correct Islamic beliefs and practices 
are and how they engage with global and local Salafi doctrines. Martin 
van Bruinessen closed the conference by summarizing the main themes 
of the conference and by bringing forward that the deliberation seemed 
to revolve around the relationship between the global and the local. The 
importance of the local context and the various ways in which individual 
Salafists engage with the different movements rendered the discussions 
on conceptualizing “Salafism” into a complicated matter that merits ex-
pansion.
A selection of the papers will be published by Hurst Publishers.  
The programme of the conference can found on the ISIM website.
salafism as a transnational Movement
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ISIM/Publications
isiM Book series
The ISIM Book Series on Contemporary Muslim Societies 
is a joint initiative of Amsterdam University Press 
(AUP) and ISIM. The Series seeks to present innovative 
scholarship on Islam and Muslim societies in different 
parts of the globe. It aims to expose both the distinctive 
and comparable aspects of trends and developments 
in Muslim societies, bringing together expertise in 
anthropology, sociology, political science, social history, 
cultural studies, and religious studies. 
The editors invite monographs and edited volumes that 
are both theoretically informed and grounded in empirical 
research. Proposals will be reviewed by experts in the field, 
under the direction of an international editorial board. 
Titles from Amsterdam University Press in the U.S. and 
Canada are distributed by the University of Chicago Press.
For more information about the Series, please contact 
Dennis Janssen at review@isim.nl. Guidelines for book pro-
posals and manuscripts are available at www.isim.nl.
Editors
– Annelies Moors
– Mathijs Pelkmans
– Abdulkader Tayob 
Editorial Board
– Nadje al-Ali
– Kamran Asdar Ali
– John Bowen
– Léon Buskens 
– Shamil Jeppie
– Deniz Kandiyoti
– Muhammad Khalid Masud
– Werner Schiffauer
– Seteney Shami
– Lynn Welchman
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n	Sindre Bangstad
 Global Flows, Local 
Appropriations
 Facets of Secularisation and Re-
Islamization among Contemporary 
Cape Muslims
In this dissertation Bangstad explores 
processes of secularisation and re-is-
lamization among Cape Muslims in the 
context of a post-apartheid South Af-
rica in which liberal and secular values 
have attained considerable purchase 
in the new political and social elites. 
Fractured by status, ethnicity, and reli-
gious orientation Cape Muslims have 
responded to these changes through 
an ambiguous accommodation with 
the new order. This study explores this 
development through chapters on con-
versions to Islam among black Africans 
in Cape Town, Cape women’s experi-
ences with polygyny, Cape Muslims and 
HIV/AIDS, the status of Islam in a Cape 
Town prison in the post-apartheid era 
and on contestation over rituals among 
Cape Muslims. 
Sindre Bangstad was ISIM Ph.D. Fellow 
from 2003 to 2007.
G E R A R D  C .  V A N  D E  B R U I N H O R S T
XXX
ISBN 978 90 5356 946 7
‘ R A I S E  Y O U R  V O I C E S  A N D  K I L L  Y O U R  A N I M A L S ’
XXX
I
S
I
M
 
D
I
S
S
E
R
T
A
T
I
O
N
S
IS
IM
   GERARD C. VAN DE BRUINHORST
‘R
AISE YO
U
R
 VO
ICES AN
D
K
ILL YO
U
R
 AN
IM
ALS’
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n	Gerard van de Bruinhorst
 ‘Raise Your Voices and Kill Your 
Animals’
 Islamic Discourses on the Idd el-Hajj 
and Sacrifices in Tanga (Tanzania)
This research analyses how groups of 
people in Tanga discursively construct 
Islam by animal slaughter. Central to 
the project are the sometimes conflict-
ing tendencies of grounding ritual 
practice in authoritative texts and 
constructing ethnic, social, and reli-
gious identity through ritual practices. 
The discourse on and the practice of 
daily animal slaughter at the abattoir, 
sacrifice as part of the annual hajj, the 
slaughter of sheep after the birth or 
death of a child, and the Swahili New 
Year sacrifice all reproduce assump-
tions of what Islam and Islamic behav-
iour should be. 
Gerard C. van de Bruinhorst was ISIM Ph.D. Fellow 
from 2000 to 2006.
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A S S O C I AT I O N S  I N  J O R D A N  B E T W E E N 
PAT R O N A G E  A N D  E M P O W E R M E N T
Eg b e r t  H a rm s e n
n	Egbert Harmsen
 Islam, Civil Society and Social 
Work
 Muslim Voluntary Welfare 
Associations in Jordan between 
Patronage and Empowerment
 
This study analyses Muslim voluntary 
welfare associations in Jordan from 
the perspective of civil society theory. 
It pays special attention to the role of 
religious faith and discourse in their 
social activities. These organizations 
are initiated by citizens and reflect their 
values and convictions. Their activities 
and discourses serve to an important 
extent as government policy goals such 
as the preservation of social and politi-
cal stability and public order. They also 
help to preserve patterns of patronage. 
However, patronage does not necessar-
ily rule out any kind of socioeconomic 
and cultural empowerment of under-
privileged groups. Moreover, political 
sentiments of protest and opposition 
can play a role under the surface. 
Therefore, these voluntary associations 
represent a highly imperfect and frus-
trated, but nevertheless real, motivated 
and changing civil society. 
Egbert Harmsen was ISIM Ph.D. Fellow 
from 2001 to 2006.
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n	Bhikhu Parekh 
Europe and ‘the Muslim Question’ 
Does Intercultural Dialogue Make 
Sense?
A large section of European opinion be-
lieves that Muslims present a long term 
political and cultural threat. Professor 
Parekh argues that this view is deeply 
mistaken. There is, nevertheless, a small 
underclass, mainly young, which is 
deeply alienated from both their paren-
tal and European cultures. They are in 
Europe but not of it, and have no com-
mitment to it. A dialogue between the 
Muslim communities in general and the 
host societies is therefore necessary. It 
has its limits and we should not expect 
too much from it. However, there is no 
alternative to it. 
Bhikhu Parekh is Professor of Political Philosophy at 
the University of Westminster, United Kingdom. 
All ISIM publications 
published by AUP can 
be ordered online 
through www.isim.nl 
or www.aup.nl or by 
email: orders@aup.nl.
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Editors’ Picks
Schooling Islam: The Culture and 
Politics of Modern Muslim Education 
Edited by Robert W. Hefner and 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007 
Since the rise of the Taliban, madrasas 
have drawn much negative attention 
but there has been a dearth of 
serious studies placing the role of 
these institutions in a more balanced 
perspective. This collection of calm 
and thoughtful essays focuses on the 
conservative and moderate mainstream 
of Islamic education, from medieval 
madrasas to the modern schools of 
Turkey’s Gülen movement and Muslim 
educational institutions in Britain; from 
core traditions such as India’s Deoband 
and Egypt’s Azhar to the madrasas of 
Mali, Morocco and Indonesia.
Voices of Hezbollah: The Statements 
of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah
Edited by Nicholas Noe
London/New York: Verso, 2007
The first major book that brings to 
an English-speaking readership the 
speeches and interviews of Sayyed 
Hassan Nasrallah, the longstanding 
Secretary General of the Lebanese 
movement Hezbollah, currently one of 
the most popular Arab-Muslim leaders 
in the Arab world. This book is a crucial 
contribution to the understanding of 
the man and the movement. 
The Islamist. Why I Joined Radical 
Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside 
and Why I Left
By Ed Husain
London: Penguin Books, 2007
One of the more interesting examples 
of ‘confession literature’ by former 
members of Islamist movements. In 
his student days, “Ed” (Mohammed) 
Husain was a leading Hizb ut-Tahrir 
activist in Britain. He describes in 
lively detail the inner workings of this 
movement, the debates with rival 
Islamic movements and the way the 
Hizb gained control of the Muslim 
associations at various university 
campuses. After a few years, he 
returned to the Sufi-tinged, peaceful 
Islam of his parents. 
The Long Partition and the Making 
of Modern South Asia 
By Vazira Fazila—Yacoobali 
Zamindar 
New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007
This admirable book traces the history 
of north Indian families divided by 
the partition of India and Pakistan. 
Based on oral histories and extensive 
archival research, Zamindar draws 
out the resistance, bewilderment, and 
marginalization of Muslims as they 
came to be pushed out and divided 
by both emergent nation-states. In 
doing so the book unravels the - often 
chaotic - processes by which national 
difference is constructed in places 
where it was the most blurred.
Les mondes chiites et l’Iran
Edited by Sabrina Mervin
Paris: Karthala, 2007
A collection of essays by (mostly) 
French scholars on Shii communities 
of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Gulf, 
Turkey, Central Asia, Senegal, Lebanon 
and Iraq and their relations with 
post-revolutionary Iran. Some of 
the chapters analyse major political 
movements such as Hizbullah and 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers; others 
on Shii minorities’ precarious relations 
with their Sunni surroundings. 
Interviews with influential thinkers 
and essays on contemporary religious 
debates conclude the volume.
The Five Percenters
By Michael Muhammad Knight
London: Oneworld Publications, 
2007 
An account of a group that splintered 
from the Nation of Islam in 1963, led 
by a man named Allah, who taught 
that black men are gods. Since their 
leader's murder in 1969, the group 
has grown in number and influence, 
and its membership includes many 
celebrated rap artists. Knight's account 
demolishes the myths about the Five 
Percenters, based on a careful reading 
of written sources and interviews with 
members, including many companions 
of the movement's founder.
Arts
Mecca2Medina is the most popular 
Muslim hiphop group in the UK. Their 
work expresses self-confidence and 
pride, relating of both European and 
transnational Islam. The three British-
African band members, who are converts 
to Islam, offer their vision of a good 
Muslim to raise awareness and pride 
among Muslim youths and to promote a 
positive image of Islam.
This is also the case of Pearls of Islam 
who play nasheed: songs supported 
by percussion. For the two Caribbean 
women “their love for their religion is 
the most important thing.” The Pearls 
represent the new trend of pious 
Muslimas expressing their religious 
commitment via music.
From 4 till 6 October ISIM hosted the 
“Return of the Poets” concert tour 
featuring Mecca2Medina and Pearls 
of Islam. The tour was organized in 
cooperation with Kosmopolis Rotterdam 
and Fatusch Productions. 
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Photo Commentary
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In the summer of 2007 
Iraqi artists started 
a campaign to paint 
Baghdad’s newly 
constructed security
block walls. 
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